Problems of Communism

JANUARY–FEBRUARY 1974

THE USSR AND EUROPE
Adam B. Ulam
Robert Legvold

Finnish Communism
John H. Hodgson

East European Socialization
Ivan Volgyes

Soviet Filmgoers
Felice D. Gaer

Book Reviews
Vojtech Mastny
J. F. Brown
Z. M. Fallenbuchl
Ted Friedgut



PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Problems of Communism

1

JAN-FEB 1974 VOL. XXIII

Problems of Communism is a bimonthly publication. Its purpose is to provide analyses and significant background information on various aspects of world communism today. Opinions expressed by contributors (as well as geographical boundaries and names used in articles and illustrations) do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Government. Communications on all matters *except* subscriptions should be addressed to the Editors, *Problems of Communism*, US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, 20547.

SUBSCRIPTIONS: Within the United States, annual subscriptions or single copies of *Problems of Communism* may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402. Price per copy: $1.20. Subscription price: $6.90. Outside the United States, *Problems of Communism* may in most cases be obtained free of charge by writing to the nearest office of the United States Information Service. The journal can also be ordered directly from the US Government Printing Office for foreign mailing, at a price of $1.50 per copy and $8.65 per subscription.

COPYRIGHT: Reproduction or republication of texts from *Problems of Communism* is permissible, and no claim of copyright is asserted. However, the Editors request that they be advised of reprint usage and that source credit be given both to the authors of individual articles and to *Problems of Communism*. Should textual items in the journal ever be subject to a claim of copyright, such claim will be clearly stated. Graphics and pictures which carry a credit line are not necessarily owned by *Problems of Communism*, and users bear responsibility for obtaining appropriate permissions.

INDEXING: Articles in *Problems of Communism* are indexed, *inter alia*, in the *Social Sciences and Humanities Index*, the *Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales* (all sections), and *ABC POL SCI.*

EDITOR: Paul A. Smith, Jr.
MANAGING EDITOR: Marie T. House
ASSOCIATE EDITORS: Clarke H. Kawakami, Wayne Hall, David E. Albright
DESIGNER: Joseph D. Hockersmith

The USSR and Europe

1 The Destiny of Eastern Europe
by Adam B. Ulam

13 The Problem of European Security
by Robert Legvold

34 Finnish Communism and Electoral Politics
by John H. Hodgson

46 Political Socialization in Eastern Europe
by Ivan Volgyes

56 The Soviet Film Audience: A Confidential View
by Felice D. Gaer

BOOKS

71 The Historian's Craft and Cold War Statesmanship
by Vojtech Mastny

76 The "Socialist Commonwealth"
by J. F. Brown

80 East European Economics
by Z. M. Fallenbuchl

85 Jewish Nationalism and the Soviet System
by Ted Friedgut

Cover: Chancellor Willy Brandt and a West German honor guard welcome Leonid I. Brezhnev upon the Soviet leader's arrival in Bonn on May 18, 1973, for bilateral talks. Photo by Wide World.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The USSR and Europe

EDITORS' NOTE: The last few years have witnessed major changes in the European environment, one of the most significant of which has been the emerging détente between the Eastern and Western segments of the continent. This development raises some key questions about the attitudes and perceptions of Soviet leaders. Why have they entered upon the course of détente, and how does détente bear upon the specific and continuing problems that they confront in the European context? The following articles address themselves to these questions within the framework of discussions of two important issues that have long been with Moscow: Soviet relations with Eastern Europe and the Soviet approach to European security. Mr. Ulam argues that the Kremlin's desire to preserve the USSR's position in Eastern Europe, but to reduce the risks involved in that position, figured prominently in Soviet motivations for moving toward a détente. Mr. Legvold inquires into the Soviet leaders' conceptions of European security and the influence of these conceptions on their policies in the various current international security and arms-control negotations; he concludes that while Moscow verbally maintains that Soviet security is compatible with that of Western Europe, it is unwilling at present to go beyond offering the West European states "contextual" as opposed to "basic" security.

The Destiny of Eastern Europe

By Adam B. Ulam

Preoccupied by the Middle East and by the sinuosities of the Sino-Soviet conflict—not to mention the titillating US domestic drama—we in the West have tended to forget about Eastern Europe. Yet here are to be found eight Communist states with a combined population of more than 120 million, with substantial economic potential, and with, in some cases, quite developed industrial structures. Six of them are members of the "socialist camp" and manifest a considerable, though varying, degree of subordination to the Soviet Union. One, Yugoslavia, has managed to emancipate itself from Soviet tutelage but remains mightily affected by developments within the Soviet bloc. And there is, finally, the *enfant terrible* of the group, tiny Albania, which ever since 1960 has defied the Communist colossus that enabled its rulers to come to power and without whose protection the little country would probably have been devoured by its South Slav neighbors.

All in all, it is not a very happy family, certainly not a stable one, and its begetter and protector

Professor of Government and Director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University (Cambridge, Mass.), Mr. Ulam has written extensively on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. His major works include Stalin: The Man and His Era, *1973, and* Expansion and Coexistence: History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967, *1968.*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

obviously has quite a delicate task in seeking to maintain authority over it. (For all their opprobrious language about their erstwhile Soviet friends, even Albania's rulers are still—paradoxically and to the Kremlin's undoubted fury—beneficiaries of Soviet power. Could, for example, the USSR countenance the overthrow of communism in Albania? Perhaps yes, but Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu are betting that it would not, or at least that their own people think it would not!) Furthermore, the management of this troublesome aggregation constitutes one of the most important challenges to Soviet statesmanship, for what happens in Warsaw or East Berlin could one day have a major impact on domestic politics in the Soviet Union.

Yet events in Eastern Europe, their actual and potential effect on Soviet policy, seldom attract much attention in the West. Occasionally a dramatic event —Budapest in 1956, Prague in 1968—creates a public stir; but then the sensation subsides, and the headlines of Western journals revert to the familiar tales of our own troubles and the "real" international crises. Serious international problems in the opinion of an American or Frenchman scanning his daily newspaper are the problems in the news, and those masters at public relations, the rulers of the USSR, wisely refuse to let outsiders in on their truly serious dilemmas unless they are forced to do so by events or by discourteous challengers (as in the Sino-Soviet dispute). Moreover the problems of the Western alliance, of NATO, weigh heavily on the consciousness of US policymakers and occasionally inhibit their initiatives and complicate their overall policy; hence, there is a tendency in the West to overlook the dilemmas and anxieties that the USSR's system of alliances—which is to be sure, quite different in nature from that of the United States—produces for Moscow.

However, the Soviet Union's approach to and goals in the current negotiations concerning reductions in the conventional forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact deployed in Europe and concerning a general European peace treaty cannot be understood apart from Moscow's fears and hopes with respect to the eight Communist states of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, as well as its overall policy objectives. Indeed, the very character and future of US-Soviet détente depend not only on what happens in Peking and the Middle East and on the USSR's crops and computer industry, but also on the effect that the Russians gauge such détente will have on the area they have now dominated for more than a generation. Hence, we must pay more attention to Soviet aims for this part of the world. And that, in turn, should impel us to take a deeper interest in the broad complex of political and social trends in the area.

Causes of Soviet Preoccupation

In undertaking to explore these matters, perhaps we might usefully begin by contemplating briefly why Eastern Europe has loomed and continues to loom so large in Moscow's foreign policy calculations. To a considerable extent, the explanation lies in cold realities, for the area has been the scene of many momentous developments which have changed the course of the world Communist movement. It witnessed, for example, the first defection from the Stalinist monolith by a ruling Communist party (Yugoslavia, 1948); the first national revolt against communism (Hungary, 1956); an attempt to transform a Communist regime into a more liberal mold (Czechoslovakia, 1968); and a partly successful endeavor by a Communist state to achieve autonomy in internal and external policies while remaining within the "socialist camp" (Romania, post-1963).

For the historically-minded, suggestive and entrancing precedents and perspectives for these developments may be found in earlier periods. Throughout the 19th century—in fact, until 1914—the Russian revolutionary movement often drew examples and gathered strength from similar movements among the non-Russian nationalities of the Tsarist Empire. The Empire's foreign ventures and wars, even when successful, were almost invariably followed by periods of reform or of heightened radical activity at home. Thus, there was a poignant reminder as well as a certain symbolism in that miniscule demonstration by a handful of Soviet dissenters in Red Square in August 1968 to protest the invasion of Czechoslovakia. And today the center of the new empire, though infinitely stronger and more tightly controlled than that of the Romanovs, is still not invulnerable to the echoes of protest and rebellion in its dependencies.

Certainly, events in Eastern Europe that many people now remember as little more than minor episodes of intra-Communist politics have had far-reaching consequences in and for the USSR. We might recall, for instance, that Nikita Khrushchev's mismanagement—as it was termed by some of his

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

colleagues—of the 1956 upheavals in Poland and Hungary had serious domestic repercussions: his position became precarious, and in the summer of 1957 he was almost overthrown.[1] The disarray in the Soviet satellite empire in 1956 also undoubtedly played an important role in postponing the Sino-Soviet breach, compelling the Kremlin to pursue a course during the next two years which can only be described as appeasement of Peking. In January 1957, Chou En-lai toured the East European capitals and lent the USSR badly-needed support by strongly endorsing Soviet foreign policy and the Soviet Union's claim to be head of the socialist camp. This Chinese support, however, did not come free. Not only did the USSR extend additional economic and technological aid to China, but in October 1957 Moscow likewise pledged to turn over a sample atomic bomb to Peking—a promise on which the Russians ultimately reneged in 1959.[2]

To cite just one more illustration, Wladyslaw Gomulka's replacement by Edward Gierek as head of the Polish regime under the pressure of a workers' rebellion and Gierek's subsequent initiation of a policy of greater attention to consumer interests have evidently influenced Moscow's thinking about the USSR's domestic situation. Can it be merely a coincidence, for instance, that since 1971 the Soviet leaders have grown more solicitous of their own consumers—that in 1972 they felt constrained to purchase large quantities of foreign foodstuffs and are prepared to do so again rather than let their people suffer the full consequences of a lean year in agriculture as in the past?

In part, however, Moscow's great concern with Eastern Europe has stemmed from more subjective considerations. The Soviet Union's fears with respect to its sphere of dominance have never been properly understood by many in the West. In the years immediately after the inauguration of the Marshall Plan, the Kremlin was haunted by the suspicion that the economic reconstruction of Western Europe, and of Germany in particular, was not an end in itself but the opening ploy in a grand American strategy designed to wrest away the Soviet Union's World War II gains. The USSR might be confronted with a series of wars of liberation—

Chinese Premier Chou En-lai arrives in Budapest aboard a Soviet airliner during his January 1957 tour of Eastern Europe in support of Moscow's policy. From left, Hungarian party chief János Kadar, Chou, Marshal Ho Lung, and Ferenc Munnich.

—Photo by MTI (Hungarian News Agency) via Eastfoto.

with West Germany providing military help, perhaps even "volunteers" in the manner that Soviet and Chinese actions in Korea have made familiar—and Moscow would face the cruel dilemma of having to decide whether or not to risk direct intervention while still in a position of nuclear inferiority vis-à-vis the United States.[3]

Although the West's inactivity at the time of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 went far to dispel these rather fantastic suspicions, a less dramatic scenario replaced them in the anxious minds of the Kremlin leaders: the growing prosperity of Western Europe and the success of the Common Market, juxtaposed to the relative economic stagnation of the East, might prove a fissiparous influence on the Communist commonwealth. That there was, and to a certain extent remains, at least some substance to this fear seems demonstrable. Economic considerations did provide the major impetus for Romania's divergence from the Soviet line beginning in the early 1960's, and the unhappy state of the Czechoslovak economy under the Novotny regime did trigger the Dubcek experiment of 1968.

[1] This was not the only reason, to be sure, for the attempted coup by the so-called "anti-party group," which included most of the Stalinist old guard such as G.M. Malenkov, V.M. Molotov, and L.M. Kaganovich.

[2] See this author's *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1967*, New York, Praeger, 1968, p. 599.

[3] This point is discussed at greater length in *ibid.*, pp. 436-40.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In retrospect—to repeat—it is remarkable how Soviet feelings about the vulnerability of the USSR's East European empire have affected the general thrust of Soviet policy and how little these fears have been appreciated in the West. For all the American rhetoric about the "rollback" of communism, for all the US celebrations of "captive nations' weeks," no responsible politician in the United States since the onset of the 1950's, if not earlier, has believed that the status quo in Eastern Europe would or could be changed through any action of the West. Yet, from Moscow's perspective, the very considerable risks that it undertook in the successive "Berlin crises" [4] were justified on the ground that a sovereign West Germany equipped with a new army, and perhaps eventually with nuclear weapons, would pose a threat—as much psychological as military—to the whole Soviet position in Eastern Europe (and not just to the German Democratic Republic). The Warsaw Pact, after all, came into being only after West Germany had been admitted to NATO, and it was plainly intended to serve as a bargaining counter in any negotiations to undo or restrain the remilitarization of the Federal Republic.

(In view of Soviet preoccupation with the German danger—or, more precisely, with the possibility, as Moscow saw it, that the West German "revanchists" might serve as a cat's paw for the American "imperialists" and further American designs on the Soviet sphere—it is ironic that the actual challenge to the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe emerged from an entirely different quarter. It was China's conflict with the USSR, once their disagreements became acute and public in 1960, that enabled Romania to gain a modicum of independence in her foreign policy and little Albania to skip the leash entirely. Since this conflict surfaced openly, Peking's aim in Eastern Europe—just as elsewhere—has been to stir up the maximum amount of trouble for the Soviet Union, to encourage Communist regimes and parties in the area to sever or at least to attenuate their links with Moscow. In pursuing that goal, it has been uninhibited by ideological scruples, even though its main professed objection to Soviet policies has been their allegedly "revisionist" character. Certainly, Communist semantics would have dictated that the Chinese classify Ceausescu's regime in Romania—notably its policies vis-à-vis the West and its stand on the Middle East conflict—as revisionist, but Bucharest's intransigence with respect to Moscow and its cordial attitude toward Peking have more than compensated for such peccadilloes.[5])

The Intervention Dilemma

The importance that Moscow has attached to Eastern Europe, of course, has imparted added significance to the quandaries that Eastern Europe has created for the Soviet leaders, and these have been enormous. Indeed, what to do with Eastern Europe has constituted one of the most perplexing problems on the Kremlin's agenda in the post-World War II years—in a way more perplexing than the problem of China. In the case of China, the risks involved in any drastic attempt to solve the problem have been so great that they have virtually impelled Moscow to bide its time; moreover, the traditional recourse of politicians faced with an insoluble difficulty is to wait until "something happens." This approach, to be sure, has visible merits, for the Chinese situation contains elements of potential flux. For instance, Mao's disappearance from the scene cannot be much delayed; and his departure could produce a long struggle for power, perhaps a civil war. Or his successors could even decide to seek a détente with the USSR. Nonetheless, such developments do not require Soviet *action*. In contrast, Eastern Europe has presented dangers to the USSR—small as they have been or have seemed to be to outsiders—which have called repeatedly for Soviet responses and posed a painful dilemma: to intervene or not to intervene?

This dilemma has been with the Kremlin at least since 1948. In February of that year, Stalin finally decided to pressure Czechoslovakia to preserve and strengthen its Communist regime—a move not entirely without peril in view of the still fresh nature of the USSR's war wounds and the tremendous power of the United States. But then he declined, no doubt regretfully, to intervene militarily against Tito later

[4] The quotation marks here reflect the author's view, which runs contrary to the generally-accepted interpretation in the West, that the main Soviet objective in squeezing the city was not to seize West Berlin but to force the conclusion of a German peace treaty that would legitimize the status quo in Eastern Europe and place constraints on the remilitarization of the Bonn republic.

[5] Why, then, the apparent incongruity of Chinese hostility toward Yugoslavia, which was so pronounced in the late 1950's and throughout the 1960's? In the first place, Yugoslavia had already asserted its independence of the USSR; thus, Mao's regime had no great incentive to woo Tito. Secondly, in Peking's eyes, Yugoslavia's internal policies and her far-reaching rapprochement with the West—in contrast to the more cautious approach of Romania—set a bad example for Communists everywhere. To top things off, Tito and Khrushchev, for all their occasional tiffs, became close allies.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the year. In 1956, Stalin's successors—as we know from Chinese Communist indiscretions in 1963[6]—agonized over their decision to suppress the Hungarian national revolution through military means. Previously, only a hair's breadth had separated them from a similar decision with respect to Poland, *i.e.*, from acting to prevent Gomulka's return to power there.

The Soviets again found themselves hesitant about how to react to developments in Czechoslovakia beginning in January 1968. In the present context, it is important to stress two aspects of the unfolding situation. First, the Kremlin believed that Czechoslovakia, like Hungary in 1956, would not remain the sole aberrant Communist regime—that events there would set in motion similar trends elsewhere in Eastern Europe, with a "falling dominoes" effect resulting.

Second, while the Soviets had marched into Hungary fully realizing that they would encounter armed resistance, it is quite conceivable—in fact, probable—that the 1968 coup in Prague would not have taken place had the Russians thought that the Czechs and Slovaks would fight. Indeed, the consultation at Cierna, where virtually the whole Soviet Politburo met in unprecedented fashion with the top leaders of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, was obviously designed to enable the Russians to assess the degree of risk involved in intervention. Evidently, the conclusion that they reached was overoptimistic, for the pro-Soviet, "healthy elements" of the Czechoslovak party proved unable to take over control *immediately* after the Soviet invasion. Nevertheless, the principal deduction that the Soviets drew from the Cierna meeting turned out to be well-founded:

[6] See "The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves—Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU," *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), Sept. 6, 1963, quoted in William E. Griffith, *The Sino-Soviet Rift*, Cambridge, Mass., The M.I.T. Press, 1964, p. 395.

Soviet President N. V. Podgorny, CPSU General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, and USSR Premier A. N. Kosygin, third through fifth from left at the table, are flanked by other members of the CPSU Politburo and Secretariat as the Soviet party leadership grapples with the situation in Czechoslovakia under Alexander Dubcek, seated at the center on the right side of the table, during talks at Cierna on July 31, 1968.

—Photo by Finda of CTK (Czechoslovak News Agency) via Eastfoto.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Soviet tanks parade in Prague after Warsaw Pact maneuvers in 1972.

—Photo from CTK (Czechoslovak News Agency) via Eastfoto.

there was no armed resistance, and after an interval the pro-Soviet elements and "realists" replaced Alexander Dubcek and his fellow reformers.

(In the wake of Czechoslovakia's tragedy, the Western press made a great deal of fuss over the so-called Brezhnev doctrine, yet—with all due respect to the current General Secretary of the Soviet party—Brezhnev can hardly claim credit for the doctrine or practice of intervention in the affairs of Communist countries whose regimes Moscow deems to be straying from the straight and narrow path of authoritarian socialism. The doctrine was a well-recognized principle of Soviet policy and behavior in Stalin's time and remained so in Khrushchev's. Only when a practice of long standing is challenged do Soviet rulers feel constrained to enunciate its theoretical justification; hence, it may be significant that the name of the *current* leader of the Soviet Union has become associated with the Monroe Doctrine of the Communist world.)

Prior to the Czechoslovak imbroglio, East Europeans' memories of Budapest had been vivid enough for 12 years to discourage any internal revolt or popular pressure against authoritarian communism (in the case of Albania and Yugoslavia it was of course the regimes themselves which initiated new policies, and these bore mainly on foreign rather than domestic issues); but barely a year and a half after the blossoming of the "Prague spring," there was another popular revolution in the area. To be sure, the Polish events of 1970 do not seem to belong in the same class with the Hungarian rebellion and the Czechoslovak reform movement; however, from the Soviet perspective, they were in a way more significant and more threatening. Popular discontent triggered by the Communist regime's oppressive economic policies erupted in a series of spontaneous uprisings—and it was workers who rioted against the policies of the "workers' state." Admittedly, the Polish party responded quickly to the danger: Gomulka and his closest associates, once national heroes but now dully oppressive bureaucrats, were ousted, and a more responsive leadership was installed in power under Gierek. The new ruler reduced food prices and engaged hastily in what Americans would describe as a dialogue with the workers. Yet, this episode could hardly have been comforting to the Kremlin. It caused another alert for Soviet troops, and food shipments had to be rushed into Poland. Above all, there was the disturbing precedent of a shift in leadership and policies in answer to popular pressures.

This brief rundown of the major challenges that Soviet leaders have confronted in Eastern Europe over the years affords some indication of the character of the problems and difficulties that the USSR's imperial position in the area has posed for it. These have been rendered especially acute, it is worth noting, by the Soviet Union's ideological link with the "people's democracies." The absence of such a link with Finland has enabled the Kremlin to adopt a more relaxed attitude about domestic policies there, despite the fact that the USSR exerts as much influence on the foreign policies and even certain aspects of the economic policies of its little neighbor as it does on those of its Communist protégés. Thus, Finland's free press and *genuine* multiparty system do not disturb the Politburo, while any sign of the emergence of such political forms in, say, Czechoslovakia immediately becomes a clear and present danger. From the Soviet point of view, the "Finlandization" of Eastern (as opposed to Western) Europe is inadmissible, and the preservation of Communist regimes within the USSR's sphere of domination remains an absolute imperative in Moscow's eyes.

Approaches to Eastern Europe

Beset by the quandaries already described, the Kremlin has long searched for a way at least to ease them. Since Stalin's death, in fact, it has sought a formula and policy which would enable it to preserve the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and their

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pro-Soviet orientation, while at the same time freeing the Soviet Union from the burden of constant supervision of their internal policies and the risks of intermittent military intervention in their affairs. The despot's successors did not miss the danger signals inherent in the East German riots of 1953. They concluded that the Stalinist system in the "people's democracies"—even more so than in the USSR—could be perpetuated only through terror on a scale which they felt unable to continue. So they not only permitted but urged the local Communist regimes to liberalize internal policies, and they drastically reduced the USSR's economic exploitation of the East European states.

Implicit in this new policy, it should be understood, was Khrushchev's conviction—if not, indeed, the conviction of the entire Soviet Politburo—that the former degree of Soviet supervision and exploitation was unnecessary as well as impossible to maintain. In Khrushchev's eyes, the ruling groups of East Europe, though enjoying greater internal autonomy and pursuing separate but parallel roads to socialism, would still, through the bonds of ideology and self-interest, feel constrained to follow the Soviet lead on fundamental issues of policy, both foreign and domestic. At the same time, the granting of increased autonomy to these groups would help them render Communist rule more acceptable to their peoples and would give the Soviet Union a new image —that of a friend and protector of its fellow Communist states rather than that of an oppressor.

The events of 1956 showed that such expectations were wildly overoptimistic. A drastic reversal of policy—*i.e.*, a return to Stalinist methods of governing the Soviet sphere—was of course out of the question, but Khrushchev's vision of a Communist commonwealth of nations united by voluntary bonds had to be modified. The Red Army once again became the main guarantor of Soviet interests and of ruling Communist regimes; however, many of the gains registered by the satellite nations between 1953 and 1956 were allowed to stand. For example, the most blatant forms of economic exploitation and internal oppression were discontinued. The state of affairs prevalent in Eastern Europe between 1957 and 1964, then, can aptly be described by a term applied to French politics of the Fourth Republic—*immobilisme*. There was no going back to the pre-1953 horrors; by the same token, any forward movement, whether on internal matters or in connection with relations with Moscow, was precluded by memories of Budapest.

From the Soviet point of view, nevertheless, the situation continued to be precarious, and by the early 1960's it was one of the factors pushing Moscow toward a basic reassessment of Soviet foreign policy and toward détente with the West. Acceptance of the status quo in Europe, it should be emphasized, constituted a central feature of the Kremlin's conception of such a détente. This would mean not merely Soviet acquiescence in the continued existence of a non-Communist West Berlin, but also Western recognition of the post-World War II boundaries in Central and Eastern Europe. The latter, in effect, would amount to Western acknowledgment of the legitimacy and permanence of Soviet gains in Eastern Europe.

To be sure, détente with the West would not be without certain risks and costs for the Soviet Union vis-à-vis the "people's democracies," for it could conceivably weaken the Soviet position in Eastern Europe. After all, the threat of alleged "German revanchism" had been a valuable Soviet asset in justifying the USSR's military presence and occasional intervention in the area, in securing the complete servility of the East German Communists, and in repressing any aspiration among the Poles and Czechs to follow Romania's, if not indeed Yugoslavia's, path. But the passage of time had robbed the German bogy of much of its propaganda value and credibility, and even though Moscow subsequently invoked it as a justification for the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the whole notion of NATO forces pouring into the plains of Bohemia and Moravia was by now fantastically anachronistic.

What was not fantastic, however, was the continuing attraction—especially the economic attraction—that the West had for the East. It was knowledge of a freer and more abundant life in the West, rather than the vision of American and German troops coming to the rescue, that fed the dissatisfaction of Poles and Czechs with their own regimes and with the Soviet protectorate. The danger to Soviet interests in this state of affairs could not be conjured away, but from Moscow's perspective there were ways in which it might possibly be rendered less threatening.

One of these would be to divorce the economic and what might be called the social discontent from any lingering hopes for a change in the *political* status quo. The formal recognition by the West of the legitimacy of that status quo would go far, according to the Kremlin's analysis, toward stripping the situation of its explosive potential, which neces-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sitated constant Soviet watchfulness and constant Soviet readiness to intervene militarily. Amicable relations between the USSR, on the one hand, and the US and the Bonn republic, on the other hand, would promote a feeling of "normalcy"—a realization on the part of both the peoples and the governments of Eastern Europe that any improvement or evolution in their lot would be possible only within a Communist and Soviet-approved framework.

Another related measure would involve allowing the East European countries to increase their economic and cultural intercourse with the West. With détente, such intercourse would tend to lose most of its anti-Soviet, and hence subversive, potential. In fact, the possibility of the extension of Western credits and other forms of economic help to Eastern Europe, which the Kremlin had heretofore seen as a threat to the Soviet position, would become not only acceptable but quite agreeable to Moscow. Such assistance would contribute to the stability of the local Communist regimes and perhaps indirectly to the Soviet economy! The West's acknowledgment of the political facts of life in Eastern Europe, in short, would enable the USSR not only to permit but even to encourage the governments and populations in the area to expand profitable contacts with the rest of the continent and with the US as long as they remained content to work "within the system."

Achievement of Détente

As already pointed out, the above considerations were serving as an impetus for the USSR to seek détente with the West as long ago as the early 1960's. That such a détente did not take place until a whole decade later was due to several circumstances. The most important was Moscow's conviction that it could not negotiate with the United States from a position of weakness—*i.e.,* by openly admitting both its nuclear inferiority and the full extent of its troubles with Peking. As Khrushchev characteristically put it,

If you and I come up to the imperialists carrying a cross and, praying on our knees, begin to implore them to be humane, they would laugh at us: they would see in this our weakness and their strength.[7]

Hence his bizarre scheme to—so to speak—"blackmail" the West into acquiescing to a détente by emplacing Soviet missiles in Cuba. Chastened by the resultant crisis, however, he would quite likely have embarked on a new and less "harebrained" approach to the West had he not fallen from power. His inclination to do so was certainly evident in his decision to conclude the partial nuclear test-ban treaty of 1963 and his contemplation, according to rumors rife just before his downfall in 1964, of a visit to the Federal Republic of Germany.

Even after Khrushchev's departure, it was not inconceivable that efforts aimed at bringing about a détente might have been forthcoming from Moscow, especially since the Brezhnev-Kosygin team soon discovered that the removal of their ebullient predecessor did not lower the temperature of the Sino-Soviet dispute. But then the US found itself massively involved in Vietnam. Despite some nervousness at first, the Soviet rulers had every reason to watch with equanimity American discomfitures in Southeast Asia and the debilitating effect of these on the US posture in Europe and on the whole edifice of the Western alliance. With Soviet nuclear strength vis-à-vis the US growing apace and the US's European allies becoming increasingly disposed to seek their own separate arrangements with Moscow, a détente appeared probable without additional Soviet initiatives and particularly without further Berlin crises or other dangerous improvisations such as putting nuclear missiles on a Caribbean island.

The events culminating in the détente in Soviet-American relations in 1972 are too familiar to require detailed recounting. From a historical perspective, however, we can see how greatly international politics is the art of timing. Twenty, certainly 25, years earlier, Western recognition of the territorial changes wrought by the war in Central Europe could have purchased significant Soviet concessions. Specifically, the Kremlin regarded the threat of a rearmed West Germany as serious enough that the USSR might well have considered the question of East Germany negotiable in exchange for the removal of that threat.[8] But the historical moment when the whole German problem might have been resolved in such a manner, with incalculable consequences for the rest of Central and Eastern Europe, passed some five to seven years after the end of World War II.

[7] *Pravda* (Moscow), Dec. 10, 1961.

[8] There is considerable circumstantial evidence that Stalin did not anticipate that the Soviet occupation zone would inevitably turn into a Communist state. For example, if he had been confident of such a development, the USSR would most likely not have insisted that so much territory had to go to Poland.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(Western statesmen, it should be stressed, cannot be faulted too much for ignoring these opportunities for bargaining. Both Stalin's posture of ominous isolation and the drama of the first Berlin crisis suggested that, far from being willing to negotiate and perhaps to agree on a unified, neutralized Germany, the USSR was still intent on expansion and further violations of the wartime agreements.)

By the late 1960's, such possibilities had become but a dim memory. Indeed, the shoe was now on the other foot. The West, in this case Washington and Bonn, had emerged as adherents of the status quo, in fact if not in public professions. US troubles, both at home and in Southeast Asia, and West Germany's fear that because of these Washington might be constrained to weaken its commitments to Europe combined to remove the last lingering traces of the Dulles-Adenauer position of "no compromise" on Germany. The new orientation received its formal expression in the *Ostpolitik* of Chancellor Willy Brandt.

Between 1970 and 1972, a whole complex of agreements concerning the two Germanies was reached, and these amount in effect, though not strictly in law, to a German peace treaty sealing the frontiers as they were arranged in 1945, denying to West Germany the right to independent ownership or manufacture of nuclear weapons, and acknowledging the legitimacy of the East German Communist regime. One might quibble about the last, just as one might assert that as of this date the US has not yet fully recognized the People's Republic of China. But what else could be implied by the agreement of the two Germanies to exchange representatives and the admission of both to the United Nations? What Khrushchev had sought to accomplish through threats, bluster, and oversubtle designs, the Brezhnev-Kosygin team managed to obtain through persevering and patient diplomacy.

In return for Western cooperation in the fulfillment of what had been a fundamental goal of Soviet foreign policy for more than a generation, the USSR agreed to respect the rights of the Western powers in Berlin. According to the agreement of the Four Powers,

Disputes are to be settled by peaceful means. . . . There shall be no use or threat to use force in the area.[9]

A cynic might argue that the Soviet Union has merely promised not to do something which the clear language of its previous agreements and pledges gave it no right to do and which, moreover, was fraught with considerable risks anyway.

At any rate, a new page in the chronicle of Europe has been turned. Will a future historian be able to add: "and East and West coexisted happily ever

[9] *The New York Times*, Sept. 6, 1971.

Walter Scheel and Otto Winzer, Foreign Ministers of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, respectively, attend the United Nations' General Assembly session of Sept. 19, 1973, the first full day of UN membership for the two states.

—Wide World.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet and East European Communist leaders confer in the Soviet Crimea in July 1973. From left, Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria, Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania, Edward Gierek of Poland, János Kádár of Hungary, Gustav Husak of Czechoslovakia, Leonid I. Brezhnev of the USSR, Erich Honecker of East Germany, and Zumzhagin Tsedenbal of Mongolia. At far right is Soviet Foreign Minister and Politburo Member Andrei A. Gromyko.

—Photo by TASS via Sovfoto.

after"? To attempt to answer this question, one must weigh how Moscow sees the recent turn of events.

We have already noted some of the dividends that the current Soviet regime hopes to derive from continuing détente; yet there are others as well. Moscow anticipates that the Conference on European Security and Cooperation could enlarge the whole network of East-West cooperation. Similarly, Soviet leaders feel that the talks on mutual reduction of forces in the region might lead to a diminution of the American military presence there and incidentally enable the USSR to devote a larger part of its military resources to the Far East. It is undoubtedly an oversimplification, however, to regard Soviet strategy in both sets of negotiations as directed toward some quite concrete and unalterable goals. To be sure, the Soviets would undoubtedly grasp at any opportunities that they perceive to weaken NATO, to attenuate ties between the US and other Western Powers; but the main thrust of their diplomatic offensive has been to present the USSR and its family of Communist states as good Europeans eager to reduce the level of armaments and tension in the area and to expand links between East and West. Privately, Moscow in all likelihood hopes that the resulting intra-European intimacy will go far to undercut the incentive for its newfound friends to pursue closer relations with Peking or to help in China's rapid industrialization.

Détente and the Future

If we turn to the central focus or our inquiry, how do the new Soviet posture and the current and continuing détente affect the future of the East European states? Soviet desires in this connecton have already been described: the reaction of the people and governments of the area should be a harmonious balance between resignation and hope—resignation that their political status is unalterable and hope that in other respects life will become freer and more rewarding materially. But do things look the same way from the perspective of, say, Warsaw, Sofia, or East Berlin? It is not very likely.

A considerable community of interests does exist, of course, between the local Communist regimes and the Kremlin. It is fair to say that not even Nicolae Ceausescu or Josip Tito would care to see Brezhnev or some successor preside over the liquidation of the Communist camp in Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the local oligarchies obviously differ in their conceptions of the desirable extent of Soviet power and influence in the area.

Albania—the "left-dogmatist" rebel, to borrow Communist semantics—probably remains unwilling to return to the Soviet fold in the absence of a very far-reaching Sino-Soviet reconciliation. Yugoslavia, or at least its current leaders, would like Soviet ties with other Communist states to follow the pattern of current relations between Moscow and Belgrade: fairly close ideological links, mutual consultation on international issues, and general adherence to the same foreign policy line, but no domination by one side. Among the members of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon—*i.e.*, among the unemancipated members

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



of the Communist family—Romania probably prefers the Yugoslav option.

At the opposite extreme is the East German regime, which no doubt deems that the whole trend of East-West rapprochment has already gone too far. To Honecker, as to Ulbricht before him, the Brezhnev doctrine affords a reassuring guarantee of political stability, and any dilution, not to mention repudiation, of the doctrine would be a calamity. Similar though not so intensive sentiments and fears probably color the thinking of the ruling groups in Warsaw, Budapest, Sofia, and Prague. None of these regimes has the same stake in the preservation of a certain irreducible minimum of East-West tension that the East German one does, yet each of them does rely ultimately on Soviet power for its self-preservation. Moreover, the inherent conservatism of the Communist elites in these countries was undoubtedly strengthened by the lesson of Czechoslovakia in 1968. For them, the Czech events provided a vivid demonstration that a precipitous experiment with internal reforms threatens the very foundations of a one-party state. A few more months and the same crowds that cheered Dubcek and his fellow reformers would have demanded and probably forced an end to the Communist monopoly of power. Therefore, how could even the most popular and progressive Communist regime ever feel secure unless it assumed that the Soviet Union would not tolerate its overthrow? And by the same token, to the conservative, doctrinaire mind, the successful intervention of the Warsaw Pact states in Czechoslovakia proved most reassuring. It was not only in Bulgaria that the intervention "brought comfort and a new lease of security to the party apparat"; [10] indeed, it undercut any possibility that one of the hitherto "obedient" people's democracies would try to emulate Romania's path in the near future. Even János Kádár's regime in Hungary, the least willing partner in the Soviet aggression, read the implication of the Czechoslovak episode quite clearly.

One should realistically keep in mind, then, that nothing that takes place at the European security conference in Helsinki or at the talks on mutual reduction of forces in Vienna will *by itself* alter the political reality in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union will not surrender its claim to intervene in the internal affairs of the countries of the area whenever it judges that the Communist character of the local regimes or their fidelity to the "motherland of socialism" is threatened. While the local regimes want to

[10] J. F. Brown, *Bulgaria Under Communist Rule*, New York, Praeger, 1970, p. 305.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

remove or restrict Soviet interference in their domestic affairs, they will not be able to eliminate it because in the last resort they need Soviet protection to stay in power. A reduction or even the removal of Soviet troops from, say, Czechoslavakia or East Germany cannot affect this picture in any foreseeable future, for the memory of what the USSR has done in the past and the conviction that it would act in the same fashion again in a similar situation, rather than the extent of Soviet military presence in this or that country, constitute the decisive factor in the thinking of the East European elites.

Even if the current situation in Eastern Europe cannot be expected to change dramatically as a result of détente, however, might it still not be affected by the enlarged network of East-West contacts in economic and cultural affairs that would ensue upon the successful conclusion of undertakings such as the Conference on European Security and Cooperation?

Western hopes in this regard (and of course they are shared by various groups in the East) have been perceptively summarized thus:

. . . by creating an increasingly dense web of joint political undertakings and functional cooperation in economic, scientific-technological, cultural and environmental affairs, the West can make it increasingly costly and difficult for Moscow to act out its inner preferences for neo-Stalinist policies toward the West, Eastern Europe, and its own population.[11]

Here, one ought to remember that many people in the West have long held similar hopes that the Soviet system—or, in this case, the pattern of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe—could be changed by osmosis, so to speak; but these hopes have almost invariably been disappointed. Perhaps a moment will come when some of the prophecies about the corrosive effect of "convergence," certain common traits of all "post-industrial" societies, "consumerism," etc., on Communist authoritarianism[12] will be fulfilled. There are, to be sure, forces of economic and social change constantly pushing against the walls of the authoritarian state. Yet the controlling factor has always been the political one. It took a new leadership of the Czechoslovak party—and let us not forget that this leadership was installed initially with Brezhnev's approval—to set the country on a new course; and in Poland in 1970, the Kremlin only permitted the shift in leadership and the new economic policies on the explicit understanding that these would not produce political by-products of the Czechoslovak variety.

It is at least premature, then, to expect that the increased volume of economic and cultural contacts will produce a diminution of authoritarian controls in the East or crucially affect the pattern of relations between the Communist states in the area and the USSR. In fact, the local regimes—like the Soviet regime during the last few years—may well tighten their ideological and political controls to protect themselves from any undesirable fruits of more extensive contacts with the West, and they may also be less willing to seek emancipation from their great friend and protector.

Are we therefore justified in accepting the inevitability of the realization of Soviet hopes with respect to the effects of détente on Eastern Europe, and in concluding that Eastern Europe will now become a placid backwater of the Communist world with none of the explosive potentialities of which we spoke at the outset of this discussion? Hardly. What we have tried to refute is the complacent assumption that the mere lessening of international tension and the increase of East-West contacts can or must bring a fundamental change in the state of affairs in the area. However, such a change could be triggered in the future, as it has been in the past, by a *political* event which affects the balance of power in Europe and thereby upsets the current balance of fears and hopes under which the East Europeans live. A new and drastic deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, a new struggle for power within the Soviet leadership, a revival of the drive for political unity and of the sense of common purpose that appeared to be budding in the early 1960's in Western Europe represent just some of the developments that could set the winds of change in motion in the East. And it is only then that the growing East-West intercourse would have an impact on the momentum of change.

[11] Franklyn Griffiths, *Genoa Talks Plus 51: Changing Soviet Objectives in Europe*, Toronto, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1973, p. 59.

[12] See, for example, Wolfgang Leonhard, *Three Faces of Marxism: The Political Concepts of Soviet Ideology, Maoism, and Humanist Marxism*, New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974, p. 370.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Problem of European Security

By Robert Legvold

Until West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* began to change the complexion of East-West relations, the question of the Soviet approach to the problem of European security scarcely seemed worth posing. Either because these relations remained thoroughly immobilized or because every Soviet initiative was regarded as self-evidently directed against Western interests—against the cohesion of the Western alliance, against the American presence in Europe, or against any erosion of Europe's division—few if any non-Communist specialists saw much point in exploring the subject.[1] Now, however, that era of immobility is passing, and the neglect can and should be overcome. Over the last four years, enough has changed in the interaction between East and West to justify a serious look at what Soviet leaders may mean by "European security" and how they may hope to promote it.

Anyone looking into Soviet conceptions of security in Europe immediately confronts a striking paradox. By the standards of the existing international system, no state would appear to enjoy greater security on the European continent than the Soviet Union. Yet it is the Soviet Union which is manifesting the greatest public concern over European security and pressing the hardest for international action on the issue. By contrast, it is the West European countries—the most fearful that the arrangements which have guaranteed them a remarkable degree of security over the last two decades cannot last much longer—that are showing the least eagerness to raise the issue.

The reasons why the Soviet Union should feel less threatened by the situation in Europe than at any time in its history are reasonably obvious. In the first place, the German problem—for years the core of East-West tensions—has been disposed of essentially in accordance with Soviet desires. Not only has Germany been left as Moscow wants it—within the Oder-Neisse, divided at the Elbe, and without nuclear weapons—but in the process the primary obstacle to general acceptance of the East European status quo has been removed. The West's acceptance of that status quo may be merely juridical, but for the Soviet leaders it represents a long step toward a genuine Western coming-to-terms with the reality of socialism in Eastern Europe. (They of course have this impression primarily because the Western powers have always meant their refusal to accept the postwar territorial status quo in Eastern Europe as a repudiation of the political changes there.)

In the second place, the prospects for the reduction of American power in Europe, so long sought by the USSR, must appear to the Kremlin to be better now than ever before in the postwar era. True, the reasons impelling Moscow to seek a diminution of that power have weakened. Since the USSR no longer needs to force a solution of the German problem by isolating the Federal Republic, the Soviet effort to deprive West German policy of US backing has lost all urgency; and at the same time the NATO alliance no longer boasts the same cohesion or significance

Mr. Legvold is Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University (Medford, Mass.) and author of Soviet Policy in West Africa, *1970.* *He desires to acknowledge the support of the American Council of Learned Societies and the helpful criticism of John Yochelson, of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, in the preparation of this paper.*

[1] Excellent Western studies of Soviet policy in Europe, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski's *Alternative to Partition* (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1965,) Thomas W. Wolfe's *Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970* (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), and Marshall D. Shulman's article, " 'Europe' Versus 'Detente,' " in *Foreign Affairs* (New York), April 1967, pp. 389-402, largely ignored the issue of European security in focusing on the Soviet approach to more immediate problems. Pierre Hassner's work was a notable exception: see, particularly, his remarkable "Change and Security in Europe," Parts I and II, *Adelphi Papers* (London), Nos. 45 and 49, 1968, respectively.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that it did in earlier periods of East-West confrontation. Nevertheless, to the extent that the Soviet leaders continue to view the Atlantic alliance as reinforcing both West European integration and American global power, they must be reassured by recent trends suggesting that the United States may soon be compelled to reconceive, and perhaps to trim, its preeminent role within the alliance.

Third, in contrast to the strained condition of the Western alliance, the Soviet leaders have reason to regard the state of their own alliance as reasonably tranquil and secure. Having brought the pace of change in Eastern Europe back under control, they presumably have considerable confidence in their ability to deploy their partners as they choose in the developing East-West dialogue. Not that they underestimate the importance of insulating members of the Warsaw Pact from the contaminating effects of détente; but in the short run the threat of excessively independent East European foreign and domestic policies evidently appears to them to be adequately contained by two factors: (1) the prophylactic effects of the Warsaw Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia; and (2) the evident disposition of the major Western powers to take care not to deal with Eastern Europe behind Moscow's back.

The fact that the Soviet Union, despite its strengthened security position, is the country making the most ado over the issue of European security raises a variety of complex questions. Does Moscow genuinely regard European security as an end in itself? That is to say, have the Soviet leaders concluded that the best way to serve their own national interests is to promote general European security because enhanced security for all European states will mean greater security for the USSR itself? More simply put, to what extent do they see a correspondence between Soviet security and European security?

Or, alternatively, is the Soviet leadership's campaign on behalf of European security merely a means to an end? More specifically, is it addressed to an unconfessed desire to bolster the stability of the Soviet East European empire? Is it calculated to promote the mutual benefits (primarily economic) of deepening East-West détente while securing the European front so that Moscow can deal more confidently with the challenge from China? Or, more ominously, is it a device to capitalize on the uncertain future role of the United States in Europe and to secure for the Soviet Union unilateral advantages that would inevitably heighten the *insecurity* of the other side?

In searching for answers to these questions, the present analysis will explore four main areas. First, we shall probe the meaning of the concept of European security for its Soviet proponents. If we assume that they are indeed talking about security and not something quite different, then security for whom and against what? And if they are not talking exclusively about Soviet security, what form of European security do they have in mind? Second, we shall sketch what might be an ideal Soviet vision of security in Europe, drawing upon statements of Soviet analysts in the few instances in which they have tried to elaborate a broad, long-range perspective on the security problem. Third, we shall examine the trends bearing on European security that Soviet experts expect actually to emerge over the next decade. Fourth and last, we shall explore the degree to which contemporary Soviet policies—in particular, the Soviet approaches to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the talks on Mutual Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)—are designed to assure that these trends do emerge.

Security in What Sense?

Let us turn, then, to the meaning that the Soviet leaders attach to European security. Since the Soviet Union, no less than other nations, views the problem of security in Europe through the prism of national interest, the content that Moscow gives to the concept of European security is determined, basically, by the way it defines the requirements of national security.

We may begin by asking: security against what? Surely not, as the Soviet leaders must see Europe, against an overt military threat, at least not in any practical sense. Is it, then, security against a more indirect threat, *i.e.,* against the almost equivalent danger of an erosion of Soviet power in Eastern Europe? If the Soviet Union continues to fear the penetration of its empire by Western powers, European security comes to mean measures guarding against renewed Western "bridge-building" or an *Ostpolitik* that might make too many inroads into Eastern Europe. But conceivably this misses the point, and what the Soviet Union is really seeking is security against a type of change in Eastern Europe that would exceed the limits of the orthodoxy to which it seeks to hold the East European states' internal and external policies. If so, building Euro-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ean security becomes a process whereby the Soviet Union endeavors to enlist Western cooperation to this end. Or, if they are more forward-looking, the Soviet leaders may have begun to think about security against destabilizing crises in vulnerable European states. They presumably have no more desire than the Western powers to see any future crisis in Greece or Spain spill over into East-West relations. Perhaps they also worry about the fallout from another Polish or Czechoslovak crisis—or even a possible post-Tito Yugoslav crisis (whatever its potential advantages for Moscow might be). If the last hypothesis is true, the Soviet commitment to European security takes on quite another character.

The Soviet conception of European security can be approached from a second perspective: *security for the sake of what?* Viewed from this standpoint, too, Soviet policy could have multiple motivations. Efforts on behalf of European security, real or affected, might appear to Moscow to be the best way to strengthen détente and thus to foster more bountiful economic cooperation with the industrially and technologically advanced nations of Western Europe. Such efforts might also appear to be the best way to accentuate trends within Western Europe that would tend to enhance the Soviet Union's relative power position on the continent. Or they might be seen as an effective means of reinforcing the East European alliance—on the one hand, by fostering dependency through (intra-alliance) cooperation, rather than through (interalliance) insecurity and, on the other hand, by reducing the unproductive burdens of interalliance confrontation, including heavy defense outlays and economic autarky. Or, again looking ahead, Moscow might hope, by promoting European security, to dissuade the gathering West European community from becoming a "closed economic grouping" or a new military formation with a nuclear capability matching the Soviet Union's, and thus to deny the Chinese some of the satisfactions of a more convincing multipolarity. This last consideration reminds us that, for the Soviet Union, national security and hence the Soviet conception of European security have a global dimension.

Whichever of these two perspectives seems more compelling, or however both should be combined, there is a third aspect of the Soviet approach to European security that needs consideration: namely, *security by what*—i.e., security by system or security by circumstance? To put the question more simply, is the Soviet Union prepared to move toward more explicit and deliberately structured forms of European security, or would it rather improve the existing pattern through gradual, fairly discrete, basically unilateral but hopefuly reciprocal measures? Is security, to the extent that Moscow sees Soviet security as in some fashion a function of European security, to be a conscious construction or a cumulative effect? Is the result to be collective security for Europe or a less obtrusive unilateral security for the Soviet Union?

If Moscow contemplates security by system, it has various secondary options to choose from. One choice lies between an inclusive set of security arrangements that would commit the parties to collective action in all instances, and looser arrangements that would allow the Soviet Union, where convenient, to excuse itself or its alliance. Assuming that the Soviet leaders can be brought to accept more elaborate political and military safeguards in Europe, it is more than conceivable that they will opt for the latter type of arrangements and will insist on considerable autonomy within their own alliance, qualified collective security with a built-in veto, and crisis management only outside Central Europe's "iron triangle."

Even in the most far-reaching instance of a system without exemptions, the Soviet Union has the option of promoting European security via US participation or European security as a means of facilitating the exclusion of the US. It can also treat the process of building European security as a means of adding stability to a changing international order or as a means of transforming Europe into a sanctuary in an uncertain international order.

If, on the other hand, the Soviet Union settles for security as a situation, its alternatives are even more basic. Is the Soviet Union to sanction, and even advance, a process potentially moving toward a continental system of security, or is it to continue to subordinate all-European security to subsystem security? Is its objective to be equal security or self-security, to make Europe safe without alliances or for alliances? Not only is the choice of scope fundamental in this instance, but so is the choice of content. Very early in the process of negotiation, the Soviet leaders reach—indeed, they have already reached—the point of choosing in a preliminary way between basic and contextual security, between security in its essence (*i.e.*, regulating the military balance) and security as a function of environment (*i.e.*, accenting political détente). The two are not mutually exclusive, but as long as contextual security is chosen over basic security, particularly when the choice is

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

made to avoid raising the latter, the distinction is important.

The Soviet leaders must also choose the auspices under which to proceed. Here, their alternatives are essentially four. First, they can confine, or attempt to confine, the most important aspects of European security to their negotiations with the United States, in which case the process will tend to focus on the conclusion of peripheral military agreements and on imparting formal superpower sanction to the results of European détente. Second, they can stress a bloc-to-bloc approach aimed at achieving a more beneficial *modus vivendi* between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization and between the EEC and Comecon. Third, they can push multilateral contacts and a broad, gradual improvement in atmosphere. Fourth, and most likely, they can settle for some combination of all three.

Finally, there is still another possible perspective in which the Soviet leaders may view the problem of European security—specifically, *security as a process*. When security is seen in this light—that is, as a dynamic rather than as a fixed concept—progress, or even perhaps merely a sense of progress, toward easier relations comes to represent greater security, and any interruption in the process means continuing insecurity. The importance of such an approach can be either profound or superficial. If the Soviet leaders regard the process as an integral part of the product and therefore conceive it as a stage-by-stage, piecemeal, but self-reinforcing advance toward the final goal, the effect may well be profound. If, on the other hand, they fall back on a directionless manipulation of the international climate in Europe for want of a clear notion of the kind of European security they wish to achieve, the effect is likely to be a good deal less constructive.

Leonid I. Brezhnev, with CPSU Secretary K. F. Katushev, I., and Soviet Premier A. N. Kosygin, r., signs the final documents of a two-day session of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee, held Jan. 25-26, 1972, in Prague. The organization urged rapid convocation of a European conference on security and cooperation.

—Photo by K. Mevald of CTK via Eastfoto.

The Soviet Security Ideal

This leads us to inquire into the kind of security conditions that Moscow might ideally hope to bring about in Europe. Such an undertaking raises a complex of questions to which, as might be expected, Soviet sources provide few answers. Perhaps Soviet leaders themselves are unsure of the answers to many of these questions; perhaps more than a few have not even been raised. The challenge, then, is to construct a reasonably comprehensive and coherent impression of Soviet security aspirations—some of which may be only half-formed—on the basis of analyses dealing either with other issues or only partially with security issues and from a different perspective.

Soviet leaders doubtless have some vague sense of what would be an ideal state of security in Europe.[2] It may not be—indeed quite probably is not—a full and articulate vision, much less a clear design motivating day-to-day policy. Nevertheless, an attempt to construct an ideal image, based on preferences reflected in current policy choices and occasionally on the specific imaginings of Soviet specialists, may provide useful insights into the direction in which Soviet leaders would move events if they could, and therefore into the manner in which they ultimately reconcile European with national security.

In the simplest and most immediate sense, the

[2] The implication that Soviet leaders have a unified sense of the ideal is, of course, merely symbolic. Not only should we presume that Soviet attitudes differ here (and even more so on specific policy alternatives), but we should also bear in mind that the way these differences unfold is decisive for the actual course of Soviet policy. Without knowing the details of bureaucratic and leadership politics, however, we must perforce begin at the level of the outcome—or outcomes, since the outcome may change from time to time under the continuous impact of bureaucratic and leadership politics. By outcome I mean the apparently predominant view, and when I state that the Soviet leaders wish such and such, I am really referring to the temporary result of an ongoing political interaction.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet security ideal for Europe probably implies a loyal Soviet-East European alliance system, impermeable to everything but external goods and capital, facing a loose constellation of West European states whose major members would be less and less attached to the United States, whose neutral members would be increasingly deferential to Soviet interests, and all of whom would be dealing basically for themselves alone. At first glance, this seems to differ dramatically from the conception of European security outlined by N. N. Inozemtsev, Director of the Soviet Academy of Sciences' Institute of World Economy and International Relations, in a remarkable report to the 1972 Varna Conference of European Institutes of International Relations.[3] Nevertheless, when Inozemtsev's ideas are examined more carefully, they bear a closer relation to this simplified formulation than might first appear to be the case.

According to Inozemtsev, the best—if admittedly least likely—outcome of current trends in Europe would be the dissolution of both opposing political and military blocs and their replacement by an all-European security system.[4] As he envisions it, the system would be build upon an extensive set of mutual engagements involving, above all, exclusion of the use of force or the threat of force. It would have a formal "pan-European institution" possessing "rights guaranteeing equal security for all and an effective system of control." And it would be buttressed by cooperation between socialist and capitalist countries under the stimulus of the gathering "scientific-technical revolution."

If one goes further, however, it appears that there are important limitations to Inozemstev's concept of European security. In his view, just as the liquidation of military blocs will undermine the need for the stationing of foreign troops in Europe, so will the gradual economic "integration" of East and West Europe undermine the West European impulse toward political and military integration. European security, therefore, is not to be underwritten ultimately by a direct American (or Soviet?) military presence, and neither is it to be built upon two solidly integrated parts. But neither is it—*and this condition is the very essence of the Soviet conception*—to prejudice the integrity of the two dominant systems in Europe, at least not the one in the East. The economic integration of East and West Europe that Inozemtsev has in mind is clearly to strengthen and not to diminish, to transcend but not to transform, the separate political-economic systems of Europe's two halves.

(There is in this last point a crucial irony that relates to the paradox of an essentially secure Soviet Union making a fuss over European security while a potentially insecure West Europe ducks the subject. Through a curious inversion, the Soviet Union has apparently come to fear the vulnerability of its system to the inherent influence of the West European nations far more than it fears their physical power, whereas the opposite is true of Western Europe. Because the Soviet leaders evidently see controlled détente or contextual security as the best way to contain their problem, and because contextual security seems for the moment to be the more likely form for promoting European security, it is understandable that they should rally to the idea of European security. On the other hand, because Western Europe's problem has more to do with the actual structure of European security (*i.e.*, the military balance), and because a revamping of the military balance is less likely to enter into at least the initial stages of negotiations on European security or, if raised marginally, would likely only compound Western Europe's sense of insecurity, West European leaders find the call for European security less compelling. This is certainly not to argue that West European leaders have no reasons of their own for advancing contextual security, but for them the process of building European security carries the risk of accentuating the very trends within the Atlantic alliance that are the source of Western Europe's uneasiness and, in the process, opening the way for the Soviet Union to exploit discord growing out of the alliance's difficulties.)

For the Soviet Union, then, idealized European security appears to revolve around liberation of Europe's two systems from their embodiment as political-military blocs. Rather than the challenge of structuring security in the absence of blocs, it is the advantages of reducing the present competing political-military blocs to integral systems that seem to occupy Soviet leaders. And it is the highly cautious course being followed by the Soviet leaders while

[3] Inozemtsev's report, as translated into French, was published under the title "Les relations internationales en Europe dans les années 1970" (International Relations in Europe in the 1970's), in *Europe 1980*, Geneva, A.W. Sijthoff, 1972, pp. 121-36, and excerpts from it also appeared in *Le Monde* (Paris), Nov. 18, 1972, p. 6. To the author's knowledge, however, it has not been published in the Soviet Union. Besides heading the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, traditionally the most influential of the Soviet institutes analyzing international affairs, Inozemtsev is a full member of the Central Committee and former deputy editor of *Pravda*.

[4] *Europe 1980*, p. 136.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

M-60 tanks of the 200th German Panzer Regiment on line at the start of a maneuver in NATO's "Reforger IV" exercises held in the Federal Republic of Germany early in 1973.

—U.S. Department of Defense.

this process is still barely under way that accounts for the impression that they are striving for a kind of European security quite different from Inozemtsev's "model." The constant allusions of Soviet leaders and publicists to European security as a structured system seem, in their near total vagueness, to be more expressive of a deeply desired eventuality than of any genuine interest in taking the steps necessary to assure that the outcome would be security for all sides. There is more than a hint that everyone's security is to be found in a situation backed by modest safeguards, not in an elaborately designed and internally-balanced set of commitments and institutions.

European security exhorted as an opportunity rather than as a necessity and conceived as a weakening of blocs in order to enhance systems opens several vistas to the Soviet Union. The first is a vista of Atlanticism eroded. How sincerely Moscow sees NATO as capable of threatening Soviet security or the security of its allies touches on only a part of the issue. In the 26 years of NATO's existence, the Soviet Union has made enough fuss over the alliance's military potential to imply some substance to its concern. To cite a recent example, on the eve of Brezhnev's June 1973 visit to the United States, a foreign affairs commentator for *New Times* responded to a doubting American reader:

On what do you think the members of NATO spent $104.3 billion in 1971? For what does the "totally ineffectual" organization need the 7,000 nuclear warheads which the US amed forces have stationed in Western Europe? What sort of a "good time" is being had by the 1.2 million NATO troops in Western Europe, including nearly 300,000 US servicemen, the maintenance of whom is costing some $15 billion annually? [5]

Yet, Soviet leaders oppose NATO less because of its intrinsic military potential than because it brings American power to bear in Europe and—in their somewhat exaggerated estimation—brings European power to bear in support of America's global objectives. NATO may be the institutional core of Atlanticism, but from the Soviet point of view Atlanticism adds up to much more. Not only does it join European to American power in an American-dominated partnership, but it corrupts the cooperation of West European states with one another. It has transformed the Common Market into an auxiliary of NATO and prodded the Common Market countries toward greater political integration in the hope of making the group a more effective junior partner of the United States. In the same spirit, Atlanticism presses the West Europeans to move toward more elaborate forms of defense integration, not only so that they can assume a larger share of the NATO alliance's burdens, but also so that the cohesion of

[5] Mikhail Kobrin, "Letter to an American Reader," *New Times* (Moscow), No. 24 (June) 1973, p. 22.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the alliance wil be protected against possible encroachments by national defense planning.

Soviet observers are scarcely reassured by the possibility that American sponsors of the Atlantic community, in promoting the political, economic, and even the military integration of Western Europe, may be sponsoring the emergence of a power center capable of rivaling rather than complementing US power. They find equally unappealing the prospect of some form of Anglo-French nuclear cooperation—even if it were to leave France's *force de frappe* outside NATO control—because it could be the basis for an independent European nuclear deterrent. Even more to the point, Soviet writers perceive the formation of the Eurogroup within NATO, in the short run, as a device for extracting larger contributions from European members and for tying these 10 countries more closely to the organization, while, in the long run, they fear the group's conversion "into a Western European military grouping based upon the economic potential of the Common Market." [6]

Writing after President Nixon's 1972 visit to Moscow, one authoritative Soviet commentator declared that "Europeans need a European, not an Atlantic, Europe." [7] In his analysis, the repudiation of Atlanticism (and presumably the reduction of American power in Europe) is unmistakably linked with the Soviet vision of a diminution of blocs in order to enhance systems. "Such a Europe," he continues,

will not, of course, erase the opposition between socialism and capitalism. But it will replace the bloc structure with an effective system of multilateral guarantees and obligations backed by corresponding institutional mechanisms. It will combine growing interrelations, advantageous to all, with complete respect for the national distinctions and independence of every European state.

This vision holds the promise of a second related advantage for Moscow: namely, the ability to influence Europe's part in an emerging multipolarity. Soviet leaders have not deceived themselves into believing that only the proponents of a strong Atlantic community are pushing Western Europe toward a more ambitious political and military integration. But they do seem to feel that a transformation of relations between Eastern and Western Europe along the lines envisaged in Moscow will be the most effective means of retarding such integration. Thus, while they are prepared to acknowledge that "West European ruling circles" are more and more in favor of giving the Common Market "an organizational structure" promoting more than economic objectives, it is their judgment that the primary impulse toward West European political and military integration derives from the machinations of elements dedicated to a divided Europe and the struggle against socialism.[8] The devil they see poses a triple threat: not only is he working to prolong Europe's split by turning Western Europe into a political-military bloc and at the same time striving to subordinate this bloc to NATO; but he also means to transform the EEC into a "closed economic grouping" characterized by increased "collective autarky." [9] Perhaps, however, he is less the devil when he advocates the same political-military integration as a means of asserting Western Europe's independence of the United States.[10]

It is not an easy tightrope that the Soviet leaders sense they must walk. Their opposition is to the ascendance in Western Europe of a highly integrated political entity possessing a military capability appropriate to an aggregation roughly the size of the Soviet Union and boasting greater wealth; their fascination is with an increasingly powerful West European economic community capable of challenging the other two great capitalist centers and committed to an open relationship with the nations of Comecon. The dilemma they face stems from the fact that while they favor an economically cohesive Western Europe strong enough to stand up to the United States, they are concerned lest that same cohesiveness result in a move to make the EEC a more effective "closed economic grouping." At the same time, Moscow's propensity for dealing with the EEC on a bloc-to-bloc basis in order to contain independent initiatives on the part of its East European clients risks sanctioning the EEC as a bloc.

In the last two years, Soviet writers have taken the first steps toward finding a way out of this

[6] V.W. Shein, "USA-EEC: A Knot of Contradictions," *SShA: Ekonomika, politika, ideologiia* (Moscow), No. 1 (January) 1973, p. 65.

[7] A. Bovin, *Izvestia* (Moscow), July 4, 1972, p. 3. Bovin is a former functionary of the Central Committee.

[8] N. Yuryev, "Economic Integration and Western Blocs," *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 10 (October) 1971, pp. 39-40.

[9] Yu. Kormnov and B. Dyakin, "Specialization and Cooperation in Production and Integration of CMEA Countries," *ibid.*, No. 9 (September) 1971, pp. 16-17. [In citing Soviet sources published in English, such as *International Affairs*, the authors' names are spelled as they appeared; in the case of Russian-language sources, the names are spelled according to this journal's standard method of transliteration.—Eds.]

[10] Shein, *loc. cit.*, p. 61.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dilemma. The result is the differentiation they have established between a natural process of economic integration and the transfiguration of Western Europe into a political-military bloc.[11] If this differentiation leaves room for Soviet acceptance of West European economic integration involving a retreat from Moscow's previous unconditional rejection of the Common Market, it represents, in part, simply a move to come to terms with an ineffaceable reality. As Inozemtsev acknowledged in his 1972 Varna report, "the EEC is one of the realities of Europe's contemporary economic and political life," and that fact "determines the attitude of the Soviet Union and other European socialist countries toward it." [12] Already in March 1972, Brezhnev had indicated Soviet readiness to live with this group to the extent that its members respected "the interests of the member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance." [13] He had yielded, Inozemtsev explained, because Western Europe had passed a "historic threshold." First, with Britain's entry into the Common Market at the start of the new decade, it had escaped the danger of a permanent split; and second, this enlarged group had "recognized the need to advance to a higher level of state monopolist economic integration." Inozemtsev referred specifically to the schedule for putting in place a West European economic and monetary union, but what was uppermost in his mind was the thought that a "powerful bloc had been created, possessing the overwhelming part of this region's productive capacity, foreign trade, and monetary reserves." [14]

The Soviet Union's more positive reception of the Common Market rests on the assumption that the progress of this organization need not lead inexorably to political and military integration. Indeed, from Moscow's viewpoint, if the ugliest potential of multipolarity is to be avoided, it *must* not. That is to say, if Western Europe is to become vigorous enough to offset or disrupt the economic power of the United States and Japan, yet not acquire the form or full range of power fancied by China, the Common Market must be kept an economic enterprise. And if it is to thrive as an economic enterprise without relying on "artificial discriminatory restrictions in commercial and economic relations," Soviet analysts contend, the Atlantic partnership must not simply give way to a localized West European military-political grouping.[15]

A third potential advantage that Moscow discerns in the release of Europe from the encumbrance of over-rigid blocs is linked with the most sacred of Soviet concerns—the vitality and strength of its own internal and external system. For the time being, while blocs remain a central and, to the Soviet leaders, presumably not totally uncongenial reality in Europe, the objective for Moscow is to work around them so as to secure generous technological and capital inputs from Western Europe. In the long run, however, the Soviet leaders scarcely conceive of their own country or the socialist countries of Eastern Europe as permanent economic dependencies of Western capitalism. They assume that ultimately the socialist societies will prove more productive and more dynamic than their capitalist counterparts, and that, fundamentally, the less constricting the international environment in which they operate, the more they will flourish. This premise is approximately the opposite of the West's. The cohesiveness of the socialist camp, Soviet leaders believe, is a natural and spontaneous phenomenon—the normal product of the perfection of socialist relations—and needs none of the artificially generated tension and paraphernalia of enforced cooperation that are necessary to hold the capitalist camp together. The militarization of alliances, they have always contended, came about as a conscious perversion of the basic conflict between sociopolitical systems, and the real task of those interested in European security is to undo that distortion.

If these three "vistas" do, in fact, influence Soviet aspirations, a loose impression begins to emerge of the ideal Soviet image of European security. A generous recognition of basic Soviet interests clearly dominates that image, but it is linked with the idea that these interests still leave room for the pursuit of *legitimate* West European interests within an eventual all-European security framework. True, what West European interests would be recognized as legitimate depends on Soviet definition (the political-military integration of Western Europe, for example, is obviously incompatible with the Soviet image of European security); but to some extent at least, that image does recognize the problem of equal security

[11] Yuryev, *loc. cit.*, pp. 45-46; Yu. Kormnev, "The Problem of All-European Economic Cooperation," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia* (Moscow), No. 5 (May) 1972, pp. 12-13; and Y. Shishkov, "Contradictions in and Prospects for Capitalist Integration," *ibid.*, No. 1 (January) 1973, pp. 51-56.

[12] Inozemtsev, *loc. cit.*, p. 129.

[13] See Brezhnev's speech at the 15th Trade Union Congress, *Pravda* (Moscow), March 21, 1972, p. 21.

[14] Inozemtsev, *loc. cit.*, p. 126.

[15] Yuryev, *loc. cit.*, p. 46.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

—that is, the need to assure West European security as well as the security of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The Soviet solution to this problem seems to rely less on explicit constraints than on a mutual confidence to be gently spun by growing interdependence between Eastern and Western Europe. The Soviet leaders appear eager to help promote this confidence through renunciation-of-force treaties, frontier settlements, and broad endorsements of peaceful coexistence, but the steps they propose stop considerably short of superseding the two counterpoised security systems of the postwar era by a single European security system. Their idea of paring away excessive political-military encrustation from these systems does not lead to collective security because the Soviet Union refuses to expose Eastern Europe to the principle of "all for each (anywhere), each for all." [16] Nor does it lead to anything like a "system"—despite the Soviet habit of using this term to describe Moscow's European security proposals—because the Soviet Union avoids giving structure and coherence to the relationships and mechanisms that it advocates.

Potentially, however, the transformation of military blocs could lead to a less ossified equilibrium between the separate security systems, to a livelier and more constructive interaction, and even to measures facilitating their collaboration to keep the peace in Europe. From the Soviet point of view, progress in this direction will depend on how close future trends wind up approximating their ideal of European security. In fact, however, progress will more likely depend on how easily the Soviet Union comes to terms with trends that fall short of their ideal. These two considerations fall into sharper focus in the expectations of Soviet analysts with respect to the actual course of events over the remainder of the decade.



Pipeline manufactured by the West German firm Mannesmann is installed in Czechoslovakia as part of a transmission system to deliver Soviet natural gas to countries of Western and Eastern Europe.

—Photo by Eupra.

Soviet Expectations

In the 1970's, Soviet analysts anticipate, Europe will be increasingly dominated by three fundamental tendencies: first, accelerating integration of each of Europe's two parts, together with a simultaneous growth of cooperation between the two; second, continued movement toward normalization of relations in Central Europe; and third, constant modernization of military forces, mitigated by initial steps toward arms control and toward modified roles for NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

The first of these tendencies, parallel integration as the basis for a mutually advantageous interaction, seems to possess a nice symmetry, but that impression is misleading. Indeed, both the ideal and the expectation predicate an asymmetry in the two processes of integration: both presume a double inferiority in Western integration. In only half of Europe is the geographic area of integration to preserve the boundaries of the present political-military-bloc system; hence, the integration process will serve to include one of the hegemonic powers of the previous era while excluding the other. It is not merely the ideal but the expectation of Soviet analysts that Atlantic unity will rapidly deteriorate into greater (interimperialist) and lesser (intra-European) triangles. By the end of the 1970's, Inozemtsev predicts, the West European "center" of capitalist states will be a good deal more independent of the United States, and the "competitive struggle" among Western Europe, the United States, and Japan, will be a good deal more intense.[17] This "triangle"—a term Soviet writers now use freely—parallels another link-

[16] The quotation is taken from Hassner's general discussion of the problem of European security in his "Change and Security in Europe," Part II, *loc. cit.*, esp. pp. 4-8.

[17] Inozemtsev, *loc cit.*, pp. 129-30. Also see E. Kirichenko, "The USA and the Common Market: Aspects of Foreign Trade Relations," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, No. 5 (May) 1973, pp. 31-53, and the pathbreaking article by D. Melnikov, "The West European Center of Imperialism," *ibid.*, No. 1 (January) 1972, esp. pp. 16, 22-27.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing Paris, Bonn, and London, the product of an expanded Common Market.[18]

As Soviet analysts envisage it, the process of integration in Western Europe will also be inferior in that it is to be carefully circumscribed, whereas the integration of Eastern Europe is not—short, that is, of the highly improbable absorption by the Soviet Union of its East European neighbors. Paradoxically, the very expansion of the Common Market that has moved the Soviet leaders to begin coming to terms with this organization is also the factor on which they count to limit West European integration. Britain's entry, they expect, will greatly weaken trends toward supranationality. Not that it is likely to disrupt the gradual evolution toward monetary union, or even the development of a mechanism for coordinating the broad outline of West European foreign policies; but these developments, Inozemtsev estimates, "in all probability will be rather far from the initial proposals for creating a 'political community.' " [19]

To say that, on balance, Soviet specialists are wagering against a fundamental political integration of the Common Market is not to pretend that they do not have some apprehensions. For the moment, they believe that British influence is arrayed against supranationalism, but just as they see a change in what they formerly perceived as Britain's willingness to be the United States' "Trojan Horse" in the Common Market, so they wonder if Britain's opposition to supranationalism might not also change.[20] Moreover, even assuming that progress toward political union will be stymied, they still worry that West European integration might possibly acquire—this time with strong British support—a military dimension which, however rudimentary, would either serve to reinforce a crumbling Atlanticism or become the embryo of a genuinely independent West European defense capability.

The second dominant tendency, according to Soviet projections, will be in the direction of normalized conditions in Central Europe. The process of normalization involves not only the full legal and political regularization of relations between the two German states, the development of cooperation between them on the basis of complete equality, and the admission of both to the United Nations, but also general European recognition of the permanency of existing frontiers and renunciation of recourse to force. Thus, normalization, as the Soviet Union defines it, means Western acceptance of the Eastern *status quo*. In the long run, this creates a basic symmetry between the positions of both East and West. To borrow an insight from Pierre Hassner, Brezhnev (and Brandt)—unlike Khrushchev (and de Gaulle), who attacked the European order frontally—understand "that the only way to modify the status quo [is] to begin by accepting it." [21] But in the short run this tendency, too, has an asymmetrical quality. For Brezhnev, in the short term, appears more concerned with accepting Brandt's recognition of the Eastern status quo in order to fortify it than with acknowledging the Western status quo in order to change it. But the implications of the asymmetry in this case differ from those of the asymmetry in the Soviet conceptions of East and West European integration.

In the case of the third tendency—the modernization of military forces—Soviet expectations come closer to anticipating than to approximating their ideal. Rather than any dismantling of military organizations, they expect a continuation, and even an acceleration, in qualitative terms, of the process of the strengthening of military forces on both sides.[22] At the same time, however, they expect the process of détente to yield the first agreements "limiting the development of certain types of weapons and their use, as well as reducing, in general, military capabilities." [23] Moreover, even if they anticipate that NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization will survive the 1970's, they expect that the functions of those organizations will change. Although they do not specify in what way other than to say that "possibly their military tasks . . . will be reduced," Inozemtsev does suggest that it is not inconceivable that by the second half of the decade "the liquidation of the basic structure of blocs would be envisaged." [24] To the extent that the Soviet leaders see "the policy of the nonrecognition of political and social changes in the countries of Eastern Europe" as the inspiration for NATO, the faster NATO changes—or, still better, expires—the more favorable conditions will be, in their view, for "normalizing the situation in Central Europe." [25]

[18] See S. Madzoevskii, "In The London-Paris-Bonn 'Triangle,' " *ibid.*, No. 10 (October) 1972, pp. 39-60.

[19] Inozemtsev, *loc. cit.*, p. 129.

[20] Kirichenko, *loc. cit.*, p. 32.

[21] Pierre Hassner, "Eastern Europe Seen From Afar," *Esprit* (Paris), December 1972, p. 24.

[22] Inozemtsev, *loc. cit.*, p. 131.

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] *Ibid.*

[25] S.I. Beglov, "European Security System: Content and Ways of Ensuring It," *International Affairs*, No. 11 (November) 1971, p. 67.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

From the Soviet standpoint, the successful building of European security depends in part on how readily European leaders capitalize on, and reinforce, the most hopeful aspects of the three tendencies just outlined. For the Soviet leaders conceive of European security very fundamentally as a process rather than as a static structure. While that process, in their eyes, may not necessarily be shattered by the perpetuation of NATO or even by the political and military integration of Western Europe, they believe that the process will thrive the more it promotes the tendencies they anticipate. At the same time, the less pronounced these tendencies turn out to be, the more unshakably convinced the Soviet leaders will be that —as one Soviet writer puts it—"security should not be regarded as an abstract and static thing in itself, but as a dynamic evolutionary process and a function of the existing and developing internal and external ties." [26] In other words, security as a process is a conditional process.

Moreover, it is the *process* of building European security, rather than the end product, that Soviet policy would invest with structure. In all Soviet analysis, the process begins with the general codification of the principles by which Europeans should live with one another: specifically, the principles of peaceful coexistence, inviolability of frontiers, and nonrecourse to violence or the threat of violence. Once these fundamental standards have been accepted, or simultaneously with their acceptance, the process can move on to confidence-building measures, initial steps toward arms control, and the establishment of preliminary pan-European institutions. "The greater the extent of general security and détente achieved," a Soviet specialist writes, "the broader the range of practical questions to be tackled by agencies authorized by the governments to express their collective will." [27] One gets the impression of what used to be called in the midwestern United States a "basement house"—a basement in which people lived until the rest of the house was built. In this case, it is more like a "basement church," one built on semitheological principles, a mixture of legal norms, primitive institutions, and gestures of good faith—potentially complete in its incompleteness should circumstances prevent the structure from being finished.

In the meantime, the membership is to begin enjoying its "church." For most of Europe, Soviet analysts assume, this will mean an enhanced sense of security. For their own country, these first steps represent visible progress toward legitimizing the Eastern status quo and liberating the rival systems from their incarnation as blocs. The former is clearly the objective of Soviet proposals for a formalized general commitment to the principle of permanency of frontiers, meaning in effect recognition of the territorial status quo in Europe. But it is also a reason for Moscow's eagerness to persuade the Western states to acknowledge formally the principle of peaceful coexistence. As Soviet writers have pointed out in connection with the American agreement to write peaceful coexistence into the "Basic Principles of Relations" between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Western states, by giving such acknowledgment, compromise their refusal to recognize "special conditions in socialist countries and their [the socialist countries'] special relationships with capitalist states." [28] More importantly, they also repudiate those who earlier dreamt of "rolling back" socialism and argued that the existence of opposite social systems led inevitably to tension and conflicts in Europe. "This noxious concept," S. I. Beglov contends, "may be and must be exploded by the concerted efforts of the European states in setting up *a new type of relationship* between them." [29]

If the first two principles are to provide the proper environment and blessing for the process of building European security, the third, *i.e.*, the principle of nonrecourse to violence, is to supply the cornerstone. "Above all," writes one Soviet commentator, "efforts to set up a European security system should . . . be aimed at reaching accord on preventive measures and commitments ruling out the threat or use of force in relations between states in Europe." [30] He cites the work of Hans Kelsen and Charles Rousseau to prove that the principle of renouncing the threat or use of force is the basic condition for establishing a collective security system.

The reference is tantalizing. Do the Soviets mean to say that they would submit themselves and their allies to the discipline of collective action against any potential aggressor or in any potentially de-

[26] M. Dobrosielski, "Peaceful Coexistence and European Security," *International Affairs*, No. 6 (June) 1972, p. 35.

[27] Beglov, *loc. cit.*, p. 67.

[28] See, *e.g.*, N. Kapchenko, "The Real Road to Guaranteeing Peace in Europe," *International Affairs*, No. 2 (February) 1973, p. 22.

[29] Beglov, *loc. cit.*, p. 67. Emphasis in original.

[30] Y. Rakhmaninov, "Towards Lasting Peace in Europe," *International Affairs*, No. 3 (March) 1972, p. 6.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stabilizing situation? Beglov himself raises the same question in less direct fashion:

Will the European security system [again, this pretense] *be confined to a proclamation of these binding rules of peaceful coexistence, or will there also arise the question of a formula for mutual assistance and also for sanctions against potential violators of peace?* [31]

In other words, what provision, if any, is to be made for dealing with cases in which there *is* a recourse to force?

"For the time being," Beglov confesses, "there is no short answer to this question." He and other Soviet observers recognize that in the long run, "as arms and armed forces are cut back," some mechanism must be created to "take over the function of safeguarding the continent from the threat of a 'spontaneous combustion'." [32] However, in their view, such action will become possible only after East and West have already revolutionized their relations, agreed to the formal principles guiding those relations, launched one or more pan-European agencies to promote cooperation, and developed the habit of consulting, trading, and exchanging knowledge. In the meantime, European security will remain a process of gradually thickening engagements operating at two levels toward three interrelated objectives.

At one level, the USSR will continue to weave a network of bilateral arrangements with major Western powers which will formalize the "binding rules of coexistence," institutionalize contacts, including regular high-level encounters and consultations in "threatening situations," and promote economic cooperation and (with the United States) arms control. At the same time, on the second level, the Soviet leaders will seek to translate each of bilateralism's achievements into multilateral form. The basic principles of intra-European relations are to be given general sanction, and the already established bilateral mechanisms for regularizing East-West contacts and encouraging consultation in potential crises are to be supplemented by all-European consultative organs. In addition, the notion of open East-West economic relationships is to be talked up; all-European projects in transportation, communication, and energy delivery are to be planned; and the first confidence-building measures between the two alliance systems are to be undertaken.

CPSU General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev welcomes French President Georges Pompidou at Minsk in Belorussia for a brief unofficial meeting in January 1973.

—Photo by V. Musselian of TASS via Sovfoto.

What Soviet writers often refer to as a "system of bilateral and multilateral agreements" does not necessarily add up, however, to a European security system. Only for the long run are they describing a prospective structure for East-West relations that comes close to resembling a system, and at most it appears to be what was earlier termed a system with exemptions. For they are careful to note that the principle of collective action against threats to peace must be undertaken with due respect for the Charter of the United Nations, the provisions of Article 53 of the Charter serving as insurance against automatic and comprehensive collective security. As Beglov stresses, "any formula for regional mutual assistance and enforcement sanctions must be in accord with the UN Charter and the *prerogatives of the Security Council.*" [33]

Such, then, are the "main tendencies" bearing on security that Soviet analysts anticipate will dominate

[31] Beglov, *loc. cit.*, p. 67.
[32] *Ibid.*
[33] *Ibid.* Emphasis added.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

developments in Europe over the current decade. These tendencies, they believe, are "toward ensuring European security" [34]—which is one way of saying that the direction they expect events to take contains more than a trace of their idealized conception of a secure Europe. But they cannot be certain. "So long as imperialism is there," they warn, "the opposite tendencies, led by reactionary forces, also remain." [35] Hence, Soviet policy must promote the first set of tendencies (and thus the realization of Soviet expectations) as well as impede the opposing tendencies (and thus the realization of the expectations of the Atlanticists and "Little Europeans"). Most important, it must do so on an increasingly intricate and confounded terrain.

Promoting Soviet Expectations . . .

The immediate problem confronting Soviet policymakers is to find an approach that will unify and coordinate the pursuit of Soviet security objectives in each of the related but not necessarily reinforcing negotiations inherited from Helsinki, Vienna, and Geneva.[36] More specifically, how is the Soviet Union's posture at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (really about détente without security) to be harmonized with its posture in SALT II (about security without Europe); and further, how are both of these to be coordinated with its posture in the MBFR negotiations (about a part of security for only a part of Europe)? These questions are complicated by the fact that the CSCE is the Soviet Union's pet project and the MBFR negotiations the United States', leaving SALT as a neutral forum used by both to pursue their separate European objectives and influenced in turn by the European interests each party strains to protect. To add further to the challenge, the preparatory phases of the CSCE turned out to hold more hidden disadvantages for the USSR than Moscow apparently had anticipated, while the MBFR talks presented fewer dangers than Moscow had feared.

Schematically (though the Soviet leaders probably do not see it in quite these terms), their strategy for meeting this challenge seems to accept "armed détente" as the approach most conducive to maximizing Soviet gains at Helsinki, and now at Geneva, and minimizing their risks at Vienna. Curiously, it is the French who are ordinarily considered the staunchest advocates of a political détente that avoids tampering with Europe's military balance until the culminating stage of rapprochement between Eastern and Western Europe. But the Soviet leaders, too, notwithstanding their sympathetic references to arms control, presently appear to have little inclination to give basic security as much attention as contextual security, let alone more. At the outset at least, concentrating on contextual security—that is, on political détente—must seem to them the safest way to squeeze the most from a European security conference, fashion a favorable bargaining setting in SALT, and cope with the United States' tactics in MBFR negotiations. If they see any utility in raising the issue of arms control at this point, it is probably with a view to enhancing contextual, not basic, security—meaning that their initiatives must be serious enough to instill confidence but not so far-reaching as to touch upon the fundamental structure of the European military balance.

. . . In the CSCE

No product of Europe's current diplomatic transition is more the creature of the Soviet Union than the CSCE, and consequently none better reflects the Soviet version of European security as a process. Fearful that the conference might be wrecked by an overambitious conception of its scope, or turned pernicious by a wrong one, the Soviet Union has sought to assure that only those subjects on which East and West are already in substantial agreement will be taken up—Moscow counting on success to breed success in a kind of gradual escalation to

[34] Rakhmaninov, *loc. cit.*, p. 4.

[35] *Ibid.*

[36] The CSCE is currently in its second stage. The first stage, a grand inaugural convocation of the foreign ministers of the 35 participating states, took place July 3-7, 1973, in Helsinki following a preparatory phase that extended from November 1972 to June 1973. The second stage opened in Geneva in September 1973 and comprises the deliberations of three major commissions (dealing, respectively, with "questions relating to security in Europe," "cooperation in the fields of economics, of science and technology, and of the environment," and "cooperation in humanitarian and other fields"), 11 subcommissions, and a "special working group." The third stage is to be a plenary session at the foreign ministers' level or higher, scheduled to meet in Helsinki sometime in 1974. Mutual force reduction negotiations have been under way in Vienna since October 1973 after a difficult and ambiguous preparatory phase from January 31 to June 28, 1973. The second phase of SALT began November 21, 1972, and has already been through four rounds through December 1973. Under the US-Soviet agreement reached during Brezhnev's June 1973 visit to the United States, the two sides are to try to "work out the provisions of the permanent agreement on more complete measures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms" for signing in 1974.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

security. As one Soviet writer puts it, the socialist countries, "taking the realistic approach," suggest that the conference focus "on those matters of European security on which there is a sufficient degree of accord" to assure solutions, with the expectation that agreement on these matters will "open up prospects for an advance toward the establishment of European security as a whole." [37] Essentially the same position had originally been taken in the communiqué of the Prague meeting of Warsaw Pact foreign ministers held one month after Brandt's 1969 election had made an East-West security conference plausible. Urging that an eventual conference confine itself to the problems of renouncing the use or threat of force and promoting economic, technical, and scientific cooperation, the communiqué declared that success here "would pave the way for a future examination of problems of interest to European governments," the resolution of which would result in "strengthening the peace in Europe and . . . the development of a broad, mutually advantageous cooperation between all European states." [38]

More significant, for the Soviet leaders the conference is primarily a means to an end, at least to an intermediate end. They view it as the best mechanism for structuring the process of building European security along the lines they prefer: that is, for codifying the principles of intra-European relations, institutionalizing intra-European contacts, and encouraging cooperation between Europe's two systems—in short, for assembling the "basement church" described earlier. As Beglov succinctly puts it, "one of the main aims of an all-European conference is to create . . . an atmosphere of concord and to assemble the machinery for contacts and cooperation helping to ensure collective security." [39]

In this way, the conference also becomes—more than any other agency—the medium for healing Europe's economic division while sealing its political division. It is the constant admonition of Soviet spokesmen that if Europe is ever to achieve real peace and security, Europeans must carve their economic bonds long and deep. Not a word uttered in the Soviet press on the subject of European security or the security conference fails to make the point. Promote economic cooperation, it is emphasized, and the task of strengthening security will be facilitated; strengthen security, and the process of building economic cooperation will be deepened. Both processes will go forward, each speeding the other—as one writer expresses it, "improvement of the political atmosphere" will give an impetus to "mutually beneficial business cooperation," and the latter, in turn, will infuse "the system of peace and security forming in Europe with material content." [40] The heavy emphasis on this theme in the current Soviet approach to European security is partly due, of course, to the fact that Brezhnev and his domestic allies have staked so much on overcoming the inadequacies of the Soviet economy with Western assistance. But that fact does not affect the fundamental importance of the tie. Should the Soviet wager on the benefits to be gained from Western trade and investment prove really disappointing (not just disappointing, but gravely so), the result is not likely to be simply the separation of two policies and the eclipse of one of them. The Soviet leaders have committed themselves too deeply to economic interdependence as part of an overall scheme of European security (cast in similar terms) for the collapse of one venture not to have a profound effect on their approach to the other.

This is why the conference takes on such significance for the Soviet Union. Not merely is it to pave the way for greatly increased East-West trade and to negotiate measures eliminating discrimination based on differences in socioeconomic system, but it is also to mobilize the countries of Europe against exclusive groupings. One of its important functions, from the Soviet standpoint, is to nudge the Common Market toward a more open relationship with the socialist countries by confronting it, as it enters a phase of rapid change, with the image of a Europe too vibrant and promising to justify turning inward.

Long before the Soviet leaders perceived the advantages of economic interdependence, however, they saw the conference as a mechanism for solidifying the division of Germany and herding Western Europe toward a territorial settlement. Initially (that is, from 1965 through 1967 and even after the revival early in 1969 of the idea of convening a security conference), the primary Soviet objective was to circumvent or overrun Bonn's refusal to come to terms with the "postwar reality" by isolating the Germans (and their American benefactors), and the conference was viewed by Moscow as the chief in-

[37] Rakhmaninov, *loc. cit.*, p. 6.

[38] *Pravda*, Nov. 1, 1969, p. 4.

[39] S. Beglov, "A New Chapter in the History of Europe," *International Affairs*, No. 4 (April) 1973, p. 10.

[40] L. Gorev, "Lines of European Cooperation," *New Times*, No. 26 (June) 1973, p. 10.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strumentality for pursuing this goal. Once Brandt's new *Ostpolitik* enabled the Soviet leaders to attain their primary objective directly, however, their perception of the conference's role altered. Now its task would be to generalize the accomplishments of Soviet-German bilateralism, a much different role but, as all the evidence indicates, one to which the Soviet Union still attaches major importance.

Central as the conference is to their hopes, the Soviet leaders have learned that it does not come without costs. Certainly they knew before the preparatory discussions that the Western powers had their own interests to press and that at points these interests ran headlong into those of the USSR. From the Soviet viewpoint, the main thing was to hold the conference and avoid encumbering it with more than a few essential, basically hortatory functions. On the other hand, most of the Western governments concerned wanted a more carefully prepared conference that would go beyond the mere creation of the "atmosphere of concord" proposed by Beglov, one that would not settle for just a set of general principles guaranteeing those parts of the status quo attractive to the Soviet Union while leaving unmentioned the right the Soviet Union had arrogated to itself to intervene as it saw fit in Eastern Europe, and one that would serve to promote a larger commerce in people and ideas as well as in goods and capital.



Finnish Foreign Minister Ahti Karjalainen (at the rostrum) presides over the opening session of the European Security Conference in Helsinki's Finlandia House on July 3, 1973.

—Photo by UPI.

All this the Soviet leaders knew in advance,[41] but perhaps they counted on the size of the gathering and the presence of Europe's neutrals, or on the momentum of the event, to dilute the will of the NATO powers. If so, the Soviet representatives were unpleasantly surprised, once the conference got underway, by the remarkable common front presented by the Atlantic nations and, to make matters worse, joined for the most part by the neutrals. (Actually, this was the second unpleasant surprise experienced by the Russians, the first having been Romania's unseemly rush to assert its independence —the moment the gavel struck—by demanding that the conference deal with fundamental questions, including military force reductions, and by insisting on an international guarantee against forceful intervention "in whatever form and under whatever pretext." [42]) The Soviet leaders could hardly have been pleased either to see the nine EEC governments use the preparatory discussions to launch their first major coordinated foreign policy position.[43] And finally, if they had counted on the neutral states to show restraint, they must have been shocked at times to find those states markedly less restrained than the major Atlantic powers. One day, Switzerland would urge that an eventual conference devise a formal system for the peaceful settlement of disputes (a proposal to which the Soviet Union, significantly, was hostile); the next, Austria would urge

[41] For a relevant discussion, see *Le Monde* (Paris), Oct. 8-9, 1972, p. 6.

[42] *Ibid.*, Dec. 3-4, 1972, p. 2.

[43] The Davignon Committee (the foreign-policy coordinating group within the EEC) had discussed the security conference for months in advance, and while the members had agreed not to seek representation for the EEC at the security conference, they had talked over their common aspirations for the conference. They continued to meet in order to coordinate their positions once the conference opened, and when the second of four preparatory rounds resumed in January 1973, they presented their own formal draft agenda for the conference.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the conference address itself to the situation in the Middle East, or Sweden would urge a thoroughgoing discussion of arms control.

All these developments led some in the West to believe that the Soviet Union would soon lose its taste for the conference. But inconvenient as such developments must have been, to assume that the Soviet Union would back away from the conference as a consequence was to overlook the crucial stake that it has in this project.[44] Because of that stake, the Soviet leaders paid the price. They bowed to Western insistence on expanding the discussion of the basic principles of European security to include the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other states and another commanding respect for the rights of man and his fundamental liberties: specifically, "freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and conviction." They also agreed to consider such confidence-building measures as the reciprocal dispatch of observers to military maneuvers and advance notification of large-scale military exercises. And finally, after much hard bargaining, they retreated on most of the conditions with which they had sought to hedge the chapter dealing with the promotion of cultural and human contacts. Since these concessions relate only to the agenda for the conference—or, more precisely, for the commissions and subcommissions of its second phase—and com-

[44] Soviet commentary reaffirmed the value of the conference just when Soviet second thoughts were supposed to be the greatest. It is essential, one comment went, "to eliminate the slightest doubts in certain circles concerning the necessity of completing the business of recognition of the inviolability of the border between the GDR and the FRG, in other words, the necessity to invest this recognition with a general European character." V. Romanov, "The Basis of Lasting Peace in Europe," *International Affairs*, No. 3 (March) 1973, p. 15.



Leaders of "The Nine"—member states of the European Economic Community—meeting in Copenhagen in December 1973. Clockwise from front left: Willy Brandt of the FRG, Anker Joergensen of Denmark, unidentified participant, Edmund Leburton of Belgium, Edward Heath of the United Kingdom, Joop den Uyl of the Netherlands, Pierre Werner of Luxembourg, Mariano Rumor of Italy, Liam Cosgrave of Ireland, and Georges Pompidou of France.

—Photo by Jean Guyaux.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mit the Soviet Union to nothing, one might well ask how much of a price they represent. Yet, even so, the Soviet Union showed considerable flexibility in approaching the preparations for the conference. It did so, in the author's view, because the conference remains the most tangible means to Soviet ends in Europe—as well as the perfect embodiment of the Soviet conception of European security.

. . . In MBFR

The negotiations on mutual force reductions are another matter. Not that the Soviet leaders have neglected to appeal for arms control in Europe, for the dismantling of foreign bases, the creation of denuclearized zones, and decreases in the size of both German armies. MBFR, however, is an American idea advanced to serve certain apparent American purposes, and none of these are purposes that the Soviet leaders would be particularly eager to facilitate.

From the start, US leaders apparently conceived the project more as a device for containing domestic pressures to withdraw US troops from Europe and for disciplining allies too laggard in sharing alliance burdens—or, worse, too likely to follow the American example if the US Congress were to decide to cut back American forces in Europe—than as a serious proposal for adjusting down the European military balance. Certainly, if Washington genuinely wished to draw the Soviet Union into force-reduction negotiations, the original appeal in June 1968 could hardly have been less propitiously timed. At that juncture, and indeed for several years after, the Soviet leadership regarded the proposal as a scheme for forcing larger European contributions to NATO, or for making mischief in Eastern Europe and hence as the military dimension of "bridge-building." [45]

The Soviet leaders' enthusiasm scarcely mounted when they later became convinced that Washington also valued the proposal as a means of either impeding, offsetting, or controlling the campaign for a European security conference. However, either because they believed that the West really considered a commitment to force reduction talks a precondition for the security conference or because they came to see certain advantages for the Soviet Union in agreeing to such talks, they decided to go along with the US project while keeping their guard up to make sure that they would not be mobilized to aid the United States with its alliance problems and that the negotiations would not be used against them.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, then, negotiations on MBFR are somewhat peripheral to the process of building European security. Far from being an integral part of the Soviet conception of European security, they are something into which the Soviet Union has been forced as a demi-ransom to the CSCE. Even in the best of circumstances, arms control is not what Soviet leaders perceive to be contemporary Europe's central challenge; and they consider it even less so when cut and trimmed to suit American priorities that, at best, rank all-European security as a residual consideration. Yet, while the particular nature of the MBFR conference makes the Soviet leaders' first concern damage-limiting, it would be a mistake to assume that they do not have their own rewards to pursue. Both politically and militarily, Soviet objectives in MBFR are positive as well as negative.

These two aspects of Soviet thinking have been evident even before Moscow addresses the specific issues raised by the talks themselves. On the negative side, as noted above, the Soviet leaders have exercised the greatest care to assure that the MBFR project not be used to obstruct the security conference. It was, in part, this concern that prompted them to affect greater interest in mutual force reductions at the Budapest meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee in June 1970, and which prompted Brezhnev, in 1971, to hint that the Soviet Union was really quite eager to get on with the matter. This same concern also makes them suspicious of the loose parallelism between MBFR negotiations and the CSCE worked out with President Nixon in Moscow in May 1972, for they reject any thought that progress in the one can be made dependent on progress in the other.

On the positive side, the Soviet leaders presumably see certain advantages in appearing receptive to force reductions in Europe. Not only does it lend credibility to the genuineness of their interest in European security and thereby promote détente, but it also gratifies the sponsors of MBFR and eases the task of constructing a more productive relationship with them. In short, Soviet participation in MBFR is intended to facilitate the pursuit of European détente

[45] Soon after the NATO Council meeting at Reykjavik in June 1968, a Soviet commentator assailed the US move as calculated "to distract attention, lull the vigilance of the socialist countries, and create a political climate favoring subversive activity by imperialist agents, the fanning of nationalistic feelings, and the penetration of hostile ideology." L. Vidyasova, "NATO on the Eve of 1969," *International Affairs*, No. 10 (October) 1968, p. 19.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Oleg N. Khlestov, foreground, arrives at Vienna on Jan. 31, 1973, as the head of a Soviet delegation for talks laying preparations for a conference on mutual force reductions in Central Europe.

—Wide World.

and simultaneously the lucrative cooperation Moscow seeks with the United States.

The same dual Soviet objectives—this time, viewed in both minimum and maximum terms—govern the Soviet approach to the substantive aspects of the conference. At a minimum, the Soviet leaders hope to avert any weakening of their political-military position in Central Europe while hastening the withdrawal of American troops from Western Europe. Hence their insistence that any force reductions be "symmetrical" and that the "B" in MBFR really is an "I" (for imbalanced).[46] Moreover, as long as the United States refuses to include in the negotiations its forces outside the central European region, they intend to pay the smallest possible price for the withdrawal of US troops in that region. Hence, they have demanded that Soviet troops in Hungary not count in the total figure of their troops in the area and that, in the first phase, "symmetrical" be interpreted numerically and not as a percentage. At the same time, they may see some short-term attraction in the possibility of modest arms reductions in Central Europe—provided, however, that this can be accomplished without disturbing the fundamental structure of the European military balance.

It is admittedly MBFR in its minimal dimension that prevails for the moment, but MBFR in its maximal dimension is both more interesting and potentially more relevant to the Soviet Union's idealized conception of European security. While the United States' preoccupations ensure that the project will not reach this dimension soon, the Soviet leaders have quite likely permitted themselves to weigh the potential advantages of a more ambitious arms-control agenda, which—if ambitious enough—might enable the Soviet Union to acquire a direct say in the military future of the Atlantic alliance and the future of its forward-based systems. They know that you do not trade for caviar with boxtops, and at present they seem content to leave NATO's future to its own internal dynamic of disintegration and the future of the forward-based systems to SALT. Conceivably, however, these latter processes could turn out to be disappointing in the long run, and in that event the Soviet leaders will want another recourse.

In addition to all these considerations, the Soviet leaders have still another reason for giving MBFR negotiations at least an appearance of promise. More and more, the Soviet press has been harping on the danger of Western Europe's developing an independent defense potential. It may be, Soviet observers fear, that simple American withdrawal will speed the day. Indeed, they are suggesting that mere anticipation of such withdrawal is already causing some West European circles to lean in that direction. Thus, one commentator observes that there are those in Western Europe who "make use of the mounting feelings in the USA in favor of partial withdrawal from Europe by working for the development of new, more dangerous, and more destructive types of weapons, basing their arguments on the need to compensate for any future reduction in numerical strength." [47] The Soviet commentaries on this point

[46] Many Soviet commentaries make this point, but among the more detailed ones see Commentator, "For a Military Détente in Europe," *International Affairs*, No. 1 (January) 1972, p. 66, and Yu. Kostko, "A 'Balance of Fear' or a Guarantee of Genuine Security," *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, No. 6 (June) 1972, pp. 87-89.

[47] Y. Tomilin, "Problem of Armed Forces Reductions in Europe," *International Affairs*, No. 4 (April) 1973, pp. 40-41.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are quite specific. The nervousness they express is not so much over the possibility that the West European nations may decide to fill the gap left by retreating American manpower with their own manpower. It is much more centered on the RAF's new Jaguar strike plane, the MRCA (multipurpose) aircraft that Britain, West Germany, and Italy are to produce together, and reported improvements in such missiles as the British Rapier and Blowpipe and the Franco-West German Roland.

Turning MBFR into a complement of CSCE for the purpose of hampering West European military integration, however, poses certain problems for the USSR. Only by showing some willingness to make the basic military balance safer can the Soviet leaders expect to prick the interest of the West European states and give them less reason to hurry forward with their various cooperative military programs. Yet, that kind of discussion, at this point, may risk jeopardizing the political-military advantage they firmly intend to retain in Eastern Europe. On the other hand, it is no doubt more than obvious to them already that the narrowly-defined force reductions that would protect those advantages best would simply tend to intensify West European anxieties and thus encourage Western military integration.

These are not an easy set of problems. For the moment, however, the Soviet leaders may well find consolation in the thought that those of the United States are just as challenging; for here, the United States is the *demandeur* and hence the party having to make concessions. After having accepted a certain amount of meddling with the CSCE agenda, the Soviet leaders presumably derive some satisfaction from seeing the Americans constrained to do the same on MBFR—that is, to yield on Hungarian participation, thus exempting Soviet forces there; to grant observer status to several states that the United States had no desire to see attending; and ultimately even to consent, in effect, to dropping the "B" from MBFR, thus relinquishing a basic premise of the whole project.[48]

. . . In SALT

The third set of negotiations, SALT, bears on the Soviet approach to European security in fundamentally different ways from either CSCE or the mutual force reduction talks. Since, in SALT, the European dimension is subsidiary to the transcending problem of the Soviet-American strategic balance, the Soviet Union does not regard European security as a subject of these negotiations; rather, it tends to see European security, or at least the European military balance, as a lever for obtaining a satisfactory adjustment of the more critical US-Soviet strategic balance.

This circumstance has two interesting implications for the Soviet approach to SALT. In the short term, Soviet concern in SALT with US tactical nuclear weapons and strike aircraft deployed in Europe becomes not so much a matter of obtaining a reduction of this capability as of creating the basis for demanding compensating cuts elsewhere. That is to say, it is not the European military balance that is at stake, but rather weapons systems in the overall strategic balance. In the long term, the Soviet leaders may well be troubled about NATO's forward-based systems and interested in seeing them diminished, but if so, they still tend to view these systems primarily in the context of the Soviet strategic balance with the United States, thus making the European strategic balance more an issue of global or superpower security than of European security.

Not that Soviet delegates to SALT do not worry about some aspects of European defense on the margin or outside of the bilateral strategic balance. In both rounds of SALT, they have sought to bar the transfer of American strategic weaponry and know-how to the West Europeans. Such a proscription would most directly affect the United States' special nuclear-sharing arrangements with the British, now in a critical post-Polaris phase, but the Soviet Union clearly would also like to head off any temptation on the part of the US to relieve the political and psychological malaise within the Atlantic alliance by aiding the nuclear programs of France or of the French and British together.

[48] In May 1972, President Nixon took the initial step by endorsing the Oreanda formula, to which Brezhnev and Brandt had lent their support in September 1971. This called for force reductions "without detriment to the participating states"—a formula which the Soviet Union had all along interpreted as inconsistent with the balanced force reductions initially sought by the United States. As the Vienna preparatory talks wore on, evidence mounted that the US was prepared to compromise further. In his April 1973 television address on Vietnam, the President no longer mentioned balanced cuts but merely spoke of mutual troop reductions. Then, in a June 1973 press conference following Brezhnev's visit to Washington, Henry Kissinger told a reporter interested in the absence of the word "balanced" from the joint communiqué that "we think the time has come to discuss the program rather than the adjectives of a title of a conference" (see *The Department of State Bulletin* [Washington, DC], July 23, 1973, p. 155).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nor is it that the Soviet Union sees no relationship between SALT and the process of strengthening European security. The course of SALT, for better or worse, deeply influences European diplomacy. If the two principals work with one another too well or agree on measures that seem to the West Europeans to disregard West European national interests, they risk alienating those sensitive to the apparition of superpower condominium. If, on the other hand, the West Europeans are convinced that the two principals are neither trying to protect their nuclear duopoly at Western Europe's expense nor disregarding Western Europe's (military) security, then agreement in SALT can help to heighten the confidence with which the West Europeans join in the promotion of European détente.

For their part, Soviet analysts have established a link between the results of SALT and European arms control. "If the qualitative evolution of strategic armaments . . . does not lead to a general disequilibrium of forces," Inozemtsev predicts, "one will see a gradual limitation of the military functions of blocs by way of a pan-European renunciation of force and progress toward the reduction of armed forces and armaments." [49] But again, this underscores the dependency of the European military balance on the global strategic balance. Hence the essential dilemma in trying to achieve genuine all-European security: the Soviet Union dreams of converting Europe into a sanctuary free from the dangers of political change and dedicated to mutual economic enrichment but refuses to see the strategic balance in Europe as European; the West Europeans, on the other hand, reject the notion of a regionalization of European security but refuse to accept the global implications of Europe's strategic balance.[50]

A Summing Up

If there is a timidity and tentativeness about the Soviet conception of European security, it is because Soviet leaders realize that any plausible campaign for European security carries considerable risks as well as advantages. They cannot have one without suffering the other, and the more adventuresome they are in pursuing the advantages of greater all-European security (or those of détente in general), the more they—at least the most conservative among them—fear the hazards.

Reduced to their essentials, Soviet concerns appear to be twofold:

First, the Soviet leadership has from the very beginning been nervous about the implications of fostering East-West contact and of setting out to enlarge intra-European cooperation, worrying that the West would use this opening to promote a loosening of Soviet authority in Eastern Europe. They know full well that an East European status quo "consolidated"—to borrow Pierre Hassner's phrase—"by the fact of not being recognized" has now been recognized by Western governments in the hope of promoting its speedier erosion.[51] That is why Soviet accounts stress the need for unity within the socialist camp and vigilance against ideological infiltration in a "time of détente." It is precisely in such a time, one source exhorts, "that the unity of the socialist countries, and primarily diverse forms of cooperation with the Soviet Union, must be strengthened in deeds, not words." Even a "seemingly innocent flirtation with nationalism," the argument continues, "leads to the weakening of the socialist countries individually and the socialist community as a whole." [52]

Second, the Soviet leaders seem increasingly apprehensive over the West's readiness to utilize the Soviet stake in East-West cooperation in order to influence Soviet policy in other areas, particularly at home. Leverage, of course, flows in both directions in interdependent relationships, but for the moment it is the West—most of all, important elements in the United States—which openly links détente to the changes it wants to see within the Soviet Union. From the Soviet perspective, the dramatically explicit insistences of Senator Henry Jackson in this regard are merely the extreme end of a continuum marked also by Western Europe's lower-keyed interest in utilizing forums like the CSCE to effect system reform in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Whatever their uneasiness over the dangers of

[49] Inozemtsev, *loc. cit.*, pp. 134-35.

[50] Beglov expresses the Soviet viewpoint when he writes that "the fundamental thing will undoubtedly be that [Europe] designate itself as a region, both in terms of international law and in terms of the ultimate recognition by all Europeans that on this continent, peace, as a state ruling out tension and war, is essential" ("European Security System," *loc. cit.*, p. 66). Presumably it was to something like this idea, in all its ramifications, that the French and Belgian foreign ministers referred when they cautioned the June 1973 NATO Council meeting at Copenhagen that the CSCE must not end by making Europe a "special zone" (*Le Monde*, June 16, 1973, p. 3).

[51] Hassner, "Eastern Europe Seen From Afar," *loc. cit.*, p. 19.

[52] Mieczyslaw F. Rakowsky, "Our Common Duty," *New Times*, No. 16 (April) 1973, p. 5.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the campaign for European security, however, the Soviet leaders at this point apparently view it as the most profitable way to go about coping with the basic pattern of change in Europe. They believe that security is not merely, or even necessarily, an objective circumstance, but rather a state of mind; and this belief dominates their approach to European security. They are much inspired by the possibility that Europeans will take heart from the decline in East-West tension and that, as they do, beneficial change can be more easily promoted and detrimental change more easily contained—that Europe's interdependence will be encouraged and interpenetration of the two political systems avoided; that the decline of Atlanticism will be speeded and the process of West European integration retarded (or at least deflected from political-military forms); that the legitimacy of socialism (and Soviet power) in Eastern Europe will be further acknowledged and the merit of a security sphere in Western Europe denied. Obviously, there would be Soviet security in such a situation, but for reasons that are not so obvious, even if sincere, the Soviet leaders insist that so would there be West European security. (Eastern Europe's security vis-à-vis its principal protector is another matter.) Ultimately, however, the subjective nature of security on which they count to direct change in Europe makes it impossible for them to convince Western Europe that European security is no more than the possibility that Soviet security leaves room for the security of others.

The Soviet Union has good reason to want an easier atmosphere in Europe, and maybe even a greater sense of security among the Western European states. Hence, it has done what it can to deepen the mood of détente in Europe. It may also be prepare to enhance this trend by concrete concessions in security matters—perhaps by accepting a certain degree of European arms control: *e.g.*, marginal reciprocal force reductions in Central Europe, "collateral constraints" such as advance notification of, and the presence of foreign observers at, major maneuvers, and maybe even a limitation on troop movements. Perhaps it will also help to put in place machinery facilitating consultation should a crisis begin to build in some country outside the socialist camp, although in any acute crisis it is likely to revert to bilateralism with the United States.

Meanwhile, the West Europeans are offered mutual cooperation in lieu of security, or—looked at another way—they are urged to join in building a context of security in advance of the substance of security. Whether in time the Soviet Union will come to place its trust in formal, credible, and comprehensive security structures or, short of that, in a more informal recasting of Europe's underlying military structure remains an open question.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Finnish Communism and Electoral Politics

By John H. Hodgson

In 1916, Lenin departed from his general advocacy of violent revolution and suggested that socialism might be achieved peacefully in a small country sharing a common frontier with a large country that has already undergone the transformation from capitalism to socialism.[1] Irrespective of whether Lenin had Finland in mind, this country seems to fit his explicit and implicit criteria. Not only does Finland share an 800-mile border with the Soviet Union, but it also boasts a strong labor movement. Moreover, a majority of the members of the Finnish Communist Party (*Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue*—SKP) appear to accept the notion of a transition to socialism via the ballot box. Thus, Finland provides an interesting and important case study of the possibilities and problems facing a Communist party committed to a "peaceful path" to socialism.

Operating through the Communist-dominated Finnish People's Democratic League (*Suomen Kansan Demokraattinen Liitto*—SKDL), the SKP has achieved considerable electoral success, polling more than 20 percent of the popular vote in seven of the nine postwar Finnish national elections. This performance, surpassed in the West only by the French and Italian Communist parties (see Table 1, p. 36), has led one noted Western scholar to classify Finland and Italy among the world's "unstable democracies."[2] Another study has included the SKP among the 13 "most influential" of the nonruling Communist parties committed to the "peaceful path."[3]

Mr. Hodgson is Professor and Chairman of the Department of Political Science at Syracuse University (Syracuse, N.Y.). He is author of Communism in Finland: A History and Interpretation, *1967, and the forthcoming* Escape to Russia: A Political Biography of Otto W. Kuusinen *(to be published in Swedish).*

Indeed, the SKDL shares with the Social Democratic Party and the Center (Agrarian) Party the distinction of having dominated the Finnish electoral scene since World War II, although Finnish politics in the postwar period have been characterized by competition between a minimum of seven parties. In one election (that of 1958), the League emerged with a plurality of seats, but the Social Democrats have proved the most consistent vote-getters, winning a plurality of seats in six elections. The Center Party captured the most seats in two others (1948 and 1962).

The dominance of these three parties has been reflected in the composition of the Finnish Cabinet. A coalition including all three ruled during two periods: 1944-48 and 1966-70. In the 1950's, the Agrarians exercised prime influence in the government, and the Social Democrats have enjoyed the upper hand thus far in the 1970's.[4]

A Finnish Model

In pursuing power by parliamentary means, the SKP has rejected the model singled out for emulation by Soviet party leaders at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956—the model of

[1] V. I. Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* (Complete Collected Works), Vol. 30, Moscow, Izdatelstvo politicheskoi literatury, 5th ed., 1962, p. 122.

[2] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1959, pp. 30, 32.

[3] George W. Rice, "Nonruling Parties and the 'Peaceful Path'," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1973, pp. 65-66.

[4] For a summary view of Finnish politics, see Jaakko Nousiainen, *The Finnish Political System*, tr. by John H. Hodgson, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971, esp. pp. 40-41, 180-81, and 262-65.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1948 Czechoslovakia. While admitting that socialism was achieved by "relatively peaceful" means in certain East European countries in the early postwar period, SKP Chairman Aarne Saarinen argues that circumstances surrounding those events were unusually tense and hence atypical. Although Stalinist elements within the SKP resist his views, Saarinen remains optimistic about the prospect for a transition to socialism in Finland even more peaceful than those experienced in countries such as Czechoslovakia. As he explains it,

Finland is to a degree an exception because we have in general a very strong labor movement and the lefist labor movement is relatively powerful. When socialist principles gain ground within the rest of the labor movement—I have in mind particularly the Finnish Social Democratic Party—it is quite possible that a majority of the voters will lean toward support for socialist reforms.[5]

Finnish Communists have nonetheless moved cautiously in nationalistic Finland, particularly in the early postwar years. At that time, the Finnish electorate was hardly ready for Communist or even socialist slogans—a fact duly noted by Hertta Kuusinen, who was to serve for many years as a member of the SKP Politburo and Chairman of the SKDL's Parliamentary Group.[6] The populace at large found unsettling the presence in Helsinki of A. Zhdanov's Allied Control Commission during 1944-47, and the return to Finland in 1946 of several emigrant Finnish Communists, including Hertta Kuusinen's first husband T. Lehen, was seen by many observers at home and abroad as an ill wind. In Finland there were rumors about the existence of a "barricade" group of Communists, and abroad there was talk about Finnish political leaders having sold out to Moscow. The fact that Hertta Kuusinen's father had been a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union since 1941 and was a member of the CPSU Presidium (Politburo) under both Stalin (1952-53) and Khrushchev (1957-64) added to the uncertainties of a population that had rallied so spontaneously and uniformly to the defense of their country against the incursion of Soviet forces in 1939.

In light of these circumstances, it has been natural for the SKP to shun the Communist label and to campaign under the banner of the Finnish People's Democratic League at election time. The Communists' central role in the SKDL has been unchallenged for three decades. With nearly 50,000 members, the Finnish Communist Party constitutes the largest of the member units that comprise the League. (Other units include the 25,000-strong Finnish Democratic Youth League, which joined the SKDL in 1967, and the 20,000-strong Finnish Democratic League of Women.) Perhaps more indicative of the Communist domination of the umbrella organization is the unusually high percentage of SKP members who sit on SKDL executive committees at the local, district and

Finnish Communist Party figure Hertta Kuusinen in 1948.

—Wide World.

[5] See the interview with Saarinen in *Suomen Kuvalehti* (Helsinki), Jan. 28, 1967, p. 22.

[6] See *Vapaa Pohjola* (Helsinki), April 4, 1946. Hertta Kuusinen is the daughter of the late Otto W. Kuusinen, former member of the CPSU Politburo and a former Comintern functionary. His political career is outlined in two books by the present author: *Edvard Gylling ja Otto W. Kuusinen asiakirjojen valossa, 1918-1920* (A Profile of Edvard Gylling and Otto W. Kuusinen through Documents, 1918-1920), Helsinki, Tammi, 1974, and the forthcoming *Escape to Russia: A Political Biography of Otto W. Kuusinen,* to be published in Swedish by Holger Schildts Förlagsaktiebolag, Helsinki, and by Forum, Stockholm.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 1: Communist Election Results and Membership—A Comparison

	Finland			France		Italy	
Year of Nat'l Election	Percent of popular vote	Membership of SKP	Membership of SKDL	Percent of popular vote	French CP Membership[a]	Percent of popular vote	Italian CP Membership
1945	23.5	19,000	100,000	26.2[b]	825,000		
1946				25.0[b]	895,000	18.96[b]	2,150,000
"				28.2	"		
1948	20.0	53,000	150,000			21.0[c]	2,250,000
1951	21.6	45,000	143,000	26.9	625,000		
1953						22.6	2,150,000
1954	21.6	46,000	142,000				
1956				25.9	430,000		
1958	23.2	47,000	140,000	19.2	425,000	22.7	1,800,000
1962	22.0	50,000	155,000	21.7	406,000		
1963						25.3	1,600,000
1966	21.2	47,000	145,000				
1967				22.51	426,000		
1968				20.02	426,000	26.9	1,500,000
1970	16.6	48,000	165,000[d]				
1972	17.0	48,000	165,000			27.2	1,600,000
1973				21.26	455,000		

[a] Data for the PCF (Parti Communiste Français—French Communist Party) represent membership cards delivered—not total accepted—and therefore inflate the actual membership figure.
[b] Election of a Constituent Assembly.
[c] A Communist-Socialist coalition won 31 percent of the votes in Italy in 1948. Since the PCI usually wins at least 1 percent less votes than seats, its share of the 1948 vote was derived from the share of seats won (22.8 percent).
[d] The substantial jump in SKDL membership between 1966 and 1970 resulted essentially from the admission of the 25,000-member Finnish Democratic Youth League to the SKDL in 1967.

SOURCES: Eletcion data come from statistical handbooks, from *Le Monde* (Paris), and three books: Jaakko Nousiainen, *The Finnish Political System*, tr. by John H. Hodgson, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1971, pp. 40-41; Philip M. Williams, *French Politicians and Elections, 1951-1969*, Cambridge University Press, 1970, pp. 292-93; and Giaemilio Ipsevich and Enrico Zampetti, *Elezioni 1972 risultati e confronti* (1972 Election Results and Comparisons), Milan, Pan Editrice Milano, 1972, pp. 25, 139, 143, 145-46, 148-49. On party membership, see official party sources plus John H. Hodgson, "The Finnish Communist Party," *Slavic Review* (Columbus, Ohio), March 1970, p. 80; and Annie Kriegel, *The French Communists: Profile of a People*, tr. by Elaine P. Halperin, University of Chicago Press, 1972, pp. 32-35.

national levels.[7] The SKP Central Committee has itself acknowledged that the SKDL is beginning to resemble a unified political party, but the Committee still wishes to avoid the appearance of excessive Communist control of the League and looks with disfavor upon suggestions that the SKDL and the SKP form a single political party,[8] although pressures in that direction persist within Communist ranks. At the SKP Congress in 1972, for example, Leo Suonpää—a leading Stalinist—proposed reorganizing the SKDL so as to further reduce the influence of left-wing socialist *(i.e.,* non-Communist) elements.[9]

Despite the drop in the SKDL's share of the vote in the 1970 and 1972 elections (see Table 1) and the shock administered to supporters of the "peaceful path" by the overthrow of the Allende coalition government in Chile in September 1973, leaders of the SKP and SKDL have not abandoned their optimism about the chances for a peaceful transition to socialism in Finland.[10] Whether or not such optimism is justified is, of course, another question—a question that can be answered only if one understands the sources of SKDL strength and the causes of the fluctuations in the League's electoral achievements.

An analysis of this aspect of the problem leads to the conclusion that, despite the generally held view that Communist electoral successes primarily reflect economic factors *(i.e.,* are greatest when economic conditions are the worst), in Finland the electoral

[7] On this point, see John H. Hodgson, "The Finnish Communist Party," *Slavic Review* (Columbus, Ohio), March 1970, pp. 83-84, and Ele Alenius, quoted in *Helsingin Sanomat* (Helsinki), May 16, 1970.

[8] See *SKP 16 edustajakokous Helsinki 31.3-2.4-72. Päätos-ja julkilausumat* (The 16th Congress of the SKP, Helsinki, March 31-April 2, 1972. Resolutions and Proclamations), Helsinki, Yhteistyö, 1972, p. 36.

[9] *Helsingin Sanomat*, April 2, 1972.

[10] On the reaction to the Chilean events, see Arvo Aalto and Jorma A. Hentilä in *Suomen Kuvalehti*, Sept. 28, 1973, p. 31, and Ele Alenius in *ibid.*, Sept. 21, 1973, p. 7.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ups and downs of the Communists are more a function of politics.[11] (Thomas H. Green has drawn attention to the importance of the political—as opposed to the economic—factor in the electoral fortunes of French and Italian Communists.[12]) Specifically, the fortunes of the SKDL seem to bear an inverse relationship to the vicissitudes of its major rival on the left—the Social Democratic Party. It is in the relative attractiveness of these two parties to the Finnish electorate, particularly to the protest voter, that one can find some realistic basis for assessing the past achievements and future prospects of the peaceful, parliamentary strategy of Finland's Communists.

Factors in Postwar Strength

The parliamentary successes of the SKP are primarily a post-World War II phenomen, achieved through the Communist-dominated SKDL, although the history of the SKP dates back to its formation in Moscow in the summer of 1918 by Finnish Social Democrats who had escaped to the USSR after defeat in a three-month-long civil war.[13] The SKP was for all practical purposes an illegal organization throughout the 1920's and 1930's, achieving a maximum membership of 2,000, although it was able during the 1920's, operating through two electoral fronts similar to the SKDL (the Socialist Workers' Party of Finland and the Socialist Workers' and Small Farmers' Election Organization), to win an average of 12.7 percent of the popular vote in national elections (reaching a high in 1922 of 14.8 percent, netting 18 of 200 parliamentary seats). After 1930, when all groups of the extreme left (including the Socialist Workers' and Small Farmers' Election Organization) were proscribed, Communists apparently either abstained from voting or voted for the Social Democratic Party. It was only in 1944, as a result of the Finnish-Soviet Armistice, that the SKP became a fully legal political organization. This, in turn, paved the way for the formation of the SKDL by Communist and left-wing Socialists for purposes of winning the March 1945 national election. On the eve of that first postwar election, Finnish President J. K. Paasikivi made his famous appeal for "new faces" in Parliament.[14] When the returns were tallied, the SKDL had captured 23.5 percent of the popular vote and 49 of 200 parliamentary seats.

An appreciation of the reasons for this remarkable Communist electoral success—virtually a doubling of the party's strength from the levels attained in the 1920's, and this after nearly 15 years of illegal status—is essential for an understanding of the whole postwar record of the SKDL. Although the inheritance of political loyalties and beliefs from prewar days—what one scholar has called "the Mendelian law" of politics[15]—may have played a role in the resurgence of Finnish Communists, the factor hardly suffices to account for the SKDL's resounding success in 1945. Nor does the absence in 1945 of the intimidation and violence that had characterized the interwar elections in which Communist-supported candidates had been permitted to participate fully explain the jump in Communist strength. Instead, it might well be that the answer should be sought in political events which dramatically realigned working-class voting patterns, events such as those to which Richard F. Hamilton refers in his study of French workers.[16] Specifically, the behavior of Finland's workers in the 1945 election may have stemmed from an adverse reaction to Finland's experiences with right extremism and a growing awareness that changes within the Social Democratic Party had undercut its status as the best political spokesman for worker interests. Both aspects of this proposition call for further examination.

During the two decades preceding the outbreak of World War II, Finland (like Italy and France) experienced movements both of a conservative "right-wing" and of a revolutionary "centrist" nature[17]—*i.e.*, it had its monarchists and parafascists. In the former category was Gustaf Mannerheim, an aristocrat in

[11] Among those who have argued that Communists are most successful where economic development and educational opportunities are limited are Seymour Martin Lipset (see *op. cit.*, pp. 45-46, 118-19, 125) and Charles A. Micaud (see his "French Political Parties: Ideological Myths and Social Realties," in Sigmund Neumann, Ed., *Modern Political Parties: Approaches to Comparative Politics*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956, p. 152).

[12] See his article, "The Communist Parties of Italy and France: A Study in Comparative Communism," *World Politics* (Princeton, N. J.), October 1968, p. 9.

[13] For a discussion of the Finnish Civil War, see John H. Hodgson, *Communism in Finland: A History and Interpretation*, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1967, pp. 53-80, and Marvin Rintala, *Three Generations: The Extreme Right Wing in Finnish Politics*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1962, pp. 7-70.

[14] See *Paasikiven linja* (The Paasikiven Line), Vol. I, Porvoo, WSOY, 1956, pp. 15-16.

[15] See Robert E. Lane, "Fathers and Sons: Foundations of Political Belief," *American Sociological Review* (Washington, DC), August 1959, p. 502.

[16] See his *Affluence and the French Worker in the Fourth Republic*, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1967, p. 285.

[17] Lipset set up these descriptive categories in *op. cit.*, p. 130.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the age of democracy, who on two occasions served as head of state (1918-19 and 1944-46) yet never accepted parliamentary government.[18] To the end of his life, Mannerheim remained faithful in spirit if not in his actions to the Lapua Movement, which from its inception in the early 1930's sought ultimately to destroy all parties and parliamentary government.[19] In 1932, some 10 years after the successful fascist march on Rome, there was a revolt by the Lapua Movement forces of Vihtori Kosola in the Finnish community of Mantsälä that was supposed to be followed by a march on Helsinki in support of demands for a new government that would include Mannerheim as president and his closest friend and chief lieutenant, Rudolf Walden, as prime minister. But this revolt was suppressed without bloodshed, its leaders were arrested, and the Lapua Movement was outlawed.[20]

In the same year (1932), there also emerged a militant new party, the People's Patriotic Movement (*Isänmaallinen Kansanliike*—IKL).[21] Because of its attacks on capitalism (a position resembling the anti-capitalist themes of Jacques Doriot's *Parti Populaire Français*[22]) and on Finland's Swedish-speaking minority, the IKL antagonized Finnish industrialists who had been prominent in the Lapua Movement, and failed to win the blessing of the older generation of conservatives who had supported the latter—e.g., Mannerheim and J. K. Paasikivi. Paasikivi, who had favored a German monarch for Finland in 1918, denounced the IKL as a revolutionary body seeking to establish a fascist dictatorship in Finland. In fact, the IKL leadership did have a deep admiration for Mussolini and Hitler, in particular for fascist Italy. Nonetheless, in the 1936 and 1939 elections the People's Patriotic Movement won 8.3 and 6.6 percent of the vote, respectively, drawing support from civil servants, academics, physicians and clergy.

In its quest for the Finnish equivalent of the German *Volksgemeinschaft* (national community), the IKL ultimately sought a Greater Finland, to be achieved at the territorial expense of the Soviet Union. Both the Winter War of 1939-40 with the USSR and Finland's co-belligerency with Germany in World War II seemed compatible with IKL's goal of a Greater Finland. However, the aspirations of the movement collapsed with the defeat of Germany, and the IKL was explicitly outlawed by the terms of the Finnish-Soviet Armistice of 1944.

Although some would argue that postwar support for the Communists has no roots in such prewar or wartime political events,[23] the Finnish experience with right extremism—whether the Mäntsälä revolt or the cooperation with Germany's National Socialists—can hardly be discounted as a factor in postwar Communist electoral successes. It helps to explain why Hertta Kuusinen during the first years after her postwar release from prison stressed the themes of anti-fascism and support of democracy. Such themes were openly accepted by SKDL supporters, whereas these constituents might have been alienated by direct talk of socialism.[24] Moreover, the League was able to marshal considerable support among leftist groups for its demand that those responsible for Finland's wartime misadventures be held accountable. In a broader, comparative frame of reference, it is surely more than coincidence that three of the strongest of Europe's nonruling Communist parties—those of Finland, France and Italy—have operated in polities that experienced a traumatic struggle with right extremism of one or another variety in the interwar period.

Weakness of Social Democracy

Not only did Finnish rejection of right extremism provide a favorable environment for the promotion of Communist political fortunes, but—more important perhaps—the whole issue of interpreting the war years served as a major source of debilitating controversy within the Social Democratic Party, the SKDL's principal rival for the postwar leftist vote.[25]

[18] See Marvin Rintala, *Four Finns: Political Profiles*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1969, pp. 13, 22, 37-39.

[19] See Marvin Rintala, *Three Generations . . .*, pp. 183, 193.

[20] On the Lapua Movement, see *ibid.*, pp. 164-99, and Rintala, "Finland," in Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber, Eds., *The European Right: A Historical Profile*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1966, pp. 434-35.

[21] Rintala discusses the IKL in his contribution to the Rogger and Weber volume, pp. 435-41, in his *Three Generations*, pp. 221-43, and in "An Image of European Politics: The People's Patriotic Movement," *Journal of Central European Affairs* (Boulder, Colorado), October 1962, pp. 309-15.

[22] On Doriot's party, see Eugen Weber, "France," in Rogger and Weber, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-10.

[23] See, for example, Erik Allardt, "Traditional and Emerging Radicalism," a draft paper, 1963, p. 38.

[24] See fn. 6 above.

[25] The tendency for Communist parties to register electoral gains in countries where rival Socialist parties are weak and disunited was noted by Gabriel A. Almond in his pioneering study, *The Appeals of Communism*, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1954, pp. 387-88. This has certainly been the case in France, where the PCF (French Communist Party) has benefited from the vertical and horizontal rifts in the Socialist Party—see, *e.g.*, Micaud *op. cit.*, p. 137.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Dissension within the SDP largely revolved around the person and policies of Väinö Tanner, a man who dominated the Social Democratic movement for more than a quarter of a century and was perhaps the most powerful single Finnish political leader of this century. His firm, unyielding grip on his party during the war years and the opposition to his policies within the SDP weakened the electoral appeal of the party in the early postwar period.

The controversy reached back to the Winter War of 1939-40 with the Soviet Union. Tanner was Finland's Foreign Minister during these events and was therefore both vulnerable and unreceptive to demands from other Social Democrats that the circumstances of the brief war be thoroughly discussed. In 1940, K. H. Wiik, the party secretary of 10 years' standing and a man dubbed "Finland's Karl Marx" by one rightist observer,[26] led the fight to lift the veil of secrecy from events surrounding the brief conflict with the USSR. Instead, Wiik and one other SDP leader, Johan Helo, were expelled from the party and its Executive Committee in the fall of 1940 in a move spearheaded by a small group supporting a program evocative of Germany's National Socialism and closely associated with Tanner. After Finland joined Germany against the USSR in 1941, Tanner publicly demanded that Wiik and his supporters be "crushed" (*on murskattava*),[27] and six SDP members of parliament (including Wiik), plus Helsinki's city manager, were subsequently arrested, convicted of treason, and imprisoned.[28]

These measures failed, however, to eliminate opposition within the Social Democratic Party to Tanner and to his apparent conviction that German military might was invincible and that Finnish independence could be secured only through support of Germany. As the war progressed, Mauno Pekkala and J. W. Keto—members of the SDP's Executive Committee—argued for negotiation of a separate treaty with the USSR and for reliance on support for Finnish independence from the United Kingdom and the United States at an eventual peace conference. When the President of Finland, Risto Ryti, pledged in a June 26, 1944, letter to Hitler that neither he nor any Finnish government appointed by him would sign a separate peace treaty with the USSR, a majority of the SDP Executive Committee sought to have the party disassociate itself from this position by withdrawing from the Finnish Cabinet. But Tanner, relying on support from the SDP's Parliamentary Group, blocked this move.[29]

Mauno Pekkala, Finnish Premier and leader of Finland's delegation to the Paris peace negotiations in August 1946, is greeted in Paris by Finnish Minister to Paris Johan Helo. With Pekkala is Yrjoe Leino, a Communist and Minister of the Interior in Pekkala's government (formed in March 1946).

—Wide World.

Although President Ryti's pledge was rendered meaningless by his resignation and by Marshal Mannerheim's assumption of the duties of President on August 4, 1944 (followed quickly by the signing of an armistice with the USSR in September), the affair further exacerbated the rift within the SDP. Pekkala and others warned that the Communists—free to operate legally, as a result of the armistice with the Soviet Union—would dominate the Left in forthcoming elections unless the Social Democratic Party underwent a radical transformation, including the retirement of Tanner and others most closely associated with war responsibility, and the readmission to the party of Wiik's group, which had been freed and returned to Parliament.

Tanner dismissed these proposals as a bid for power by Pekkala, and the SDP Executive Committee also rejected Pekkala's subsequent call for an electoral alliance with the Communists. When the oppo-

[26] Erkki Räikkönen, in *Kustaa Vaasa* (Helsinki), March 22, 1939.
[27] *Suomen Sosialidemokraatti* (Helsinki), July 31, 1941.
[28] See Hodgson, *Communism in Finland*, pp. 181-91.
[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 196-202.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sition announced its intention of joining an electoral coalition with the Finnish People's Democratic League irrespective of the Executive Committee's decision, Pekkala and Keto were removed from that organ and all members favoring an electoral alliance with the Communists were expelled from the SDP. Thus, on the eve of the March 1945 election, a sizable number of Social Democrats, disillusioned with their party's wartime leadership and collaboration with right extremism, swung their support to the Communist-dominated SKDL and thereby contributed to its successful political debut.[30]

Political Plateau

Once established, the electoral strength of Finnish communism (*i.e.*, the SKDL) has proved relatively stable. In keeping with generally observable rules of Finnish political behavior,[31] the average fluctuation in the SKDL's share of the vote in the nine postwar elections has been only 1.7 percent (see Table 1).

The explanation for this stability is fairly simple. Finns, like voters elsewhere, tend not only to remain constant in their political loyalties once party identification has been established, but also to vote as their parents do. Indeed, the proportion of Finns who vote the same way as their parents may run as high as 75 percent.[32] Thus, persons who cast their ballots for the SKDL in 1945 have by and large done so ever since, and their offspring have in all likelihood followed their example.

Of course, Communist electoral strength in Finland has not been as steady as the average shift of 1.7 percent from election to election would indicate. Election-to-election fluctuations generally exceeded the indicated average, and there was an unusually sharp drop in Communist support in 1970, which will be discussed in following paragraphs. In an effort to explain the earlier fluctuations, a number of observers have posited a direct relationship between unemployment and a vote for the SKDL.[33] For example, in examining Finland's 1951 and 1954 parliamentary elections, Erik Allardt sees a correlation between support for the SKDL and unemployment in the given voters' families during the Great Depression.[34] Other studies single out unemployment in the family as the most important determinant of a vote for the Communists in the Finnish city of Tampere in the 1958 parliamentary election. Unemployment was, to be sure, exceptionally high in the entire country on the eve of the polling, and the Communist share of total votes jumped to 23.2 percent from its level of 21.6 percent in 1954.[35]

Without question there is validity to the argument that in some instances unemployment may be a significant independent (or explanatory) variable determining Communist electoral support in Finland. However, one should be cautious about elevating this finding to the status of a general principle. In fact, time-series data for the years 1947-72 (encompassing the last eight of Finland's nine postwar elections) show an *inverse* relationship between unemployment (the independent variable) and Communist votes (the dependent variable): *i.e.*, it turns out that the higher the average unemployment recorded in the years preceding an election, the lower the vote for the SKDL.[36] This phenomenon was most evident in the 1970 elec-

[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 202-14.

[31] On the stability of Finnish voting patterns during normal times, see Tapio Koskiaho, "The Popular Vote and Parliamentary Seats by Party in the Elections of 1907-1966," in Olavi Borg, Ed., *Mitä puoluetta äänestäisin. Tietoja ja tutkimuksia puolueista, politiikasta ja vaaleista* (What Party Should I Vote For? Information and Studies about Parties, Politics and Elections), Helsinki, Otava, 1970, p. 161, and Nousiainen, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-41.

[32] On the topic of generational political continuity, see V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, New York, Crowell, 4th ed., 1958, pp. 234-35. On Finnish voting habits, see also Antti Jaakkola, "Electoral Studies and General Factors Influencing Voting Behavior," and Risto Sankiaho, "Geographic Support for Finnish Parties," in Borg, *op. cit.*, pp. 123 and 191, respectively; Onni Rantala, "Shifts in Voter Preference," in *Valtio ja yhteiskunta* (Government and Society), Vol. 16, Vammala, Vammalan kirjapaino, 1957, pp. 72-74; Pertti Pesonen, *Valtuutus kansalta* (Mandate from the People), Porvoo, WSOY, 1965, pp. 96-97, 106-117, 348 (an English-language edition of Pesonen's work was published as *An Election in Finland: Party Activities and Voter Reactions*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968).

[33] See, for example, Erik Allardt, *Social struktur och politisk aktivitat* (Social Structure and Political Activity), Borga, WSOY, 1956, p. 83; Lipset, *op. cit.*, pp. 106, 248; and Allardt, "Patterns of Class Conflict and Working Class Consciousness in Finnish Politics," in Erik Allardt and Yrjo Litunen, Eds., *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems*, Turku, Transactions of the Westermarck Society, Vol. 10, 1964, pp. 112, 114, 116-17. Allardt finds this linkage particularly striking in northern and eastern Finland (see "Finnish Communism," in *Suomen Tie* [Helsinki] No. 1, 1961, p. 5, and "Factors Explaining Variation in Strength and Changes of Strength of Political Radicalism," *Helsingin Yliopiston Sosiologian laitoksen tutkimuksia* [Helsinki] No. 15, 1962, p. 10).

[34] *Social struktur . . .*, p. 84. In "Traditional and Emerging Radicalism," *loc. cit.*, Allardt argues that unemployment is related positively to increases in Communist strength but has little or no bearing on the initial magnitude of that strength.

[35] See Pesonen, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-91, 95, 297, 399; and Lipset, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-19, fn. 66.

[36] The Pearson correlation coefficient (r) is —.52. Data on unemployment in Finland came from the *Yearbook of Labour Statistics*

(continued on page 41)

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion, when the SKDL suffered its sharpest decline in voter support. Although the League had recently been strengthened by the addition of the 25,000-member Youth League, the party captured only 16.6 percent of the vote (as compared with 21.2 percent in 1966) and dropped below the 20-percent mark for the first time in its history. Yet, prior to this election, Finns had experienced the worst unemployment in the country's history. As one observer commented in 1968, "The unemployment situation in our country has never been this bad before, not even during the period of the so-called Great Depression."[37] The fact that the SKDL received its biggest postwar setback in this economic setting suggests that one might do well—at least in the case of Finland—to look elsewhere than to economic determinism as the basic explanation of changes in Communist electoral fortunes.

Reasons for the 1970 Setback

A more rewarding approach would seem to be to focus on the question of political alternatives, which, as has been noted above, figured so prominently in the SKDL's success in 1945. To Finnish workers and farmers, who accounted for 81 percent and 13 percent, respectively, of SKDL supporters on the eve of the 1970 election,[38] the choices were no longer so clear-cut as they had been in 1966, or for that matter throughout most of the postwar period. Marked transformations within the Social Democratic Party and within the Finnish Communist movement as well as the emergence of a new rural political protest movement had further expanded the options open to Finland's protest voters.

Turning first to the Social Democratic Party, it would not be inaccurate to say that the SDP had gradually resolved its internal disputes and had come to present the electorate with a more united and radical posture. During the mid-1950's, the party experienced a major struggle between forces led by Party Secretary Väinö Leskinen, who was associated with a vigorous policy of anti-communism, and those around Party Chairman Emil Skog. On the eve of the extraordinary SDP Congress of 1957, called in response to pressure from a number of district organizations controlled by Leskinen's forces, Skog was asked to meet with Väinö Tanner, who had reemerged into the SDP limelight after a political retirement that had been forced upon him by imprisonment for "war responsibility."[39] Tanner announced that he had agreed, at the age of 76, to answer the appeal of the opposition group to run as a "harmony candidate" against an opponent acceptable to the Skog group. The result was hardly harmonious, for when Tanner triumphed by a margin of one vote, Skog and his supporters boycotted elections for the party Executive Committee and secretaryship. Soon after the 1958 parliamentary election, the new leadership of the SDP moved to expel the "rebellious" members and sections,[40] and in the spring of 1959, the Skog group organized an independent party around its 14 members of parliament.

The disarray in the party began to abate in 1963, however, when Rafael Paasio replaced Tanner as SDP Chairman. In a "programmatic speech," Paasio called for party unity and, significantly, also noted that the SDP had erred in forgetting that it was first and foremost a party of the workers.[41] The ensuing years produced substantial progress toward intra-party harmony and successful projection of a more radical SDP image. (A major step in the latter direction was the inclusion of SKDL and SKP ministers in the Cabinet formed by Paasio in 1966.)

Some evidence of the success achieved in transforming the political image of the Social Democratic Party can be seen in the responses to polls taken in 1958, 1966, and 1969, in which supporters of all Finnish parties were asked to identify their second choice among Finland's political parties.[42] In 1958,

published annually by the International Labor Office in Geneva and from Terho Pulkkinen, *Tyottomyyden levinnesisyys. Sosiali-poliittinen tutkimus työttömyyden levinneisyydesta suomessa vuosina 1948-1953* (Distribution of Unemployment. Sociopolitical Study of the Distribution of Unemployment in Finland in the Years 1948-53), Porvoo, WSOY, 1956, pp. 231-34.

[37] See the editorial in *Uusi Suomi* (Helsinki), Sept. 15, 1968.

[38] Gallup poll results, reported in *Helsingin Sanomat*, Nov. 23, 1969.

[39] Tanner was sentenced to a five-and-one-half year term in 1946 but was released in 1948; he was soon re-elected to Parliament and to the SDP Executive Committee. In 1957, Tanner was invited by the Finnish President, Urho K. Kekkonen, to try his hand at forming a cabinet, an unsuccessful effort that nonetheless gave Soviet commentators an opportunity to castigate Tanner as a reactionary tool in the hands of the Finnish bourgeoisie. See *Izvestia* (Moscow), Oct. 26, 1957.

[40] See Emil Skog, *Sosialisti ja patriotti* (A Socialist and Patriot), Porvoo, WSOY, 1971, pp. 367-407; and Nousianinen, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

[41] The full text appeared in *Kansan Lehti* (Tampere) and then in *Suomen Sosialidemokraatti;* excerpts can be found in *Uusi Suomi*, June 27, 1963.

[42] See Pertti Pesonen, *An Election in Finland . . .*, p. 141, and "Dimensions of Political Cleavage in Multi-Party Systems," a paper delivered at the 1972 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, p. 15; also Gallup poll results reported in *Helsingin Sanomat*, Dec. 5, 1969.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

when the SDP was pursuing an essentially moderate, nonradical course and when cleavages within its ranks had weakened its appeal among the dissatisfied and unemployed, the party proved an unexpectedly strong alternative choice (selected by 26 percent of those polled) among supporters of the National Coalition Party, which is located at the right end of the Finnish political spectrum. The share of National Coalition Party supporters seeing the SDP as a viable alternative dropped to 19 percent in 1966 and only 9 percent in 1969. By way of contrast, in the latter year—on the eve of the 1970 election—the increasingly radical posture of the SDP had made it the first alternative choice of 51 percent of SKDL supporters (as compared with just 30 percent in 1958 and 38 percent in 1966). Clearly, the Social Democratic Party had become a more formidable political rival of the SKDL over the intervening decade.

Ele Alenius, Chairman of the Finnish People's Democratic League and a Co-Minister of Finance from 1966 to 1970 in the governments of Rafael Paasio and Mauno Koivisto.

—From Suomen Kuvalehti (Helsinki), Oct. 12, 1973, p. 45.

Schism in the SKP

While the SDP seemed to be moving toward the left politically and closer to internal unity, the Finnish Communist Party was undergoing its first major schism of the postwar period. The party was in the throes of a conflict over the issue of maintaining hardline Stalinist positions on matters of doctrine and political strategy *vs.* seeking new ways to promote the SKP's fortunes in the Finnish political context.

In the mid-1960's, opposition to General Secretary Ville Pessi and other Stalinist leaders of the SKP began to surface in the party press.[43] A further crack in the conservative leadership of the party occurred in 1966 at the 14th SKP Congress, where Aarne Saarinen was elected Party Chairman, replacing the veteran Aimo Aaltonen, a man who sought to cleanse the SKP of "revisionist bedbugs." [44] Saarinen, a relative newcomer to party ranks (having joined the SKP only in 1944), brought to the post a fresh perspective, but one which profoundly antagonized many traditionalists in the party hierarchy. He reformulated the traditional Communist concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" by advocating "workers' power" and a form of "democratic centralism" that placed more emphasis on "democracy" than on "centralism," and he went on record as favoring the existence of a number of different parties under socialism.[45] Moreover, under his leadership, the SKP accepted Cabinet responsibility after an opposition role dating back to 1948, when the Communist rejected K. A. Fagerholm's offer of five portfolios in his government.[46] In 1966, SKDL Chairman Ele

[43] See Ilkka Hakalehto's summary in *Suomen Kuvalehti*, April 3, 1969, pp. 51, 54.

[44] See *Uusi Päivä* (Turku), April 26, 1966.

[45] See interview with Saarinen in *Suomen Kuvalehti*, Jan. 28, 1967, and his comments in *Kansan Uutiset*, Aug. 31, 1966.

[46] On this episode, see the mimeographed release "Pääministeri K.-A. Fagerholmin puhe Tampereen työväëntalossa 20.8.1948" (Prime Minister K. A. Fagerholm's Aug. 20, 1948, Speech in the Tampere Workers' Building), K. D. No. 4560, Helsinki, Valtion Tiedoituskeskus, pp. 4-5.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Alenius and two SKP members accepted portfolios in the Cabinet of SDP Chairman Rafael Paasio.

This step toward accommodation with other political forces and greater legitimacy ironically backfired, for the League and the Communists assumed governmental responsibility at a time when unemployment was high and harsh economic measures such as devaluation of the Finnmark were the rule rather than the exception. With Alenius the Co-Minister of Finance, SKP member Leo Suonpää the Co-Minister of Communications and Public Works (with special responsibility for matters related to unemployment), and SKP member Matti Kiovunen the Minister of Social Affairs, it was difficult for the Communists to dissociate themselves in the public mind from unpopular policies and circumstances. The result was a decline in acceptance of the SKDL among its normal followers,[47] a major factor in the Communist decision not to accept Cabinet portfolios following the parliamentary election of 1970.

Opposition to Saarinen's initiatives from within the party hierarchy was strongest in the conservative Communist strongholds of southern Finland and coalesced around the person of Taisto Sinisalo, Vice Chairman of the SKP and member of Parliament. Throughout this period (from the mid-1960's on), Sinisalo defended traditional Stalinist doctrine against Saarinen and the latter's support of innovations such as "workers' power." [48]

The rift within the SKP widened in the wake of the invasion of Czecholovakia by Soviet troops in August 1968 and the ensuing termination of Alexander Dubcek's experiment in "socialism with a human face." On the morning after the invasion, Saarinen called a meeting of the SKP Politburo, which voted to condemn the Soviet Union as an aggressor in Czechoslovakia.[49] This condemnation was later endorsed by the SKP's Central Committee. In September, Vice Chairman Erkki Salomaa, in upholding the party's official position, even termed the Soviet presence in Czechoslovakia an "occupation" (*miehitys*). When he came under attack from Moscow, the SKDL/SKP newspaper *Kansan Uutiset* rose to his defense and claimed that his comments reflected the views held by Finnish Communists.[50] However, this view

Taisto Sinisalo, leading spokesman for the Stalinist opposition elements in the SKP, who became a party Vice-Chairman as a result of efforts to avoid a direct schism after the 15th Congress of the SKP.

—From *Suomen Kuvalehti* (Helsinki), Sept. 28, 1973, p. 3.

was clearly not shared by all SKP elements. Saarinen's speech to the Central Committee prior to that body's formal approval of the earlier Politburo action caused the opposition to circulate a mimeographed statement that contained a strong denunciation of his stance.[51] Subsequently, members of the opposition singled out SKP criticism of the Soviet invasion as a major cause of the party's developing internal crisis, and Saarinen agreed that events in Czechoslovakia had "very significantly" exacerbated the conflict within party ranks.[52]

[47] The negative impact of SKDL and SKP participation in the Cabinet during 1966-70 on SKDL voter support was revealed in various opinion polls, the results of which were discussed in an editorial in *Helsingin Sanomat*, Sept. 24, 1972.

[48] Sinisalo's views were summarized in an article appearing in *ibid.*, Feb. 15, 1970.

[49] See *The New York Times*, Sept. 25, 1968.

[50] *Kansan Uutiset*, Oct. 3, 1968 (quoted in *Uusi Suomi*, Oct. 4.)

[51] Excerpts from the mimeographed statement were quoted in *Uusi Suomi*, Oct. 16, 1968. The opposition continues to view Saarinen as an undesirable Finnish Dubcek (see *Helsingin Sanomat*, April 15, 1973).

[52] See *Helsingin Sanomat*, Oct. 9 and 26, 1969.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The dispute finally erupted in open confrontation in April 1969, when opposition delegates to the 15th SKP Congress marched out of the conference hall and held a separate meeting to discuss the advisability of forming a new party.[53] When the opposition further refused to participate in the election of SKP officials, Arvo Aalto, a 37-year-old district secretary from northern Finland, was elected General Secretary, replacing Ville Pessi, who had served in that capacity for 25 years and who leaned toward the opposition. The latter group began to establish a "shadow organization" throughout the country, and in August 1969 six district executive committees under the control of Sinisalo forces charged the SKP leadership with abandoning the principles of Marxism-Leninism.[54]

A formal rupture was averted, however, through the efforts of a mediation committee, established in May 1969. By the end of the year, the committee had hammered out a written agreement designed to restore some semblance of party unity, and this agreement was formally approved in early 1970 at an extraordinary SKP Congress. Under its terms, the opposition received 15 of 35 Central Committee seats, 6 of 16 Politburo seats, and 3 of 8 seats in the party Secretariat. While the agreement prevented the presentation of rival Communist slates in the parliamentary election that took place one month after the extraordinary party congress (a specter that had been raised in at least four electoral districts), it could not conceal the deep cleavage in the party. The SKDL's attractiveness as a political alternative was severely damaged, and it experienced a sharp drop in popular support and a loss of five seats in parliament.

In assessing the lessons of their 1970 setback, Finnish Communists generally displayed an awareness of the foregoing factors, even if their commentaries were not so candid as Saarinen's analysis of a similar electoral defeat suffered by the Communists in Sweden two years before had been. At that time, Saarinen had observed:

As a Communist I naturally consider as most regrettable the defeat of our fraternal party in Sweden. But it comes as no great surprise, because within the party as well as on its fringes there exist many different tendencies which have dissipated the party's energies, have prevented the appearance of a common front, and have transmitted to the voters an image of vacillation. The outcome of the election was no doubt also influenced by the fact that the Social Democratic Party sought after its defeat in the communal election of 1966 to strike a more radical pose on policy questions. Many left-wing voters apparently thought it safer and more certain to cast ballots for the Social Democrats. Obviously the events in Czechoslovakia also had an important effect on the electorate.[55]

In a postmortem on the 1970 Finnish election, Ele Alenius, the SKDL's Chairman, admitted that his party had suffered from participation in the government, from the spillover effects of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and from the schism within the Finnish Communist Party. Although more noncommittal about the changing nature of Social Democracy in Finland, Alenius did acknowledge the growing strength of a new protest movement (*protestiliike*)—the Rural Party (*Suomen Maaseudun Puolue*).[56] In 1970 the Rural Party campaigned on a platform mixing right-wing bourgeois and left-wing socialist demands designed to attract swing voters in the countryside.[57] Drawing 49 percent of its supporters from farmers and 43 percent from workers, the Rural Party evidently siphoned voters from both the Center (Agrarian) Party and the SKDL in boosting its share of the vote from 1 percent in 1966 to 10.5 percent in 1970.[58]

Prospects

Turning to a brief evaluation of the SKP's prospects, one can hardly avoid the conclusion that it faces at best an uncertain future. The present party leadership is not oblivious to the fact that the SKP and the SKDL have failed to keep pace with the rapid changes in Finnish society. Chairman Saarinen ac-

[53] One delegate suggested naming the new organization the Finnish Communist Workers' Party (see *Uusi Suomi*, April 8, 1969).

[54] *Helsingin Sanomat*, Aug. 29, 1969.

[55] Quoted in *Uusi Suomi*, Sept. 16, 1968. The Swedish CP polled 3.0 percent of the popular vote in the national election of 1968 (as compared with 6.4 percent in the communal elections of 1966 and 5.2 percent in the 1964 national election). See M. Donald Hancock, *Sweden: The Politics of Postindustrial Change*, Hinsdale, Dryden Press, 1972, p. 117. Saarinen's comments, it is worth noting, came a month before the Finnish communal elections of 1968, in which SKDL support dropped 5 percentage points, presaging the setback in the 1970 national election.

[56] See *Kansan Uutiset*, May 16, 1970.

[57] Olavi Borg, *Suomen puolueet ja puolueohjelmat 1880-1964* (Finnish Parties and Party Programs: 1880-1964), Porvoo, WSOY, 1965, p. 340.

[58] *Helsingin Sanomat*, Nov. 23, 1969, and March 24, 1970.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Pictured at the 15th SKP Congress held in Helsinki in early 1969 are Vice-Chairman Erkki Salomaa (since deceased), Chairman Aarne Saarinen, and General Secretary Arvo Aalto.

—From *SKP:n 15. edustajakokous* (The 15th SKP Congress), Kuopio, Savon Sana, 1969, p. 142.

knowledges that the SKP has lost support among construction and factory workers in urban areas and among the poorer people of the countryside. To help offset this trend, he has called for a special effort to win recruits from labor's "new strata," *i.e.*, white-collar professionals like nurses.[59] Moreover, although the movement may have become more respectable among Finland's protest voters as a result of the reduction of Soviet influence in the SKP, this increased independence has created serious tensions within the party, and these tensions have adversely affected the electoral fortunes of the Finnish People's Democratic League.

In short, the leftist voter in Finland appears to have found viable political alternatives in the 1970's, and it is unlikely that the SKDL can recapture the ground that it lost in 1970, let alone improve upon earlier levels of electoral achievement. (In 1972 it managed to win only 17.0 percent of the national vote.) Neverthless, the League remains one of the three strongest blocs in Parliament and could well reenter the government in some form of coalition before the end of the decade.

This is a long way, however, from saying that the prospects for a peaceful transition to socialism, as envisioned by Finnish Communists, are promising. Only twice in Finland's history have parties of the working class captured a majority of the 200 seats in Parliament (103 in both 1916 and 1966), and only once have they been able to win a majority of the popular vote (51 percent in 1966). The probability of a repeat performance in terms of either seats or the popular vote is low. Furthermore, given the long history of conflict between Finnish Communists and Social Democrats, cooperation on far-reaching solutions to major social problems will almost certainly remain an unrealized goal. The cabinet coalition of 1966-70, which brought together Communists, Social Democrats, and Agrarians in a 3:7:5 ratio, was based on a program that Prime Minister Paasio (the first of two Social Democrats to lead the coalition) called "a compromise of compromises." More important, the years of the coalition's existence were notable for the country's lack of progress toward socialism. A multiparty system encourages dissent, not concordance. If the Finnish case is typical of prospects for the major nonruling Communist parties in the world, the judgment expressed by Peking in the early 1960's, *i.e.*, that "there is no historical precedent for parliamentary transition from capitalism to socialism," [60] will be no less valid at the end of the present decade.

[59] *Kansan Uutiset*, June 18, 1970.

[60] See a report in *The New York Times*, July 5, 1963.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Socialization in Eastern Europe

By Ivan Volgyes

EDITORS' NOTE: In our September-October 1973 issue, we presented articles examining political socialization in the Soviet and Chinese contexts. The following contribution extends the discussion of this process to the Communist states of Eastern Europe.

The Communist regimes which came to power in Eastern Europe after World War II faced a bleak political landscape dotted with dissident forces and characterized by populaces which, by and large, were not eager to live under the system that was about to be imposed upon them. The new leaders recognized that in order to maintain power they would have not only to control the masses but also to convince them, ultimately, of the correctness of the Communist vision and hence of the legitimacy of Communist rule. The long-term goal was the creation of a new type of citizenry, of a new socialist man—"a man of special mold," as Stalin had once put it.[1] Ideally, this new man would subordinate all else to serving the needs and furthering the goals of the ruling Communist party. He would be an active, hard-working, highly moral, and honest leader, a disciplined follower, unprejudiced in his actions toward those who support the system and full of hatred for the "enemies" who oppose it. He would also be an internationalist who "loves his fellow workers of the world" and is willing to work for their "liberation." Over the last quarter of a century the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe have made conscious and serious attempts to transmit these values to their subjects, to socialize them in this distinctive political mold.

Political socialization is not, of course, a Communist invention.[2] It is a process which occurs in every country, under every system of government, as the leaders of society attempt to foster desirable attitudes among the citizenry. However, in the Communist states of Eastern Europe—as in other Communist countries—the regimes try to exert a much more complete control over the process and to provide a more purposeful and intensive input into it than do the leaderships of Western democracies. This important distinction places an important imprint on the nature of political socialization observable in Eastern Europe. In the first place, as we shall see presently, it affects the process of transmitting values from one generation to the next—a process akin to, yet differing from, the adult-to-child form of political socialization observable in other political systems. Second, it results in an intensive effort to "resocialize" the adult population, *i.e.*, to alter the exist-

Mr. Volgyes is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Nebraska (Lincoln). Among his many works on Communism in Eastern Europe are The Politics of the Communist Party States in Eastern Europe *(forthcoming), which he co-authored with Peter A. Toma, and two other volumes forthcoming under his editorship*—Comparative Political Socialization: Eastern Europe *and* Environmental Deterioration in the USSR and in Eastern Europe.

[1] For the idealized picture of this "special man" of the future, see the oath of allegiance read by Stalin on Jan. 26, 1924, at Lenin's funeral, in J. V. Stalin, *Sochineniia* (Works), Vol. 6, Moscow, Ogiz, 1946-48, pp. 46-51. For a more recent Soviet statement on the subject of the "new Soviet man," see V. P. Tugarinov, "Socialist Society and the Person," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 18, 1960, pp. 27-34.

[2] As used here, the term "political socialization" signifies the transmission of political values, attitudes and norms from one political generation to another and the maintenance of desired values in successive political generations.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing value systems of adults and bring them into conformity with idealized Communist norms. This second process—one of "resocialization," or forcible adult-to-adult socialization—is unique to postrevolutionary systems. In such polities, traditional norms and values held by those who were influential in the prerevolutionary political system become subject to official proscription and are replaced by radically different value systems.[3]

In Eastern Europe, this latter process of resocialization has taken two forms: a *revolutionary*, or Stalinist, form and a *continuum* form. The revolutionary type of resocialization was given priority in the period immediately following Communist takeover, as the new regimes sought to coerce the respective populations into abandoning previously held norms and adhering at least publicly to the new belief system. These new values included acceptance of the dictatorship of the proletariat (*i.e.*, Communist rule); love of the Soviet Union and admiration for all things Soviet; condemnation of the given nation's past as bourgeois, decadent and negative; recognition of the intrinsically negative nature of all enemies of the USSR; and unquestioned obedience to the party line.

In the revolutionary phase of resocialization, what was demanded was open and enthusiastic displays of public support for the new regime and overt acceptance of its values—the sincerity or genuineness of adherence to the beliefs thus publicly displayed was of lesser importance. It did not matter so much whether the populace *wanted* to participate in a May Day parade; what was important was the act of

[3] Postrevolutionary systems are those in which there has been a radical change in the political system, whether by violent or relatively peaceful means. The important criterion is that the values held by the ruling elite of a postrevolutionary system differ radically from those held by the prerevolutionary elites. Thus, the 1948 takeover by the Communists in Czechoslovakia, while generally peaceful, still wrought revolutionary changes in the prevailing political system.

A massive public demonstration of loyalty to Nicolae Ceausescu, leader of the Romanian Communist Party, in Bucharest's Square of the Union of Iaşi.

—Photo by Eastfoto.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

participation, whether coerced or not. Belief in the infallibility of Stalin was unimportant; open and enthusiastic proclamation of that infallibility, however, was mandatory. This stage, though generally referred to as the Stalinist phase of resocialization in Eastern Europe, actually extended far beyond the Soviet dictator's death. Indeed, it may be said to have continued to the present in East Germany, Albania and Romania, and to have been reintroduced in Czechoslovakia after the fall of Dubcek.

So long as Stalinist methods of rule persisted, the primary concern of the East European Communist regimes was to maintain control over their subject populations. However, even in this period, the regimes also began to work toward a more fundamental and lasting political reorientation of the population—toward the internalization of the values of the revolution by the masses. Once Stalinism was abandoned, either as a result of political upheavals or as a consequence of a gradual liberalization of Communist rule, priority shifted from the modes of revolutionary socialization toward tactics of what might be called *continuum* resocialization. Either by necessity or conscious choice, the Communist leaderships of some East European states turned to "softer," subtler methods designed to bring about the gradual and continuous alteration of values held by the public to make them conform to the values of the regime. This continuum phase of resocialization resembles traditional types of adult political socialization in other types of societies, although it involves a higher degree of conscious control of the process by the leaders.

In a certain sense, this phase of political socialization actually results in a "depoliticization" of society—insofar as overt political activity (demonstrations, etc.) is minimized. Instead, public energies are increasingly rechanneled into those economic and social activities necessary to maintain and strengthen the socialist system. This shift of concern from the survival of Communist rule to the legitimization of Communist leadership occurred around 1954 in Yugoslavia, 1965 in Hungary, and 1963 in Poland. It has placed greater burdens on the respective leaderships, which, in order to "earn" their popularity, must now prepare their messages to the populace with greater sophistication and care than in the period of revolutionary resocialization, when rote declarations of allegiance could be forcibly elicited from the public.

In examining the structures or agencies of political socialization in Communist Eastern Europe, one discovers considerable similarities to, as well as pronounced differences from, those in Western states. In general, agencies of political socialization fall into two broad categories, either primary and informal or secondary and formal.[4] The primary, informal agencies undertake the inculcation of values through face-to-face contact, generally in unorganized activities involving a direct relationship between the socializer and the socialized. Secondary, or formal agencies of socialization transfer values through more structured and purposive activities.

Socialization Institutions

In Communist societies, as elsewhere, the most important of the primary agencies of socialization are the family, the church, and informal peer groups. The socialization functions of these primary agencies closely correspond in Communist and non-Communist societies, although differences do exist. The most striking difference, perhaps, is the fact that in Communist Eastern Europe, the primary agencies not only remain outside the control of the regime but also often teach values which run counter to those promoted by the regime.

It is in comparing the role and functions of the secondary, formal agencies of political socialization, however, that one discovers the greatest differentiation between practices in Communist and non-Communist societies. In the former, secondary agencies such as the Communist party, the youth groups, the schools, the trade unions, the military, and various specialized peer groups (*e.g.*, women's or sports organizations) undertake the inculcation of well-defined political norms among their members through activities which are more structured and purposive than in non-Communist societies or, for that matter, in the case of primary agencies of socialization within Communist societies.

Here, the Communist party in each of the East European states plays a pivotal and dual role. Not only does the party function as a secondary agent in socializing its own membership and conducting agitation and propaganda among the populace at large; it also acts as the formalizer and articulator of the values to be taught and as an overseer of the activi-

[4] For a categorization of agencies of political socialization, see Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, *Political Socialization*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1969, p. 110. (Literature in this field is already so extensive that comprehensive references would be impossible.)

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Albanian kindergarten children prepare a wall display commemorating the April 1970 centenary of Lenin's birth.

—Photo by Eastfoto.

ties of all other agencies of socialization.[5] Thus, party secretaries in every local cell oversee socializing activities, provide feedback on dysfunctional aspects of the process, and, depending on the extent of political control achieved, may even attempt to influence the activities of the primary socializing agencies.

Bringing Up Youth

The political socialization of children in Eastern Europe is accomplished by both primary and secondary structures. In the early years, the primary structures are of central importance, but as the child grows older the role of formal structures increases. The most important of the formal socializing agencies dealing with youth between the ages of 6 and 18 is the school system. It is closely controlled by the party, which relies on it to transmit to youth the officially sanctioned values. Indeed, political socialization is one of the central tasks of the school systems of Eastern Europe.[6] In each of these Communist states, control is exercised over the schools by a central ministry, which establishes compulsory curricula for all schools as well as providing uniform textbooks and prescribing the pedagogical methods to be used.[7]

Four approaches to political socialization in the context of the schools merit attention. Two are indirect—the use of classroom bulletin boards and of value-loaded teaching and textbooks. Two are more direct—the teaching of topics in Marxism-Leninism and the socializing activities of various youth groups connected with the schools.[8]

At one level, the bulletin boards which are provided in each classroom of every school merely serve to communicate neutral information to students. However, the pictures and articles placed on such bulletin boards at the direction of the youth league or the teachers who act as advisors to the youth league contain value-loaded information designed to inculcate specific political values in the student body. Throughout Eastern Europe, the bulletin boards are clearly used by a few active students chosen by teachers or youth-group secretaries to influence the political attitudes of their classmates. The bulletin boards are ubiquitous, but the content and style vary from country to country, from school to school, and even from class to class.[9] The degree of "organization" of these bulletin boards or "wall newspapers" in the schools of Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia is rather low. By contrast, usage is well organized in Romania and East Germany, although also on the decline.

Like the message of the bulletin boards, the content of every classroom subject from mathematics to foreign languages is value-loaded, designed to exert an indirect influence on the formation of political values in the students. For example, a mathematics problem will indicate that worker X in a socialist state earns Y amount of money by working only a few hours, whereas worker Z in a capitalist country, working three times as long, receives only one-third as much pay.[10] Likewise, foreign-language

[5] On the role of the party as a structuring agent, see Frank S. Meyer, *The Moulding of Communists: The Training of the Communist Cadre*, New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961.

[6] This critical function of Communist school systems is highlighted in Wasyl Shimoniak, *Communist Education*, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1970, and M. Szanawska, *Swiatopoglad mlodziezy* (The World-View of Youth), Warsaw, Osrodek Badan Opinii Publicznej, 1960.

[7] For a particularly useful description of centralized educational controls in an East European state, see Peter John Georgeoff, *The Social Education of Bulgarian Youth*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1968.

[8] These major approaches to the socialization of youth were suggested in Erno Buti's *Public Education in the Hungarian People's Republic*, Budapest, Tankonyvkiado, 1968.

[9] Use of the bulletin boards by politically active students is described in Dr. Anna Verebely (Mrs. Ligeti), "Research Among Upperclassmen Concerning the Inculcation of the Esthetics of Behavior," *Budapesti nevelo* (Budapest), No. 3, 1970, pp. 31-32.

[10] See Iordan Makov, *Aritmetika: za vtori klas na obshtoobrazovatelnite trudovo politeknicheski uchilishta* (Arithmetics: [A Textbook] for Second-Grade Students of a General Polytechnical School), Sofia, Narodna Prosveta, 1964, pp. 35-36.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

texts, even at the elementary level, contain exaggerated examples of the exploitation of workers in capitalist countries.[11]

All the Communist states of Eastern Europe practice value-loaded teaching aimed at infusing students with a Marxist *Weltanschauung*. Particularly in the teaching of the humanities and social sciences, objectivity is abandoned as the ministries of education try to incorporate in the curricula the current views of the ruling elite.[12] Consequently, when a new party leadership emerges, it demands a new interpretation of past events, and textbooks are withdrawn and rewritten to the new specifications. This practice has occurred in all East European states, most frequently in those which have experienced revolutionary upheavals, and least frequently in East Germany and Yugoslavia, which have experienced a relative continuity of political values.

Direct instruction in political values is carried out either by means of specific courses in ideology or through the "form-master's hour." Courses on Marxism-Leninism exist in the high-school curricula of Hungary, East Germany, and Romania, and are usually taught at the senior level under a rubric such as "The Bases of Our Ideology" or simply "Marxism-Leninism."[13] Such courses seek to teach students to discover and comprehend the working of abstract Marxist "laws" in the concrete information learned in other classes. Thus, a student's knowledge of the fact that a few Roman families ruled the total population of the Roman Empire is conceptualized in such a course as a demonstration of Marx's theory of class struggle.

In addition to this type of instruction in Marxist theory and values, students also undergo direct political socialization in the "form-master's hour"—a weekly session devoted to special topics and public events. In every East European state, occasions such as "Liberation Day" are utilized in these sessions to discuss the historical appropriateness and ideological importance of the events commemorated—a practice designed to increase the students' acceptance of the legitimacy of the Communist political system.

Table 1: Socialization Potential of East European Youth Leagues

(in percent)[a]

	High	Medium	Low
East German	72		
Albanian[b]	68		
Bulgarian	67		
Polish	61		
Romanian		53	
Czechoslovak			27
Hungarian			25
Yugoslav			23

[a] The figures are weighted averages of three indicators: 1) the membership of the given youth league as a percent of those in the eligible age group; 2) the number of youth league officials who serve in top party bodies (*e.g.*, central committees and central auditing commissions) and hence provide a direct line from the party leadership to the leagues; and 3) the circulation of the youth league newspaper as a percentage of those in the age group eligible for membership. For a further discussion of these calculations, see the author's *Comparative Political Socialization: Eastern Europe*, New York, Praeger (forthcoming).

[b] The figure for Albania had to be an estimate because of the insufficiency of available data.

A fourth instrumentality through which political socialization is carried out in the schools is the network of youth groups. These organizations, existing in each East European Communist state, and ranging from the Pioneers through the "young Communist leagues," are under the direct supervision of the party but operate in and through the school systems.[14] Political activities are introduced gradually in these groups, and the subtlety and sophistication of the values stressed increase as the student progresses from kindergarten on through the university level.[15] Political socialization appears to be most successful among children in the age-range of 12 to 15 years, when the desire for acceptance by one's peers is strongest.

While it is evident that the youth leagues of Eastern Europe are of differing utility as instruments of the political socialization programs of the respective Communist regimes, it is impossible to provide a

[11] For clear examples of this type of value-loaded teaching, see *My English Reader*, Budapest, Tankonyvkiado, 1970—a textbook for the Hungarian high school system. Selections like "On Strike," from Richard Llewellyn's *How Green Was My Valley* (on pp. 171-73 of this reader) abound.

[12] Thus, we read on p. 114 of a Hungarian first-grade textbook—*ABC olvasokonyv* (ABC Reader), Budapest, Tankonyvkiado, 1970: "Today, the 4th of April, we celebrate our country's liberation. We can be grateful for this to the heroic Soviet soldiers."

[13] The revamped Hungarian high school curriculum uses the latest textbook on Marxism-Leninism—*Vilagnezetunk alapjai* (The Foundations for Our *Weltanschauung*), Budapest, Tankonyvkiado, 1970.

[14] Bozhidăr Bozhilov, in his *Deseti kongress* (10th Congress), Sofia, Partizdat, 1971, offers a clear statement of the intended role of youth leagues in the political socialization process.

[15] The gradations in political activities at different age-levels were discussed by Christina Geerdts and Heinz Schmidt in "Conference Concerning Socialist Upbringing," *Jugendhilfe* (East Berlin), No. 3, 1966, especially pp. 92-95.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

precise determination of the actual "effectiveness" of any given youth league as a socializing tool of the ruling party. However, the accompanying Table 1 provides an approximate ranking of the potential utility of the East European youth leagues as agencies of political socialization. Several points should be noted in reading this relative ranking of effectiveness. In the first place, the situation in Poland is in a state of flux as a result of the reorganization of the youth leagues which began in 1972 and culminated in the summer of 1973. It remains to be seen whether the new Polish Socialist Youth Federation can maintain even a middle level of effectiveness as a political socializer. Low rankings for the Hungarian and Yugoslav youth movements reflect the relative stability of the regimes and the consequently lesser need for the socializing work of youth groups. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the ineffectiveness of youth organizations stems from quite an opposite cause—namely, the prevalence of general bitterness against the regime and the occupying Russian troops who buttress it.

The Media and Political Communication

While the most important agency of political socialization of the adult-to-child type is the schools, Communist political systems rely heavily on the communications media—television, radio, newspapers, journals, books, films, theater, and demonstrative art—to instill political values at the adult-to-adult level. At the outset, the concern was to establish control of all the media of communication to prevent their use as agents of negative political socialization, *i.e.*, as promoters of values opposed to the official value system. Once monopoly control was established over the media, they could be used by the governments as channels of positive political communication.

It would be foolish, of course, to contend that there is a clear and positive correlation between the extent of control over the media by a regime and the content of the messages communicated, on the one hand, and the political behavior of the citizenry, on the other.[16] The differing political cultures and distinctive national characteristics of the citizenries of Eastern Europe (both from country to country and within a given multinational country) militate against such a view. The attitudes of a Bulgarian toward authority of any kind may differ markedly from those of a Pole, or a native of Bohemia may react differently than a Slovak to political messages emanating from a regime in Prague. The phenomenon of cognitive dissonance—*i.e.*, the tendency of individual citizens to compartmentalize their attitudes concerning different types of behavior—also works counter to the regime's efforts to evoke consistently correct political behavior by its messages.[17] Thus, a person who accepts socialist ownership of property may still accept bribes or go to church, unable or unwilling to perceive any inconsistency in his actions. Despite these important qualifications, one must recognize that the centralized control exercised by the regimes over communications media of all types affords them an unusually great capacity for transmitting political messages. Whether sophisticated or inept, the messages transmitted exert an influence on political attitudes and behavior which is greater than that prevalent in democratic political systems.

The range and intensity of controls exercised over the media in Eastern Europe vary from country to country, and there seems to be a direct correlation between the amount of control exercised over the entire polity and the intensity with which the government uses the media for political communication. The strictest controls are exercised in Albania, followed by East Germany, Romania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, while considerably less control over these transmission belts of political socialization is evident in Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia.

Themes of Political Socialization

Having briefly examined the agencies and media, *i.e.*, the instruments whereby political values are transmitted to the population, let us turn now to the nature of the messages transmitted. While emphasis on creating the ideal Communist "new man" has tended to diminish somewhat as the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe have succeeded in placing their political legitimacy on a firmer footing, they still continue to pursue the goal of creating dedi-

[16] The problem is discussed by Richard R. Fagen in *Politics and Communication*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1966, p. 43.

[17] Clearly, Eastern Europe is just as subject as other parts of the world to this social phenomenon. For a recent theoretical discussion of the theory of cognitive dissonance, see the entry, "Cognitive Theories in Social Psychology," in Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, Eds., *Handbook of Social Psychology*, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1968, Vol. I, pp. 320-411.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 2. Key Political Socialization Themes
(listed in order of importance)

ALBANIA	HUNGARY
1. anti-imperialism [a]	1. building of socialism
2. building socialism	2. socialist morality
3. socialist morality	3. anti-imperialism
4. anti-individualism	4. socialist commonwealth
5. patriotism	5. patriotism
6. antinationalism	6. antinationalism
7. anti-Stalinism	7. anti-individualism
8. socialist commonwealth	8. anti-Stalinism
BULGARIA	**POLAND**
1. building of socialism	1. building of socialism
2. anti-imperialism	2. patriotism
3. socialist commonwealth	3. anti-Stalinism
4. anti-individualism	4. socialist morality
5. socialist morality	5. anti-individualism
6. patriotism	6. socialist commonwealth
7. antinationalism	7. anti-imperialism
8. anti-Stalinism	8. antinationalism
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	**ROMANIA**
1. antinationalism	1. patriotism
2. socialist commonwealth	2. anti-Stalinism
3. anti-imperialism	3. building of socialism
4. anti-individualism	4. anti-individualism
5. building of socialism	5. socialist morality
6. socialist morality	6. anti-imperialism
7. anti-Stalinism	7. socialist commonwealth
8. patriotism	8. antinationalism
EAST GERMANY	**YUGOSLAVIA**
1. building of socialism	1. antinationalism
2. anti-imperialism	2. patriotism
3. socialist commonwealth	3. building of socialism
4. antinationalism	4. anti-Stalinism
5. socialist morality	5. anti-individualism
6. anti-individualism	6. socialist morality
7. anti-Stalinism	7. socialist commonwealth
8. patriotism	8. anti-imperialism

EAST EUROPE AS A WHOLE [b]	
1. building of socialism	**5. anti-individualism**
2. anti-imperialism	**6. socialist commonwealth**
3. socialist morality	**7. antinationalism**
4. patriotism	**8. anti-Stalinism**

[a] In the case of Albania, this theme is coupled with anti-revisionism, *i.e.*, condemnation of the Soviet Union as imperialist.
[b] Derived from the relative rankings for the eight countries.

SOURCES: Newspapers sampled (by alphabetical order of country involved) were: *Zeri i popullit* (Tirana), *Rabotnichesko delo* (Sofia), *Rude pravo* (Prague), *Neues Deutschland* (E. Berlin), *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), *Trybuna ludu* (Warsaw), *Scinteia* (Bucharest), and *Borba* (Belgrade).

cated citizens. There are differences from country to country, but certain values are stressed in the political socialization messages of all. In order to separate out the themes emphasized by the respective regimes, the author analyzed the contents of 50 issues of the official newspaper of each ruling Communist party, the issues having been selected at random from those appearing between July 1, 1971, and January 1, 1972.[18]

The messages contained both positive and negative themes of political socialization, the former emphasizing attitudes supportive of officially prescribed values, and the latter stressing attitudes of opposition to "contrary" values. Among the positive themes were commitment to the building of socialism and socialist morality, patriotism, and love for the socialist commonwealth, while negative themes included anti-imperialism, antinationalism, anti-individualism, and anti-Stalinism. Differing emphases placed on one or another of these themes reflect not only the differing international situations of individual countries but also significant changes in the political life of a given state. Although it is difficult to be definitive in judgments concerning the intensity of emphasis placed on the various themes in any given case, a tentative country-by-country ranking of importance of socialization themes (based on frequency of mention) has been provided in Table 2.

As these data indicate, the building of socialism is the theme most emphasized throughout Eastern Europe, representing an essential element in the process of political legitimization of the respective regimes. Only in Czechoslovakia does this theme fall below the median—a reflection of unusual problems facing the post-Dubcek leadership. During the period surveyed, the prime concern of Czechoslovakia's Communist leaders was to combat nationalism—both separatist forces within the country and anti-Russian sentiment. Also of relatively greater importance to the Czechoslovak regime was the promotion of support for the socialist commonwealth of nations in order to eliminate the bitterness created by the August 1968 invasion by the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland.

The "negative" theme of anti-imperialism emerged as the next most important theme of political social-

[18] The author discussed the socialization messages of the East European Communist regimes in greater detail in "Political Socialization in Eastern Europe: A Comparative Framework," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* (De Kalb, Ill.), Fall 1973.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ization in Eastern Europe as a whole. It was emphasized in Albania, Bulgaria, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, although it fell below the median in Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia.[19] Poland's relative deemphasis of this theme reflects a number of factors: the grant of "most favored nation" trade status to Poland by the United States, the large number of Poles living in the West, the lack of a perceivable threat from the West, and perhaps concern on the part of the Polish leadership lest the population identify the Soviet Union itself as a threatening imperialist power.

There seems to be a reasonable degree of consensus among the East European regimes concerning the importance of inculcating socialist morality in the population. The need for stressing this theme is evident in the recurrent instances of petty corruption and official scandal in these states.

Patriotism is the next most important theme of political socialization, although significant differences exist from country to country. Patriotism has been stressed by the Gierek regime to cut the ground from under potential political opposition; in Romania the theme is utilized to help build a united domestic front against possible Soviet pressures; and in Yugoslavia it serves both as a defense against possible foreign pressures and as an antidote to a resurgence of Croatian separatism. At the opposite extreme, appeals to patriotism are clearly politically inopportune in contemporary Czechoslovakia.

Anti-individualism seems to receive similar stress in all the states, although it is emphasized more in the conservative, conformist states than in those which show degrees of liberalization. This theme views man as a part of the social mechanism rather than as an isolated phenomenon, and it stresses the meshing of individual efforts toward approved social goals rather than the defense of individual rights against encroachment by the system.

The theme of support for the "socialist commonwealth"—*i.e.*, the community of Communist states headed by the Soviet Union—understandably receives differing treatment in different East European states. It has been emphasized in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Hungary. By contrast, the governments of Albania, Romania and Yugoslavia have played down this attitude in political socialization messages or have even encouraged negative views toward the Soviet-dominated system.

No clear pattern of emphasis emerges in the case of antinationalist messages, although both Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia place considerable importance on this theme. In the case of Yugoslavia, the thrust of such messages appears to be aimed at discouraging Croatian nationalism and separatism, while on the other hand devotion to the Yugoslav nation as a whole is naturally promoted. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the antinationalist theme has both an external and a domestic thrust: the Czechoslovak Communist Party stresses antinationalism, on the one hand, in the context of cultivating positive attitudes toward the USSR, and on the other hand, within the framework of discouraging Slovak separatism. The fact that this theme was accorded top priority in the period surveyed suggests the importance of the problems facing the Husak regime on these fronts.

The final theme emphasized in the party newspapers of Eastern Europe is that of anti-Stalinism or, more precisely, advocacy of a kind of leadership not based on a personality cult (with its claims of infallibility and implicit unaccountability). The emphasis on the topic in Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia differs from that in the other Communist states. In the case of Romania and Yugoslavia, Stalinism is associated with the USSR and its attempts to dominate these two countries. Paradoxically, both countries are ruled by strongly personalized leaders, yet both regimes attempt to legitimize their rule by opposing Stalinist practices in the Soviet Union. In Poland, Gierek has attempted to gain legitimacy by accusing his predecessor, Wladyslaw Gomulka, of letting a cult of personality develop around himself. However, the importance of this theme in Polish political socialization efforts may be expected to decline as Gierek consolidates his power.

To What End?

This brief discussion of the mechanisms and themes of political socialization in Eastern Europe indicates the great importance attached to the combined resocialization and socialization of the populace in these Communist countries. When it comes to the question of the effectiveness of the East European regimes' efforts in these areas, however,

[19] In Albania, attacks on imperialism include blasts against revisionism (*i.e.*, the USSR). See, for example, the pamphlet *Le te shpretheje e fuqishme stuhia e revolucionit* (Let us Expand the Strength of the Revolution), Tirana, Shtepia Botomjese Naim Frasheri, 1968—an essay which also appeared in *Zeri i popullit* (Tirana), May 17, 1968.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

we are confronted by a lack of adequate and reliable published data and generally limited opportunities to conduct research utilizing modern survey techniques. To be sure, conspicuous manifestations of failure—such as uprisings, defections to the West, and rumblings of political dissent—are readily apparent to everyone; on the other hand, successes are more difficult to ascertain and generally tend to go unnoticed by outside observers.

The very fact that the various populaces generally accept the socialist system as such is an indication that the East European regimes' political socialization programs have achieved a substantial measure of success. While it may not be clear in the minds of the citizenry exactly what socialism is, what type of rule it stands for, or what role the individual is to play in it, there appears to be little support for a return to the political systems of the interwar era or for the substitution of democratic-capitalist systems of a West European type. Opinion surveys in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia demonstrate this basic allegiance to the system of socialism.[20] Although these surveys were largely administered by organs of the socialist states, the basic finding of support for the system is borne out by independent observations.

Other officially prescribed values, too, appear to have been accepted and internalized by the population in various states. "Socialist patriotism," where emphasized, has met with relatively easy acceptance because it tends to reinforce preexisting values and to converge with traditional norms.[21] The goal of "building socialism," when interpreted to mean improvement of the material welfare of the population, is also likely to be accepted. Inculcation of anti-Stalinist values must fall on fertile ground where people obviously have suffered from the oppressive features of dictatorial, totalitarian rule. Anti-imperialism also may have found some receptivity among uninformed masses in Albania, who have been repeatedly exhorted to fear the Soviet and American bogeymen.



Some of 5,000 Yugoslav youths from all parts of the country who voluntarily worked to construct a new railroad pass, river embankments and parks in New Belgrade during the summer of 1968.

—Photo by Tanjug via Eastfoto.

Despite these successes, it is also true that many of the values which the leaders have tried to foster appear to have been rejected by the citizenry. Among those least accepted are socialist morality, anti-nationalism, and love of the socialist commonwealth. Socialist morality—requiring a nearly puritanical way of life characterized by honesty and the equalization of justice—seems to be the value least translated into behavior.[22] In all East European states, petty larceny, theft of state property, bribery of various sorts, and official scandals involving government ministers, party cadres and managers are rife. Though not necessarily a new phenomenon in Eastern Europe, petty corruption (from the payment of unofficial honoraria to state-employed medical

[20] See, for example, Jarek Piekalkiewicz, *Public Opinion Polling in Czechoslovakia,* New York, Praeger, 1972; Dr. Jozsev Kovacsics, *Kozvelemenykutatas a tanacsi igazgatasban* (Public Opinion Polling in the Direction of the Councils), Szekesfehervar, 1970; publications of the Sociological Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and by the Public Opinion Center of the Hungarian Radio and Television; publications of the Osrodek Badan Opinii Publicznej, including *Spoleczenstwo Polskie w badaniach ankietowych* (The Polish Society in Opinion Surveys), Warsaw, Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1966; and public opinion surveys published by sociological institutes of the various academies and by law and sociology faculties of major universities in Yugoslavia.

[21] See *Spolezenstwo Polskie . . ., op. cit.,* pp. 43 ff.; and Nicolae Ceausescu, *Raport la cel de al IX-lea congres al Partidului Communist Roman* (Report to the Ninth Congress of the Romanian Communist Party), Bucharest, Editura Politica, 1965, pp. 5 ff.

[22] Everpresent official scandals, many reported in the press, militate against successful inculcation of the theme of socialist morality. For example, *Magyar nemzet* (Budapest) of Feb. 16, 1972, described the prosecution of a prostitution ring of some 20 girls who, with their managers, worked almost exclusively for hard currency. In another case, the manager of the New Life Collective Farm gambled away the entire farm at cards; no mention was made of the lucky winners! (The author heard this on the radio and in a political satire theater during a 1971 visit to Budapest.)

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

personnel for preferential treatment to the offering of bribes to officials for a high place on the waiting list for housing) is now a common characteristic of daily life in the East European states.

The Communist regimes also have failed to stem divisive nationalist attitudes. Indeed, nationalism is rife in Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Albania, and Hungary, and strong anti-Russian attitudes have also proved resistant to change. Unique efforts have been undertaken with regard to nationalism in Yugoslavia and East Germany. In the first case, the regime faces the problem of creating nationalism—a Yugoslav nationalism. In the German Democratic Republic, anti-nationalism has come to mean opposition to German unity and support of the East German regime. There are as yet no clear indications of the successes and failures of the two regimes in these areas.

Coupled with the failure of political socialization to eradicate nationalism is the nearly universal rejection of the concept of a socialist commonwealth tied together by bonds of ideological affinity and affection. Historic national rivalries and animosities have been compounded by such events as the formation of an anti-Tito coalition in the early 1950's, the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 by troops of five Warsaw Pact countries, and the continuing pressure by Moscow to bring Romania into line. Hungarian irredentism and policies of discrimination against the Magyar minority in Romania likewise do not contribute to positive attitudes concerning any East European commonwealth of nations. Finally, popular opposition to a Soviet-dominated political system remains such that even if the party leaderships in the various countries were to strongly advocate and support such a system, they would have little success in convincing their populations of its desirability.

The average citizen in Eastern Europe today possesses a mixed value system. He rejects as false or based on untrue premises many of the values which the Communist elites attempt to inculcate in him. He also recognizes that "successes" in the building of socialism have failed to provide him with the benefits enjoyed by the citizens of most West European states—a fact brought home by increasing tourist movement between East and West. At home, the populace recognizes the existence of a semi-Orwellian society where "all are equal, but some are more equal than others." The "cadre kids" arrive at school in official cars, and leaders live in relatively luxurious "government compounds" and are able to purchase luxury items or consumer goods in short supply at special stores.

Such discrepancies between proclaimed values and the actual life-style of the political elites are perhaps the greatest obstacle to the programs of political socialization. Values are easily mouthed, but their internalization is a quite different matter. East Europeans recognize the need to repeat the slogans, but few believe in them. Continued changes in norms and deliberate official insistence upon public acceptance of values which are contradicted by reality have resulted in the prevalence of a higher degree of public cynicism than Eastern Europe has ever known before, a cynicism extending to all areas of political life.[23] It not only stands in the way of the cultivation of a new, socialist value system but also allows the regime to rule without any real challenge from the citizenry. Gone are the illusions that it is possible to create a socialist system "with a human face," as envisioned in Czechoslovakia during 1968, or a "democratic socialist" system, such as was sought in Hungary in 1956. What remains is a system of rule where the party makes the policies and the people accept the party's rule-making authority —cynically, without enthusiasm, but also without any significant opposition.

There is little, in fact, to suggest that the regimes of Eastern Europe will be able to accomplish a great deal more in terms of political socialization. A general acceptance of the legitimacy of the Communist governments has been achieved. Pursuit of the longer-range goal of transforming the very personality of socialist citizens seems to have become less promising the further the societies have moved away from the élan of the immediate postrevolutionary period. Instead, more basic and visceral issues—such as the desire for improved living conditions or the urge to assert national interests—have returned to the forefront to confound if not to force a reshaping of the messages of political socialization of the past decades.

[23] During 1972 the author began an extensive survey of cynicism in Hungary using a combination of Richard Christie's "Quantification of Machiavelli" (see his unpublished memorandum from the Department of Social Psychology, Columbia University, 1959, as printed in John P. Robinson, Jerrold G. Rush, and Kendra B. Head, *Measures of Political Attitudes*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, 1968, p. 480) and the "cynicism scales" developed by Angus Campbell *et al.*, in *The Voter Decides*, Evanston, Ill., Row, Peterson and Co., 1954. The results are now being tabulated.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Soviet Film Audience: A Confidential View

By Felice D. Gaer

In recent years, there has been increasing awareness of the rebirth of the social sciences in the Soviet Union. Sociology and political science, in particular, have emerged from officially-imposed obscurity to a state of being quasi-tolerated and even encouraged by the authorities. But the balance between approval and suppression of social science research and theory-building is still extremely tenuous. There has been an alternating pattern of relaxation and tightening-up of controls over Soviet social science research, just as there has been such a pattern in general societal politics in the USSR. The net result, nonetheless, has been a gradual loosening of the boundaries of legitimate social-scientific inquiry and the incipient institutionalization of centers for both academic and governmental (party) research in the social sciences.[1]

The progress of such inquiry is reflected to some extent in numerous reports that have appeared in the Soviet press and in a variety of magazines, pamphlets and books. All such accounts are, of course, approved for open publication only after going through the editorial and censorship apparatus. Outside analysts scrutinize this published data, often deciphering nuances in the reporting itself. They attempt to assess the "state of the art," including its levels of sophistication and the degree of approval that sociology receives from the different organizational constituencies of the research. Through analysis of such sources, it has been possible to obtain a fair understanding of the nature and quality of the social science research establishment in the Soviet Union during the past decade.

There are, however, additional publications, reports and data concerning the social sciences which are not available in "open" publications. Western observers have long been aware of such materials; their existence has been deduced, for example, from occasional references in the press to studies which are mentioned as if they were well known but which are never described in detail or quoted, and which have not been seen by the Soviet public at large or by foreigners.

Such references suggest the existence of a large store of publications in the Soviet Union which range in classification from "limited access," through "semisecret," to "secret." The Soviet authorities can restrict access to publications by limiting either the number of copies printed (*tirazh*) or the number of persons who are allowed to read the items. Readership can be curtailed, at a relatively low level of control, by restricting the geographical availability of publications (both domestically and abroad) or, at a much higher control level, by specifying the people who may see copies according to such criteria as membership in particular committees or organizations, or rank.

A good example of items in the "limited access" range of classification is the *oblast* (provincial) news-

Ms. Gaer is a Junior Fellow of the Russian Institute, Columbia University (New York). She is currently at work on a PhD dissertation about the impact of cybernetics and computerization on Soviet politics.

[1] The three major sociological institutions in the USSR are the Institute for Applied Social Research in the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Learned Council on Problems of Applied Social Research, and the Soviet Sociological Association. Sociological work is also carried on at other central academic institutions, at republic academies of science, and at major university centers. Within the CPSU, there are several specialized sociological sections in the Academy of Social Sciences of the party Central Committee. For more about the institutes, see Zev Katz, "Sociology in the Soviet Union," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1971, pp. 22-40.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

papers, which are largely confined to local circulation and are not available to foreigners by subscription.[2] Many books fall into this category in that they are released in severely limited quantities to the Soviet general public and are not available for export.[3]

The "semisecret" category probably embraces most of the aforementioned reports that get occasional passing mention in the press but are never directly quoted in open publications. Access to such items is determined not simply by the availability of copies but by restricted distribution to specific professional or party groups. "Semisecret" publications apparently range from reports circulated in limited numbers to constitutents of a particular research institute or party committee to studies dealing with sensitive issues of broader interest, such as real production figures or attitudes of sensitive sectors of the population, distributed to a number of institutional units but on the basis of selected readership. It is somewhat difficult to establish a boundary between the "semisecret" and "secret" categories, but the latter assuredly include higher-level party reports concerning particularly sensitive internal policies, internal security, and defense.

"Semisecrets" about Cinema Audiences

The present paper is occasioned by the author's chance fortune in gaining access through private channels to a Soviet document which belongs in the "semisecret" category—namely, a pamphlet by A. F. Krasilov entitled *A Sociological Study of the Cinema* (*Sotsiologicheskoe issledovanie kinematografa*), prepared under the aegis of the Film Section of the Department of Culture, Central Committee of the CPSU. Produced in Moscow in 1966, the pamphlet is 48 pages long and carries an imprint noting a *tirazh* (edition) of 300 copies. Each copy of the document (to judge by the one seen) is numbered, is labeled "for official use," and carries the following affixed notice:

Respected comrade! For information, we are sending you material of a sociological study of the cinema, which is not intended for the open press.

The text reveals that Krasilov's study was specially commissioned by the Film Section, the arm of the Department of Culture of the Central Committee that bears the ultimate responsibility for film content in the Soviet Union. This organ—to which the "formal" organization responsible for movie production, the State Committee on Cinematography, must defer—ascertains and passes censorial judgment on the ideological and general political acceptability of all films produced in (and/or shown in) the USSR.[4] The pamphlet was apparently the final installment of a broader sociological study entitled *Social Life and the Social Role of Film,* commissioned under Central Committee sponsorship and published seriatim over several months of 1966; specifically, it is a summary of the findings of seven other reports in a multifaceted survey of Soviet filmgoers' habits and attitudes.[5] The pamphlet deals frankly with the sensitive subject of the cinema audience in the Soviet Union, including certain topics which are rarely discussed in the open press —*e.g.,* the motivations that prompt Soviet citizens to attend movies and the importance of "publicity" in their selection of films. It is noteworthy that the survey was commissioned at a time when sociological studies were only beginning to emerge from officially-sanctioned obscurity and were not fully accepted as legitimate.

A point of particular interest is the absence of a censor's stamp on Krasilov's study. While there may be a certain ironic logic in the fact that a Central Committee department responsible, *inter alia,* for the censorship of film did not feel the need to censor itself, some other implications can also be drawn. The last published statute on Glavlit, the government organ responsible for censorship of printed material in the Soviet Union, stipulated in 1936 that every item put into print must bear the censor's

[2] Great quantities of information, otherwise unavailable to Western analysts of Soviet affairs, can be derived from local papers of this type. See Philip D. Stewart, *Political Power in the Soviet Union: A Study of Decision-Making in Stalingrad* (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1968) for an example of the kinds of information that can be gleaned from such papers.

[3] An example to which the writer has had access is a fascinating and highly revealing sociological study, *Chitatel i gazeta* (The Reader and the Press), published by the Institute for Applied Social Research, 1969, *tirazh* 980.

[4] For additional insights into film censorship, see Igor Yeltsov, "Censorship in the Soviet Cinema," *Studies on the Soviet Union* (Munich), Vol. II, No. 2, 1971, pp. 104-17.

[5] The seven reports are listed as follows: *Societal Life and the Social Role of Film* (200 pp.), *Sociological Study of Sociopolitical Activity* (50 pp.), *Sociological Study of Productive Activity* (37 pp.), *Sociological Study of Daily Family Relations* (37 pp.), *Sociological Characteristics of the Culture of Cinema Viewers* (24 pp.), *Sociological Characteristics of Readers of Central Newspapers* (37 pp.), and *Sociological Characteristics of Viewers of the Film,* I Am Twenty (12 pp.).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 1: Soviet Films Rated by First Preference

(in percent)

Film Titles	Total Sample[a]	Factory Personnel	Collective Farmers	Intelligentsia	Students
The Chairman (1965)	38	52	33	37	27
The Living and the Dead (1964)	23	20	34	25	13
Hamlet (1964)	23	13	6	28	47
What Should One Call You Now?	4	5	5	4	2
I Walk Around Moscow (1963)	3	2	7	2	4
Hockey Team	2	4	2	1	1
I Am Twenty (1961-63)	2	2	4	1	3
Zaichik	1	0	3	0	1
Easy Life	1	1	1	0	0
No Answer	3	1	5	2	2
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100

[a] Total sample included 3,571 persons, of which 1,058 were factory personnel (specifically, members of a factory collective in Sverdlovsk); 832 were collective farmers (from the Kalinin *oblast*); 1,036 were members of the intelligentsia (including teachers, doctors, nurses and members of the engineering-technical intelligentsia in Penza *oblast*); and 825 were students (from Leningrad State University). This breakdown of the sample applies to all tables in the present article except Table 4, which refers exclusively to the total sample of 3,571, and Table 6, which applies to a portion of the sample in Table 5 (see footnote, Table 6).

Percentage figures in all tables were cited in the Krasilov document; they have been recast in tabular form by the author.

stamp—a letter followed by five digits—*unless* it was a document deemed "secret" or "top scret".[6] In the postwar years there has been evidence that certain elements charged with ideological evaluation have evaded the censorship requirement by classifying as "secret" an ever-increasing number of publications of a sensitive nature. As a result, more and more people have gained access to ideologically sensitive writing and information. A former Soviet critic informs us, for example, that any person affiliated with a House for Writers (akin to a professional club) could obtain and familiarize himself with such works as George Orwell's *Animal Farm*.[7]

While the outlines are vague, what seems to have emerged within various specialities is a middle-level corps of experts which has access to restricted materials and which, to a large extent, has developed its own patterns and means of circulating and communicating such privileged information. This communications network has no counterpart in open societies, where much of the type of materials in question would be available to the general public. It is also quite different from the tight security systems used to control the circulation of genuinely "secret" or "top secret" materials in any country, regardless of the form of government. To reach for an analogy, the functioning of this network can perhaps best be compared to the role and conduct of confidential market research studies by large Western corporations (more on this later).

As the foregoing suggests, the content of *Sociological Study of the Cinema* permits consideration of two distinct kinds of information: (1) data about the Soviet film audience itself; and (2) information about Soviet sociological studies, their levels of sophistication, and their use in the communications network. The first several sections of this paper will deal with findings in the first category.

Krasilov's report summarizes, tabulates and—within certain, perhaps deliberate, limits—analyzes the results of a study of 3,571 Soviet filmgoers in several occupational categories and from several different locations in the largest of the Soviet Union's republics, the RSFSR. The sample included 1,058 members of a factory collective in Sverdlovsk; 832 collective farmers from the Kalinin *oblast;* 1,036 teachers, doctors, nurses, and members of the engineering-technical intelligentsia in Penza *oblast*;[8]

[6] Glavlit's full name is "The Main Board for the Protection of Military and State Secrets in the Press." For a further discussion of its functions, see Mark W. Hopkins, *Mass Media in the Soviet Union,* New York, Pegasus, 1970.

[7] Arkady Belinkov, "Evading the Censor," *Studies on the Soviet Union,* Vol. II, No. 2, 1971, p. 127.

[8] This group of 1,036 persons is characterized and analyzed collectively by Krasilov as the "intelligentsia." The term is used, in accordance with Soviet-Marxist sociological practice, to distinguish white-collar or professional labor from manual labor; it is not restricted, in this context, to the traditional intelligentsia composed of intellectuals.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and 825 students from Leningrad State University. Cross-comparisions were made in terms not only of social/occupational groups but of age, sex, and a great number of values, preferences, and character traits of those in the sample. The principal source of information for the study was a 77-point questionnaire put to the participants; while the original queries were not reproduced in the summary report, the nature of the survey emerges in the text and in the tabulation of responses. (Krasilov notes in his introduction that the broader study which his report summarizes was based additionally on research gathered from "individual observations, individual interviews, the collection of statistical data, and . . . accounts of party, trade union, Komsomol, and administrative economic organs.")

Test-Group Views of Soviet Films

In one of the main sections of the questionnaire, the respondents were asked to express their preference for one of a list of contemporary Soviet films. The results are shown in Table 1. Among the most interesting information to emerge is the data on *The Chairman,* a film which portrays the hardships of life in a collective farm village in the period after World War II. The main character is the *kolkhoz* chairman, Trubnikov, a complex man who—under pressure from higher officialdom— is relentless in extracting labor from the collective farm members but who also understands and suffers over their problems. The stark conditions depicted in the film (including, *e.g.,* a scene in which women must pull a plow because there are not enough horses) evoked great controversy in the Soviet press. In fact, there were even rumors that the film had personally displeased Khrushchev and was thus held up for release until after his ouster.[9] Against this background, it is highly interesting to note that the collective farmers queried in the film survey were several percentage points below the average of the total sample in their preference rating of *The Chairman* and were dramatically less enthusiastic about the film than the group of factory personnel interviewed. It is intriguing to ponder whether the lower preference rate among the collective farmers reflected any feeling that it was overdrawn or not "true-to-life," or—on the contrary—that it was too close to reality to be an enjoyable cinema experience.

As the table shows, the collective farmers' first choice of films was *The Living and the Dead,* for which

[9] See Gayle Durham Hollander, *Soviet-Political Indoctrination: Developments in Mass Media and Propaganda since Stalin,* New York, Praeger, 1972, pp. 137-38. See also *RT* (an illustrated weekly of the USSR Council of Ministers' Committee on Radio and Television Broadcasting), Oct. 24-30, 1966, p. 2, tr. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, Ohio), Vol. 18, No. 13, pp. 8-9.

Dying division commander Zaichikov tells the wounded Serpilin, "Save the division banner!" in this scene depicting the tumultuous early days of World War II from the Soviet film, The Living and the Dead.

—From a Mosfilm English-language handout.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ophelia's funeral from the Lenfilm version of Hamlet.

—Novosti via Sovfoto.

they expressed much greater preference than did any other group in the sample. This movie is an epic film about World War II, depicting in detail the course of the struggle at the front. One of its central characters is a Soviet military officer, by name Serpilin, who was caught in the Stalinist purges in 1937, released from a prison camp when World War II began, and went on to become an important general during the Soviet drive toward victory. According to report, there was again some controversy over whether the film should be released, notably because of a scene about prison-camp life and also because of a realistic portrayal of the chaotic situation at the front when the Red Army was forced to retreat early in the war. The fact that the novel on which the screenplay was based was written by the influential writer Konstantin Simonov is said to have been a factor offsetting such criticism.[10]

In terms of preferences of the total sample, *The Living and the Dead* tied for second place with a Soviet version of *Hamlet* directed by Grigori Kozintsev. This tie resulted, however, from the overwhelming vote given *Hamlet* by the students who were interviewed. Since the screenplay of *Hamlet* clearly implied some parallels with Soviet reality, it is interesting to speculate on whether the vote reveals a greater sense of social awareness and sensitivity among students than among other groups to the themes of hypocrisy and political intrigue highlighted in the play.

Krasilov makes no attempt at evaluations of this sort, and in fact has very little to say about the distribution of preferences throughout the study. What he does, instead, is to analyze the social characteristics of the groups of viewers who preferred one film or another on the basis of other queries put to them or other information obtained about them. Although there is some overlap in characteristics, the cluster of traits which describes each group of viewers also points out differences among them. What makes these group profiles interesting is the extent to which they conform—or fail to conform—to the traits and attributes propagandized by the Soviet leadership in its ceaseless effort to create model Soviet citizens. As the reader will see, the language used to describe some of the characteristics suggests the possibility that Krasilov—in synthesizing the results of the seven preceding reports in the study—has paraphrased the original wording of the questions put to respondents. There is, of course, no way to be sure in the absence of the original questionnaire.

To turn to the first example, the viewers who named *The Chairman* as their first preference were

[10] The information in this paragraph was provided by Yuri Brokhin, a former Soviet scriptwriter now residing in the United States.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

said to have scored above the average of the total sample for the following features: "consider things from a societal point of view"; "prefer creative labor" over other kinds of work; "come forward with criticism"; "do not violate labor discipline"; "select films [for viewing] according to reviews in the press"; "prefer 'everyday working conditions' as a theme in films"; go to the movies "to find out new things" and "to experience sharp plots." While the alternatives to these responses are not specified, making value judgments difficult in some cases, it seems clear that these are generally traits that would be deemed "positive" and desirable from the regime's point of view. (The social implications of some of the responses will become clearer as the reader sees some of the other responses given by viewer groups.)

A very similar profile emerged for the viewers who selected *The Living and the Dead* as their first choice of films. The set of features in which they were said to have scored above average was the same with two exceptions: the reference to "prefer labor" disappeared; the response, "prefer creative movie themes about World War II" supplanted the response, "prefer 'everyday working conditions' as a theme in films."

In the group that chose *Hamlet* as the preferred film, a somewhat different set of traits and attitudes emerged. The high percentage of students in this group has already been noted; Krasilov's compilations also show that larger-than-average numbers of young people in general and women rated the film first. In the range of scores above the average of the total sample, these people again "prefer creative labor" and choose films according to "reviews in the press." But in contrast to the previous groups discussed, they "prefer the theme of love and family in films," and "go to the movies for the sake of the performance of the actors." They are also said to have scored above the average in two traits that appear to have negative connotations: they "do not work to the full measure of their capabilities"; and they "are not ready for military service (according to self-evaluation)."

AS TABLE 1 SHOWS, there is a sharp drop in the popularity of the remaining films offered in the preference rating. The film in fourth place, *What Should One Call You Now?,* is a detective story rated first choice by 4 percent of the total sample—viewers whose characteristics generally parallel the positive traits of the groups who selected the two most popular movies. However, the data on the next three films on the list—*I Walk Around Moscow, Hockey Team,* and *I Am Twenty*—register a rather dramatic change in viewer profiles, a matter that seems to be of concern to Krasilov and his colleagues (particularly in the case of the last-named film). Viewer characteristics were not evaluated with respect to the last two films listed in the table, presumably because of their low ratings.

I Walk Around Moscow presents a series of lighthearted adventures of a Soviet youth and his companions as they roam the streets of the capital city. At the time of its release, its scriptwriter, Gennadi Shpalikov, was already in the public eye as author of the controversial *I Am Twenty.* His later film in itself caused no great stir, though it did come in for some criticism for its lack of any serious dramatic conflict —a complaint based more on esthetic and artistic than on ideological grounds. According to Krasilov, the viewers who named this film as their first preference scored above the average of the total sample with respect to the following traits and attitudes: "no ideals in life," "not satisfied with their salary," and "not occupied with political studies"; they still "prefer 'everyday working life' as a theme in films" but "go to the movies for simple relaxation." Conversely, they scored below average with respect to their rating of "creative labor" and their willingness to "come forth with criticism."

The next film, *Hockey Team,* is a fictional sports story that got the vote of 2 percent of the total sample, predominantly males .The group profile, to the extent it is discussed, seems to be somewhat different but not less negative than the one just described. The viewers scored above average for "not satisfied with their salary," "do not work up to the full measure of their abilities," and "are unhappy in life." Like the viewers of *I Walk Around Moscow,* they "go to the movies for simple relaxation," but they differ in scoring below average for "prefer 'everyday working life' as a theme in films."

A much more detailed study was made of the attitudes and characteristics of the viewers who listed *I Am Twenty* as their first preference, although they also amounted to only 2 percent of the total sample. In this film, scriptwriter Shpalikov dealt with the concerns of Soviet youth and in particular with the sensitive theme of the "conflict of generations," including the problems involved in the transmission of revolutionary ideals from one generation to the next. The film was originally released under the title *Ilyich Square* in 1961, but it caused such a furor that it was withdrawn, revised, and reissued as *I Am Twenty* in 1963. According to report, this was an-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The adventures of the Soviet youths depicted in the lighthearted I Walk Around Moscow *take them to the subway.*

—From *Soviet Film* (Moscow), July 1964, insert.

other movie to which Khrushchev personally raised objections, particularly with respect to a scene in which a Soviet youth "converses" with the spirit of his father, a dead war hero; in the course of the exchange, the son remarks that the father had known what he was living and fighting for but questions the purpose and goals of his own life. This frank allusion to ideological doubt and wavering among youth is considerably downplayed in the revised version.[11]

Krasilov devotes a good deal of space to the people who singled out *I Am Twenty* as their favorite Soviet film, providing more data than in the case of other viewer groups. It is interesting to note that the group contained a higher-than-average percentage of 16-25 year-olds, of single people, of men, and of spouses "not satisfied with their families (marriages)." Many of the characteristics attributed to the group have negative implications. Thus, viewers scored above average for: "not interested in political studies," "non-party," "do not attend [party or institutional] meetings," "consider criticisms of shortcomings to be in vain," "do not have ideals or life plans," "make use of foreign radio as a source of information," "do not interfere in cases of hooliganism" or in the "plunder of societal property," are "not satisfied with salary received," "do not work to the full measure of their abilities," "are not innovators (*ratsionalizatory*)," "have [been cited for] violations of labor discipline." In the case of attributes that are less clearly negative (except by comparison to other responses) the viewers scored above average in the choices, "go to movies for relaxation" or "to learn new things," prefer movies to television because they want "a change from domestic surroundings" or want "to be among the public," "do not engage in sports or physical exercise," "prefer to spend leisure time among friends," select movies "by chance" or "according to the advice of friends," "prefer screenplays taken from foreign literature," "discuss movies only with their friends."

It would appear from this assessment that the respondents were unusually frank in expressing their opinions and preferences to the surveyors. Certainly, a number of characteristics of the group seem to be directly opposed to the values and attributes which the regime has sought to instill in the Soviet populace, to some extent even suggesting images of a counterculture. There seems little doubt that the more detailed attention paid this group reflects official interest and concern over such attitudes. As will be seen, a similar profile is found—and also described at some length—among persons who liked the Soviet version of the British film, *Room at the Top*.

Analysis of Foreign Film Fare

A separate poll was taken to determine the respondents' first preference among a selection of nine foreign films that had recently been circulated in the Soviet Union. The results are shown in Table

Sergei communicates with the spirit of his dead father in a poignant scene from the Soviet film I Am Twenty.

—Photo from Yu. M. Khaniutin *et al.*, Eds., *Voprosy kino iskusstva* (Questions of Film Art, 1972), Moscow, Nauka, 1972, p. 53.

[11] See footnote 10.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 2: Foreign Films Rated by First Preference

(in percent)

Film Titles[a]	Total Sample	Factory Personnel	Collective Farmers	Intelligentsia	Students
Judgment at Nuremberg	28	22	17	31	46
Divorce Italian Style	21	25	14	21	23
Dark Sunglasses	13	14	22	11	4
Magnificent Seven	9	15	6	6	7
House on Green Street	7	7	12	7	1
Letter From an Unknown Woman	5	5	3	10	2
Devil + 10 Commandments	3	1	2	2	8
How To Be Loved	3	2	4	1	6
Carry On, Nurse	2	2	3	2	1
No Answer	9	7	17	9	2
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100

[a] "Room at the Top" is not included in this part of the survey.

2. (The list did not include *Room at the Top,* which was the subject of a separate set of questions.)

Since Krasilov's discussion of the selections is very limited, not much can be elaborated here. He does mention the need to take into account what he calls certain "peculiarities" in Soviet citizens' perceptions of foreign films. He notes, for example, that the American movie, *Judgment at Nuremberg,* was an "antiwar film" and was therefore "most consonant with the feelings and thoughts of the Leningrad viewers (*i.e.,* the students)," implying that the high preference vote this film got from the student group (46 percent, as compared to 28 percent of the total sample) was influenced by their sentiments as residents of a city that endured particular suffering during World War II.

Krasilov's somewhat curious remarks on *Divorce Italian Style,* which wound up second in the preference rating, touch on Soviet censorship of foreign films before their circulation in the USSR. He calls the original film "clearly anticlerical" but adds that "it is exactly this side that is played down in its showing on our screen." "Therefore", he adds (in a causal connection that is not very clear), "it enjoys the greatest popularity among youths who are interested in the themes, love and family" (p. 19).

In the correlation of viewer characteristics with film preferences, the respondents who named *Judgment at Nuremberg* as their first choice (28 percent of the total sample) emerged with a relatively positive profile. They scored above average for the features, "prefer creative labor," "view things from a societal point of view," "come forward with criticism," and "go to the movies to learn something new." (The other characteristics listed for them are "choose film according to the press," and prefer the themes of "World War II" and "everyday working conditions.") In the case of the next six foreign films listed in the table, the viewer profiles tended rather dramatically to reflect less desirable traits. For example, the viewers who gave first preference to *Divorce Italian Style* (21 percent) scored above the average of the total sample for the features, "do not work up to the full measure of their capabilities," "do not act against hooliganism," "do not attend meetings," "are not ready for military service," and go to the movies for "simple relaxation" or "to experience sharp plots." (With respect to other factors, they topped the average in choosing films "according to publicity" and preferring the themes of "love and family.")

In a separate question, respondents were asked to describe their reaction to *Room at the Top,* a film notable for its biting portrayal of British class distinctions (the plot centers around a young man from a working-class background who opportunistically works his way up to the top layers of British society). The responses are listed in Table 3. Two of the most interesting factors to note here are the different exposures of the four social groups to the film and the fact that some three-fourths of those who actually saw the film liked it. In his discussion of the responses, Krasilov remarks specifically that those who liked *Room at the Top* expressed "positive features" to a lesser degree and "negative features" to a higher degree than those who did not like the movie. Since the great majority of those who saw and liked the film were students and members of the pro-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 3: Reaction to *Room at the Top*

(in percent)

	Total Sample	Factory Personnel	Collective Farmers	Intelligentsia	Students
Liked the film	22	9	6	28	44
Didn't like entirely	3	2	1	4	6
Liked little	2	1	2	2	2
Didn't like the film	2	1	1	3	2
Did not see the film or no answer	71	87	90	63	46
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100

fessional and technical intelligentsia, it would follow that these groups probably included more persons with "negative features" than the other groups. This is a very interesting implication, but Krasilov makes no attempt to elaborate on the meaning of the vote in terms of social/occupational categories. He simply appends some findings to the effect that among those who liked the film there were two times more non-party respondents, two times fewer "militant atheists," 1.5 times fewer persons who favor films based on Soviet literature, and "several fewer viewers" who were "happy in life" than among those who did not like the film.

Another intriguing statistic offered at this juncture is the fact that among those who liked the film there were 1.5 times as many individuals who "positively evaluate the poetry of Yevtushenko" as there were among those who disliked the film. This constitutes the only mention in the entire report of such a variable, except for a curiosity in the graph section appended to the study. Apparently a graph intended for publication was omitted from the final printing; a legend appears but without the graph, leaving a large blank space among the other graphs. The legend indicates that the missing graph was to have analyzed respondents according to whether they evaluated Yevtushenko's poetry positively or negatively. While it is fruitless to speculate on the nature of the missing information and on the reasons for its removal, there is at least room for the supposition that at the time the survey was taken in 1966, Yevtushenko was viewed as more of a controversial and less of an "establishment" poet than he is today.

Table 4: Motives for Moviegoing

(percent of total sample)

Simple relaxation	32
To find out something new	29
To experience a sharp plot	12
Performance of the actors	9
For the sake of the music	5
Nowhere better to spend one's leisure	4
Skill of the shooting of the film	3
No answer	6
TOTAL	100

Themes, Forms and Motives

In addition to the polls on Soviet and foreign films, the survey report indicates exploration along a number of avenues to obtain information about Soviet filmgoers. While space limits on the present article—as well as spotty data in the original document—prohibit a comprehensive treatment of all of the compilations and correlations hinted at in the summary report, some highlights have been singled out for discussion in this section.

As has been suggested by a number of the clusters of answers already cited, respondents were asked to indicate their preferences among cinema themes. In terms of the total sample, the theme "love and family" was preferred by 26 percent, "World War II" by 20 percent, "life of youth" by 14 percent, and "everyday working conditions" by 14 percent, amounting to 74 percent of the respondents. The remainder of the vote was split up between "historical revolutionary topics," "science," "sports," "life in capitalist countries," and "life in socialist countries" (with 4 percent giving "no answer"). With respect to the latter categories, it is interesting that while "life in capitalist countries" got the vote of only 4 percent of the total sample, 13 percent of the students indicated this as their first preference among themes (compared to 1 percent each for the factory

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 5: Preference between Movies and Television

(in percent)

	Total Sample	Factory Personnel	Collective Farmers	Intelligentsia	Students
Own television set:					
Prefer films	54	58	28	63	63
Prefer television	18	18	37	13	4
Do not own television set or no answer	28	24	35	24	33
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100

group and the collective farmers, and 2 percent for the intelligentsia); by contrast, "life in socialist countries" was the low scorer on the list as the preferred theme of only 1 percent of the total sample (the same percentage applied to all groups except the intelligentsia, whose score was zero).

In a separate query that seemed to relate thematic preferences to artistic forms, the participants expressed first choices among movie versions or direct filming of the following categories (again, in terms of percent of the total sample): "works of Soviet literature," 38; "Russian classical literature," 19; "dramatic theatrical performances," 12; "works of foreign contemporary literature," 9; "works of foreign classical literature," 5; "operetta performances," 4; "ballet," 4; "no answer," 4. Among the four basic groups in the sample, three gave first preference to "works of Soviet literature"—the factory collective, by 46 percent; the kolkhozniks, by 41 percent; and the intelligentsia, by 40 percent. However, the student group gave this category only 21 percent, rating it as second choice behind "works of foreign contemporary literature."

A survey was also made of attendance at movies. Among other results, it was reported that the student group went to films most frequently, while one-third of the collective farmers, one-fifth of the factory sample, and one-third of the intelligentsia did not go to the movies regularly or never saw films at all. The most interesting information on attendance concerned the motivations that prompted people in the sample to go to the movies (there has been relatively little published material on this subject with respect to Soviet film audiences as compared to radio and television audiences[12]). The reasons registered by participants produced the order of ratings shown in Table 4.

One section of Krasilov's study explored viewers' preferences with respect to movies *vs.* television. As Table 5 shows, more than half the respondents (54 percent) indicated that although they owned

[12] For the most recent discussion of audience research in the Soviet Union, especially in the media of radio and television, see G. Hollander, *op. cit.* Cinema audience research is also surveyed and compared by the author with TV audience research (see especially p. 140).

Table 6: Primary Reason for Preference of Films over TV

(in percent)

	Sample Group[a]	Factory Personnel	Collective Farmers	Intelligentsia	Students
Completeness of the artistic effect	27	26	9	36	34
Novelty of films	22	24	27	21	16
Higher technique of showing films	20	27	15	18	21
Change from domestic surroundings	5	5	9	3	3
Desire to be among the public	4	3	9	1	3
No answer	22	15	31	21	23
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100

[a] In this table, the sample comprises respondents who said they owned a television set but preferred the cinema, amounting to 54 percent of the total sample. See Table 5.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

their own television sets, they preferred movies to television. Another 18 percent had their own sets and preferred television; 25 percent did not own a set; 3 percent did not answer. Thus, among all those in the sample who had TV sets, movies were favored over television by a ratio of 3 to 1. Broken down by social/occupational categories, three groups showed a ratio in favor of movies: factory personnel, 3:1; intelligentsia, 5:1; and students, 16:1. Kolkhozniks, on the other hand, preferred television by a 5:4 ratio.

Those who indicated that they preferred movies to television gave the reasons listed in Table 6. Probably the most notable statistic in the table is the figure showing that the "completeness of the artistic effect" of films influenced the preferences of collective farmers much less than it did those of other groups. Apparently those farmers who preferred films over TV regarded them as a change of pace from the daily routine rather than as an artistic experience.

"Guidance" in Cinema Selection

One of the main areas of Krasilov's investigation concerns the influences that affect Soviet citizens in the choice of films they wish to see. The responses of the survey participants to the question, "By what are you guided most of all when choosing a film for viewing?," are indicated in Table 7. Presumably, the first category, "information in the press," refers to critical reviews and commentaries on films, while the third category, "publicity," refers to advertisements of current or upcoming films, including printed movie schedules, posters and billboards. It seems fair to suppose that in a state which seeks to control the processes of indoctrination and socialization, these two categories, which are generally subject to official sanction, comprise the means of information which the authorities would prefer the populace to use in picking out films to see. Conversely, the popular selection of movies on the basis of the "advice of friends" or the "advice of families"—the second and fourth categories in the table—could be presumed to be much less desirable in the eyes of the regime from the standpoint of the socialization process (although it should be added that the family is relied on to a considerable extent as an agent of socialization in the USSR). The selection of films "by chance" probably represents the most unsatisfactory method from an ideological point of view, since it implies a random choice subject to no social influence at all.

While most of Krasilov's analysis relates to the first three types of influence listed in the table, two interesting statistics in the remaining categories might be mentioned. First, note that 21 percent of the kolkhozniks indicated a reliance on the advice of their families in choosing films—a striking margin over other groups, even when one takes into account the relative strength of family ties in the countryside and the possibility that the rural segment of the population gets a smaller exposure than the rest of the populace to press coverage and publicity about the cinema. The second statistic of note is the high percentage of students (19), compared to other groups, who indicated a disposition to choose films "by chance."

In a surprisingly lengthy (six-page) segment of the report, Krasilov correlates preferences among the three major sources of information for selecting films—reports in the press, advice of friends, and publicity—with various cross-cuts of the sample (grouped, *e.g.*, by film preferences, frequency of movie attendance, favorite genre of film, favorite newspaper, as well as by various characteristics re-

Table 7: Main Influence on Choice of Movie Fare

(in percent)

	Total Sample	Factory Personnel	Collective Farmers	Intelligentsia	Students
Information in the press	27	26	22	33	26
Advice of friends	25	23	20	29	26
Publicity	25	32	18	23	23
Advice of family	9	11	21	4	1
Chance	9	5	10	8	19
No answer	5	3	9	3	5
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lated to values and life style). The results are expressed in terms of relative choice rather than hard percentages. One of the interesting contrasts to emerge in this section concerns the viewers' rating of influences with respect to their choice of foreign as compared to domestic films. When subdivided according to their preferences among foreign films, six out of nine groups indicated that the press had the least influence (of the three main sources of information) on their selection of films for viewing. But when subdivided according to their preferences among domestic films, only two out of nine groups gave the press the same relatively low rating. This at least raises the possibility that Soviet viewers have less confidence in the reliability of press critiques and commentaries on foreign films than in those on domestic films.

Krasilov's correlation of individual characteristics with informational influences yields some interesting clusters. Viewers with each of a number of the characteristics that could be considered positive in social and ideological terms indicated that they were influenced in their choice of films by (1) the press, (2) publicity, and (3) the advice of friends, in that order. These viewers included people who "prefer to make use of Soviet official information," "have no violations of labor discipline," "prefer creative labor," "are satisfied with their life plans," "have a family (marriage) built on love" or "consider themselves happy in life." By contrast, while viewers with less positive or clearly negative traits registered a different order of choice than that above, no single pattern of informational influences emerged from the data. Thus, for example, those who in Krasilov's categorizations "make use of rumors," or who "violate labor discipline," or who "use both Soviet official radio and foreign radio," all indicated a selection of films, first, on the advice of friends; next, according to the press; and least, according to publicity. On the other hand, viewers who were "unhappy in life," who were "not satisfied with" or did not have any "life plans," or who had "families built on material calculations," chose films primarily according to publicity, to a lesser extent on the advice of friends, and lastly through the press.

Another exercise in this section of the report relates viewers' newspapers preferences to their rating of influences on their movie selections. This information was probably of interest to the researchers (and to the party authorities) because of the different degree and kinds of cinema coverage in the various news organs. The results are listed for



A Ukrainian woman stops outside the Ministry of Agriculture and the State Committee for Grain Products and the Mixed-Feed Industry of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers in Kiev to view a poster advertising a showing of the popular Soviet film, Anna Karenina.

—Photo by Renato Perez via Sovfoto.

the benefit of those familiar with the Soviet press. Briefly, those in the sample who preferred to read *Pravda* or *Sovetskaia kultura* chose films, in order of influence, through (1) the press, (2) publicity, and, to a much smaller extent, (3) the advice of friends. Among those who preferred to read *Izvestia, Komsomolskaia pravda* or *Sovetskaia Rossiia,* the order of influences was publicity first, then press, and the advice of friends. Readers who preferred *Literaturnaia gazeta* or *Trud* rated influences in the order:

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

press, advice of friends, publicity. Readers of the central newspaper dealing with rural matters, *Selskaia zhizn,* were the only group to select films most frequently on the advice of friends, with publicity and the press in second and third place; whether they represented a different kind of reader (in terms of ideological characteristics) or simply a less "urban" audience is not clear in the absence of more information.

Despite the considerable space that Krasilov devotes to the results concerning influences on film attendance, very little in the way of a clear-cut pattern emerges—nor can this study probe deeper—with respect to the reasons why Soviet viewers consider different sources of information on the cinema more reliable, or more important, than others.

THE PRECEDING PAGES offer a brief presentation of the main findings in Krasilov's investigation of the Soviet film audience.[13] In overall perspective, two major points stand out: (1) Distinctly "negative" profiles emerge for viewers who preferred certain films—namely, *I Walk Around Moscow, I Am Twenty,* and *Room at the Top;* thus, sociological measurements were apparently able to delineate groups of viewers who did not conform to the ideological characteristics "expected" of the "New Soviet Man." (2) The student sector is often different from the other sectors: consider, for example, the students' great preference for *Hamlet;* their first choice of the foreign film, *Judgment at Nuremberg;* their interest in films about "life in capitalist countries"; their interest in films based on "works of foreign contemporary literature"; their high rate of cinema attendance; and their strong tendency to choose films for viewing "by chance." Several of these characteristics also have troublesome implications for the regime.

Summary Observations

Two main questions remain to be considered: First, are there other reasons besides the negative import of the above findings to explain why the document was restricted to a very limited circulation? Second, what is the broader significance of the document as an example of "semisecret" sociological publications in the USSR? The remainder of the present paper will be directed to these queries.

There are two possible categories of reasons why Krasilov's pamphlet was not made available for open publication: (1) the specific content of the study made it controversial, or especially sensitive; (2) tactical exigencies suggested that the document would be of the greatest utility if its revelations were known only to a small segment of ideologically responsible cadres and filmmakers.

Content Considerations. In regard to content, fear of the effects of publicizing the specific findings in the report may have led to the restriction of the document. The revelations concerning "ideologically negative" groups and the discussion of motivations for cinema attendance may have been viewed as especially touchy since they tended to reflect adversely upon the success of the agencies of political socialization in the Soviet Union.[14] Yet, while much of the data in the study might be deemed "sensitive" in the Soviet political climate, very little of it qualifies as "startling" information of the sort that would, of itself, require suppression.

As mentioned earlier, sociology had a rather low status when the pamphlet was originally commissioned, and it was not yet perceived as a totally "legitimate" means of inquiry. The use of sociology and of sociological techniques in this study may have been another aspect of its "contents" which led to its restricted circulation. This hypothesis is supported by two facts about the study itself.

First of all, Krasilov spends a considerable amount of space, in both his introduction and his conclusion, explaining the distinctiveness of sociological research from esthetic or critical evaluations, and the utility of such studies for the Soviet cinema industry. He asserts the following: (1) the viewer is the prime factor in sociological studies of films; (2) sociological studies of the film audience permit generalizations of both a qualitative and a quantitative character—they enable one to measure and analyze the "voice of the people itself"; (3) models of societal life which can aid in the prediction of the future can be developed as a result of sociological studies of the cinema; (4) "dynamic" (before-and-

[13] Since, as noted earlier, Krasilov's study was itself a summary of seven preceding studies, there were undoubtedly many additional facts available for his and the Central Committee's consideration which provided further insights into the nature of the film audience, its sociopolitical characteristics, and its motivations.

[14] On the other hand, a good deal of the data seemed to reflect official success with respect to the socialization of popular preferences and values. The reader should bear in mind, however, that the Soviet populace has a reputation for being cautious in articulating grievances when questioned by persons conducting "official" surveys—"sociological" or otherwise. Hence, the degree of "positive" responses may be inflated.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

after) studies can be carried out which will point out the specific "ideological, esthetic, and . . . spiritual influence" of exposure to a given film on viewers; (5) the screening of "test" films and subsequent study of the audience's reactions can explain the specific impact of certain films, thereby helping producers, scriptwriters, and actors to perform their tasks better, and helping cinema-industry personnel to estimate more realistically the number of prints of certain films needed for circulation throughout the entire country; (6) sociological studies of the different means of information which influence the public's selection of films will allow "responsible" individuals to organize movie publicity "on a scientific basis and raise its effectiveness"; (7) sociological studies of the cinema can aid in the planning of proper repertoires in theaters and of movie production in the preferred, or most effective, genres.

The second piece of evidence which supports the possibility that the document's circulation may have been restricted, at least partly, because of the "sociological techniques" in it is the fact that the actual sociological analysis in the document is extremely simplistic, despite the author's obvious command of statistical methods. Numerous cross-tabulations have been made, and the corresponding percentages are often, but not always, reported in the study. However, there is no sophisticated statistical evaluation of the data—no regression analyses, cluster analyses, Chi-square tests, standard deviations, or anything else. Yet, Krasilov's comments elsewhere in the study show him to be well-versed in sociological techniques. Furthermore, he presumes a rather high level of sophistication for his analysis, calling it a "stereo-matrix model" and defending its utility in the interpretation of data. He explains, in addition, that his method is economically rewarding, citing a Central Committee report which praises his carefully developed analytical method. This combination of factors suggests that the simplistic analysis in *A Sociological Study of the Cinema* is probably more a reflection of the official outlook toward sociology in the Soviet Union in the mid-1960's than of the author's lack of knowledge; in a word, he was writing "down" to his audience.

Political-Tactical Considerations. The second category of reasons why this study may have been "classified" are essentially "tactical" in nature. The cinema is still one of the most carefully controlled instruments of political indoctrination in the Soviet Union. Despite the media competition that radio and television provide (as agents of political indoctrination and socialization), the film sector retains its ideologically important status. Because it is also an artistic form, this importance is magnified. Film attendance has been growing in the Soviet Union, and film content has been diversifying.[15] Exposure to films has also increased because they are shown on television. Concern about the reactions of film audiences has increased together with the growth of the film industry. As noted at the start of this paper, the Film Section of the Department of Culture of the Central Committee bears ultimate responsibility for films produced and/or shown in the Soviet Union. Like any other organization engaged in "marketing" a product, it has developed plans and policy orientations to guide its specific activities. From time to time, assessments of the success or failure of its work have to be made. This no doubt is what prompted the Film Section to commission the series of seven reports of which *A Sociological Study of the Cinema* is a summary.

To use the analogy of market research, the refusal to make the findings of this document public represents "good business" from a tactical point of view. A privately commissioned market research study provides the commissioning organization (*e.g.*, a Western business corporation) with specialized data describing its "target" market which can be used to evaluate current marketing programs and to plan future ones. The data are used, for example, to refine the image, content, and availability of the product for the mass market. Open publication of such information would deprive the commissioning organization of the competitive advantage which the information was originally designed to provide, and hence would be "bad business." In the case of the Film Section of the Department of Culture, the data from Krasilov's study were probably designed to be used to refine the content and image of Soviet films, and to determine the most effective media through which various films could be "sold" to "target" audiences in the Soviet Union. Open publication of the report would have deprived the Film Section of the tactical advantage that the data provided concerning the use of film as a medium for indoctrination and socialization of the masses. In this sense, restricting the availability of the information was "good business"—and also "good politics."

Because this document was a limited—or "semi-secret"—document, it could approach its subject

[15] For an elaboration on these points, see G. Hollander, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-43.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

matter in ways that might otherwise be proscribed. More specifically, the document did not have to be censored, since it was an internal, restricted publication of a section of the Central Committee. Data could therefore be presented forthrightly, without exhortations or instructive speeches about what must be done to correct "errors," etc. The absence of such editorial comments—which are standard in open Soviet writings on such subjects as this—was especially conspicuous in the discussions of the viewers who liked *Room at the Top* and *I am Twenty*. When foreign films were mentioned, the author reminded his readers that the appeal of certain foreign films might be related to the form in which they were shown on the Soviet screen (as opposed to their original form). Such a blatant reference to censorship is extraordinarily rare in the Soviet press. But, because Krasilov was speaking to a restricted audience which, presumably, was involved in the censorship operation itself, such a remark could be made. The author was also able to examine certain sensitive "negative profile" groups of viewers more closely than might be possible in an unrestricted publication,[16] and to use sociological techniques in his analysis, as discussed above.

Although Krasilov's ostensible—and probably primary—purpose in this study was to report his specific findings, he apparently also had a secondary purpose—namely, to bolster the emergent science of sociology in the Soviet Union. This is shown by his efforts to acquaint his highly specialized and politically influential readers with the potentialities of sociological studies of films as a tool in policy decisions. He also added his voice to those of a growing number of Soviet sociologists who in the 1960's were advocating the establishment of separate institutional centers for sociological research. Thus he ended his report with a strong argument in favor of the establishment of a centralized sociological center for the cinema to coordinate and carry out the various kinds of studies he suggests, appending these recommendations:

For the service of the entire country, it is fully sufficient to have five trained sociologists and fifty technical workers in such a center. We need to have a cipher bureau, a design-drafting bureau, a bureau for analysis and synthesis of information, a stenographic bureau, and an editorial department of the staff. (p. 48)

Against this background, it is fair to attribute the relative lack of judgmental comment in the discussion of findings not only to the restricted status of the document but to "self-censorship" on the part of the author. In the latter case, deliberate omission of such comment might have been deemed an aid in showing the "objectivity" of sociology itself as a science, or tool, which could be utilized by higher-level organizations.

The significance of *A Sociological Study of the Cinema* as a semisecret document can be summarized as follows: it was a means to keep key ideological and filmmaking cadres in touch with the populace's reactions to recent films and to the film medium; it showed that a high party body concerned with cultural policy was somewhat open to the use of sociological studies and techniques in 1966; and it provided this body with restricted information which could be used in the formation of tactical plans. In addition, this semisecret document provided Krasilov with a forum in which to demonstrate the utility and objectivity of sociology and to advocate an institutionalized sociological center for the cinema. Western analysts have abundant evidence that "open" Soviet publications are often used not only to provide information, but also to promote specific policy aims. *A Sociological Study of the Cinema* shows that semisecret publications can be used in a similar way, even at very high policy levels.

[16] In particular, the reader should note the lengthy profiles of viewers of *I Am Twenty* and *Room at the Top*.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Books

The Historian's Craft and Cold War Statesmanship

By Vojtech Mastny

ROBERT J. MADDOX: *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War.* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1973.
JOHN L. GADDIS: *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947.* New York, Columbia University Press, 1972.
JOHN W. WHEELER-BENNETT and ANTHONY NICHOLLS: *The Semblance of Peace: The Political Settlement after the Second World War.* New York, St. Martin's, 1972.
LOUIS FISCHER: *The Road to Yalta: Soviet Foreign Relations, 1941-1945.* New York, Harper and Row, 1972.

IT WAS PERHAPS inevitable that sooner or later the axe would fall on the perpetrators of the more fanciful theories about the Cold War that have proliferated during the last decade under the "revisionist" label. But it was by no means certain that this salutary operation would be performed with the grace and skill of Robert J. Maddox's devastating critique. Having chosen seven leading representatives of the "New Left" school, he subjected to scrutiny not so much their conclusions as the methods used to reach and support those conclusions. His indictment reads almost like an encyclopedia of scholarly malpractices—including such deplorable techniques as "proofs" based on lack of evidence, construction of imaginary speeches and dialogues to document alleged policies (Williams); use of a double standard, of misstatements of fact, and of quotations out of context (Kolko); reliance upon ephemeral journalistic sources of unproved accuracy (Fleming); omission of crucial passages or misleading paraphrasing of documents (Clemens); and even all-but-verbatim quotes from other authors confused with one's own writing (Horowitz).

Mr. Maddox distinguishes between "soft" and "hard" revisionism, both of which place sole responsibility for the Cold War upon the United States but differ in assigning greater blame, on one hand, to individuals—particularly Truman and his advisers—or, on the other hand, to the allegedly irresistible dynamics of America's capitalist system. While he concedes that such a version of the Cold War origins "may be perfectly valid," he avers that the dubious methods employed to support it rather warrant the contrary conclusion that it can "*only* be sustained by doing violence to historical records" (p. 164).

It is therefore distressing to read in the conclusion of the book that Professor Maddox, having sent his manuscript for comment to leading specialists in the field, received from several of them the advice that "this type of work ought not to be published" (p. 161). Some argued that whatever the facts, they are not really "relevant" to the validity of the New Left assumptions; others thought it not in good taste to publish criticism casting doubt upon the scholarly standards of the revisionist authors. By relying upon common sense and honesty, rather than upon such questionable advice, Professor Maddox has performed much-needed service to integrity in the historical profession.

The authors of the three other books under review are less concerned with pointing fingers at false prophets than with presenting their own versions of the origins of the Cold War. Of these versions, that by John L. Gaddis takes the revisionist criticism of traditional accounts the most seriously, and his successful effort to absorb

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and overcome it gives his study a special air of authority. Moreover, he is the only one to present substantive new evidence, much of it from unpublished archival sources, which he interprets with an exemplary thoroughness and openness of mind.

In turn, *The Semblance of Peace* is a monumental survey of the untidy international settlement that resulted from World War II. Despite its joint authorship, the book definitely shows the touch of Sir John Wheeler-Bennett, a veteran British commentator on 20th-century diplomacy. His majestic prose, no less than his strong feelings about certain subjects—from German militarism to Italy's role as the "whore of Europe" (p. 439)—give the book its distinctive flavor. The authors naturally stress the British side of the story, which has been all too often neglected in American Cold War literature, but as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, they frankly admit that they "do not know what is going on in the Kremlin" (p. 484), and write accordingly.

This deficiency is partly corrected by the posthumous volume of Louis Fischer, who as an American journalist in Russia had at least had the opportunity of being physically close to the Kremlin in the critical period he describes. Such proximity, as well as Fischer's once-sympathetic perspective on the Soviet regime has obvious advantages and disadvantages. Not a history in the academic sense, the book is rather a collection of well-informed but highly subjective essays on selected topics. Some of the essays are brilliant, others unfinished, for Fischer died before he could even bring his narrative beyond 1944.

The main issues of the Cold War controversy ultimately boil down to the evaluation of the statesmanship that failed to avert the confrontation. Were there different options, and if so, did the leaders perceive them and act after a careful consideration of alternatives? Did they anticipate events, and were they willing to face the consequences of their actions? Were their objectives clearly defined and their policies commensurate with their goals? And how did Stalin's statesmanship compare with that of his Western counterparts?

THANKS TO THE unparalleled readiness of the United States government to open its archives for scholarly examination, American policy is the best known—and the easiest to criticize. Both Sir John and Louis Fischer stress how singularly ill-equipped Roosevelt was to cope with the vexing problems generated by cooperation with a regime so unconventional as Stalin's. The President's vision of the future included a "special relationship" with Russia—for Sir John "a pathetic fallacy, though not an ignoble one" (p. 55). But his methods were, as Fischer puts it, reminiscent of "a public relations approach; you get along famously, you bridge gaps, and real relations remain the same or deteriorate" (p. 56). Roosevelt's less than adequate grasp of facts, his preference for genial improvisation, and his tendency to evade issues—or, even worse, to say "yes" when he really did not know—produced such thoroughly deplorable incidents as his hollow promise to the Russians that a second front would be opened in 1942. And his overzealous quest for intimacy with Stalin—which included the awkward proposal to meet with him behind Churchill's back in the summer of 1943—was hardly conducive to inspiring respect, the precondition of trust, in Moscow.

But the most obviously self-defeating aspect of the President's posture was his lack of policy in regard to Moscow's war aims: "With characteristic optimism," Professor Gaddis writes, "he hoped that in time Soviet territorial ambitions in Eastern Europe would simply go away" (p. 15). Mr. Gaddis takes a rather generous view of Roosevelt's predicament by dwelling on the constraints of public opinion circumscribing the American leader's freedom of action. Yet it is more

Reviewers in This Issue

VOJTECH MASTNY—Assistant Professor of History, Columbia University (New York), and a Research Fellow of the Lehman Institute (New York) for 1974-75; author of *Czechs under Nazi Rule: The Failure of National Resistance, 1939-42,* 1971, and numerous articles on World War II diplomacy.

J. F. BROWN—A Munich-based observer of East European affairs; author of *Bulgaria under Communist Rule,* 1966, and numerous journal contributions.

Z. M. FALLENBUCHL—Professor and Head of the Department of Economics, University of Windsor (Canada); author of numerous articles on East European economic development.

TED FRIEDGUT—Chairman of the Soviet and East European Research Center, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem; author of articles on nationality issues and other aspects of Soviet domestic politics.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

instructive to consider how the President utilized the freedom he did enjoy, particularly how he fulfilled his obligation to enlighten the nation concerning impending challenges abroad—and in this respect his record is truly depressing. In December 1944, for example, he tried to mitigate the growing discrepancy between Soviet conduct in Eastern Europe and the principles of the Atlantic Charter by the shocking disclosure that he and Churchill had not actually signed the document. At the very least, Professor Gaddis suggests,

. . . by failing to prepare the American people for Stalin's demands in Eastern Europe, Roosevelt inadvertently undermined the domestic consensus necessary for his postwar policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union. (p. 134)

The issue of continuity *vs.* discontinuity between Roosevelt's and Truman's Russian policies—a revisionist *cause célèbre*—seems no longer particularly controversial in light of the analyses by Professors Maddox and Gaddis. For it is clear that Truman did not immediately reverse his predecessor's policy, even though he did introduce a very definite change of style—from an arbitrary and dilettante to a responsible handling of foreign affairs. The new President did his homework; consulted frequently with both experts and politicians; made decisions prudently rather than compulsively; yet once he had made up his mind, acted with determination and consistency, misleading no one about his views and intents.

Perhaps because of the self-conscious American propensity to seek all conceivable flaws in the United States' conduct, Truman has always been more admired by Europeans than by his fellow countrymen. The authors of *The Semblance of Peace* are no exception to this rule. Although far from uncritical, they regard him as the embodiment of the best traits of the American character. And indeed, some of the most conspicuous failings of Truman's diplomacy were in a sense failings of his virtues. Thus, his initial reluctance to depart from Roosevelt's policy of acquiescence to Soviet *faits accomplis* in Eastern Europe was the result of a commendable respect for his predecessor's superior experience. Even later, his failure to exploit America's overwhelming material strength for bargaining with the prostrate, yet increasingly bold, Soviet Union reflected an altogether praiseworthy unwillingness to risk confrontation without compelling need.

The dramatic reversal of US policy once the growing Soviet hostility seemed to indicate such a need has been criticized for the sweeping ideological emphasis of the new doctrine of containment. Yet here again, that very emphasis was dictated by the President's sensitivity to the popular mood—an attitude in striking contrast with that of his predecessor. And the result was not only, in Mr. Gaddis' words, a "surprisingly high" (p. 346) morale within the government in 1947, but also for many years thereafter a national consensus which Americans today can only contemplate with nostalgia.

WHEREAS ROOSEVELT'S wartime record is rather easy to sort out, a precise judgment on Churchill's role in these events remains elusive. For Sir John, an eloquent critic of appeasement, the Prime Minister personifies its antidote—a courageous, farsighted and pragmatic statesmanship; for Fischer, Churchill is little short of an appeaser himself. Sir John cites as a "masterpiece" (p. 33) the June 22, 1941, speech in which the Prime Minister offered unsolicited help to the Soviet Union without any strings attached; Fischer, for his part, indignantly calls attention to Churchill's cavalier treatment of the Poles.

At first glance, there seems to have been an insuperable barrier between Churchill's pugnacity and the mentality of appeasement. Still, at least two elements typical of Britain's conduct on the eve of Munich may be traced also in his treatment of the Russians in 1943: a tendency to offer them definite concessions before they even made the extent of their demands clear and a failure to insist on a *quid pro quo* other than unspecified "goodwill." Both shortcomings are exemplified by the Prime Minister's Teheran proposal to recognize as Poland's future frontiers the Curzon Line and the Oder. As evidenced by the recently opened British government files—which Sir John and his associate were unfortunately unable to use—Churchill originally wished to apply his proposal as a bargaining device,[1] but in fact never used it to extract reciprocal concessions.

Did the Prime Minister anticipate an unacceptable growth of Russian power and act to forestall it? Sir John believes that the perils of Soviet expansionism were quite clear to Churchill in 1943, if not earlier, and quotes as evidence retrospective testimonies by Harold Macmillan and Lady Violet Bonham-Carter. Yet again, the

[1] Memorandum W. P. (43) 528, Nov. 22, 1943, CAB 66/43, Public Record Office, London.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Foreign Office files show beyond any doubt that whatever Churchill's anxieties, they were not translated into actual policies at that time.

In July 1943, Foreign Secretary Eden, a faithful executor of those policies, intimated to his collaborators that "after the war is over the fear of Russian aggression may be uppermost, but we cannot plan on that assumption now." [2] And as late as September 1944, Churchill took the unusual step of suppressing from confidential circulation among the top members of his government a memorandum which argued eloquently the opposite.[3] The author of that uncomfortable document, former Moscow correspondent of the *Daily Herald* Ronald Matthews, saw the situation in a light reminiscent of George Kennan's essay "Russia—Seven Years Later," which by coincidence was written in the same month.[4] Matthews insisted that the West, in order to moderate Moscow's aggressiveness, should give the Soviet Union a sense of security but that unjustified concessions would serve such a purpose less than firmness and tough bargaining, which, he argued, the Russians respect.

Whether because of the force of this argument or, more likely, because of his own better appreciation of reality, the Prime Minister did shortly afterwards embark upon a course designed to set limits to Soviet advance. His subsequent actions—from the "percentages" agreement with Stalin about spheres of influence in the Balkans to attempts at beating the Red Army to Vienna, Berlin, and Prague—may be criticized on grounds of morality, expediency, or feasibility, but certainly not for any element of self-delusion, carelessness, or inertia. As Churchill's optimistic assessment of Yalta indicates, he did not lose his hope for accommodation with the Russians. But he had come to regard as the necessary prerequisite of stable relations the application, rather than the abdication, of power.

In this spirit, he delivered his famous Fulton speech in 1946, at a time when the United States was still hesitating to take the approach he recommended. But in 1953, in the wake of Stalin's death, he was also among the first to advocate a new flexibility in dealing with the Russians—long before Washington dared to take the risk. With both wisdom and elegance, Sir John rightly observes that "both the strength and weakness of Mr. Churchill's statesmanship lay in the pliancy of [his] mind" and that "consistency had never been among his virtues or his failings" (pp. 295-96).

Surprisingly, however, the main hero of *The Sembiance of Peace* is not the Prime Minister but his Foreign Secretary: "In modern British diplomacy, there has rarely been a more effective, indefatigably patient or brilliant negotiator than Mr. Eden" (p. 34). He rides through the book like a veritable knight in golden armor, and against his weight that of nearly everybody else is found wanting. Of Dulles' many faults, for example, none is judged more severely than his inability to get along with his illustrious British colleague. As with Mr. Maddox's revisionists, such a judgment might be quite valid but does not seem to follow from the evidence offered. Indeed, that evidence tends to support a less sanguine view.

Sir John and Mr. Nicholls, for example, rate the deletion of references to Moscow's territorial claims from the 1942 British-Soviet alliance as Eden's "major diplomatic achievement." Yet quite aside from the fact that the deletion was the result not so much of his initiative as of blunt American pressure, the authors themselves concede in the very next sentence that "unfortunately it had not achieved what was hoped of it" (p. 50). Similarly if —as seems appropriate—the degree of fulfillment of a stateman's intentions should be the measure of his effectiveness, then Eden's performance at the 1943 Moscow conference hardly warrants the high marks the authors confer on him. Theirs is perhaps the best analysis of that critical meeting available in print, and it shows quite well how the Foreign Secretary was outmaneuvered there by Molotov on almost all substantive issues. The only exception was the establishment of the European Advisory Commission—and even that accomplishment was more apparent than real, for the role of that agency soon fell far short of British expectations.

It can be safely predicted that the reputation of wartime British diplomacy will suffer rather than prosper once scholars have examined the pertinent papers in the Public Record Office as thoroughly as they have done those in the Washington National Archives. Some historians might conclude that Churchill's habit of taking "first things first" was even poorer statesmanship than Roosevelt's

[2] "Post-War Settlement," Memorandum by Eden, No. 292, CAB 66/38, Public Record Office, London.

[3] "Russia in 1944," by Ronald Matthews, Memorandum W. P. (44) 483, for circulation on Sept. 1, 1944, CAB 66/54, Public Record Office, London.

[4] George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950*, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1967, pp. 503-31.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

policy of postponement—for, although Churchill may have been more aware of the postwar dangers, he did not act until it was too late. And others might wonder whether Eden—unlike Hull or Stettinius, an experienced professional diplomat—really made the best use of his professional qualities at the right time.

STALIN, WHO MANAGED by far the best of the Big Three to keep the documentary evidence of his policies from inquisitive eyes, has also fared best in retaining his reputation as a successful statesman. Both friendly and hostile interpreters still tend to agree that he, unlike his Western peers, had a clear idea about his goals, worked toward them with craftiness and consistency, and, as a result, achieved very much what he wanted. This is also the conviction of the authors of *The Semblance of Peace,* who describe him as striving "to hold firmly to what remained of the old Russian empire, . . . to regain the territories lost" after World War I, and to restore the "political influence which Tsarist Russia had exercised in the past and, if possible, to exceed it" (p. 29). Thus Moscow's conduct appears to them as "a re-embodiment of . . . this old-fashioned imperialist policy to which was added the further threat of the proliferation of communism" (p. 556).

This is fair enough, though hardly very illuminating as far as the origins of the Cold War are concerned. As a matter of fact, such blanket statements tend to divert attention from questions about the extent to which Stalin's goals were flexible rather than preconceived and the degree to which these goals actually depended upon opportunities provided by others. In this respect, Professor Gaddis, though concerned primarily with American attitudes, offers a more discerning view—thanks partly to his heeding rather than ignoring the revisionist arguments. In particular, he agrees with the revisionists that the Soviet Union acted at the end of World War II from a position of weakness rather than of strength and that Stalin had every reason to avoid the Cold War.

Yet Mr. Gaddis does not succumb to the facile conclusion that the Soviet leader was consequently innocent of the conflict. Not only did Stalin fail "to make the limited nature of his objectives clear" (p. 355); he also, in Mr. Gaddis' view, bears the greatest blame for neglecting the opportunities for accommodation inasmuch as

the very nature of the Soviet system afforded him a larger selection of alternatives than were open to the leaders of the United States. The Russian dictator was immune from pressures of Congress, public opinion, or the press. Even ideology did not restrict him: Stalin was the master of the Communist doctrine, not a prisoner of it, and could modify or suspend Marxism-Leninism whenever it suited him to do so. (p. 360)

This conclusion seems so fair that it is almost irresistible. Yet, while Professor Gaddis may well be right in ascribing the greatest blame for the Cold War to Stalin and the Soviet Union, he may be right for the wrong reasons, for a strong case can be made—particularly on the basis of Fischer's analysis—that both domestic politics and ideology actually limited Stalin's range of alternatives. His limitations can be seen in such significant episodes as the dissolution of the Comintern or the Katyn affair, to which Fischer devotes two of his best chapters. Fischer plausibly views the former as Stalin's "masterstroke" (p. 72)—designed not so much to assuage Western capitalists as to downgrade foreign Communists, whose rising expectations complicated rather than facilitated the use of Communist ideology for Soviet purposes. Similarly, the Katyn massacre—symptomatic less of Stalin's depravity than of the excesses the Soviet system was capable of generating and tolerating—narrowed Moscow's options in the all-important Polish question.

Fischer knew the Soviet Union too well to underestimate the domestic determinants of its foreign policy, and his diverse explanations of this crucial linkage are among the most original parts of his book. He writes:

In the Soviet Union the military and the bureaucracy get political and social nourishment from empire. It guarantees their tenure by perpetuating the dictatorship.

Moreover, Stalin also

wanted empire for circuses. It was the people's reward for the blood they shed so profusely. He hoped political power outside would conceal economic failures inside. (pp. 140-41)

And, more specifically, having retrieved and even expanded the territories Russia had owned before 1917, he could "make a claim on their loyalty by pointing to what he had done for them." In any case, not Stalin's personality, but "the Soviet regime's social weakness stood at the cradle of Soviet imperialism." (p. 193)

Whether such explanations are

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

accepted unconditionally or—more appropriately—with qualifications, they dramatize the question of how much Stalin really succeeded in terms of his own expectations. Significantly, his diplomacy was conspicuously deemphasized in the eulogies he had his propagandists heap upon himself during the Cold War years.[5] Did he realize—as Fischer writes in another of his books—that "from the point of view of the welfare of the Soviet people the war with Germany was an unmitigated disaster, for apart from the death and devastation, it saddled the Soviet Union with an empire?" [6] Here is a pertinent question for Soviet revisionist historians, whose appearance is long overdue.

IN THESE DAYS of apparent détente, the lessons of the Cold War are not easy to draw, nor are they necessarily the same for the West as for the Soviet Union. In retrospect, it seems all but certain that if a chance of averting the wasteful confrontation had ever existed, it would have required from the West a harder rather than a softer line while the Russians were still weak and before their appetite grew with eating. Yet the same hard line obviously might not produce the same effects today, when the Soviet Union is comparatively so much stronger than in 1945.

The Soviet leaders, for their part, may well have concluded that Stalin's strategy of territorial expansion and ideological confrontation did not pay, and that more subtle and less alarming methods, capitalizing on the confusion and crisis of self-confidence in the West, may therefore be in order to enhance their power. Such efforts, analysis of the Cold War's origins suggests, call for a flexibility of response based on a dispassionate consideration of alternative courses—not excluding *a priori* either acquiescence or defiance, but never leaving any ambiguity about the limits of Western tolerance.

[5] Robert H. McNeal, "Roosevelt Through Stalin's Spectacles," *International Journal* (Toronto, Canada), Vol. 18, 1962-63, pp. 205-06.

[6] Louis Fischer, *Russia's Road from Peace to War, 1917-1941*, New York, Harper and Row, 1969, p. 463.

The "Socialist Commonwealth"

By J. F. Brown

ADAM BROMKE and TERESA RAKOWSKA-HARMSTONE, Eds.: *The Communist States in Disarray—1965-1971.* Minneapolis, Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1972.
JAN TRISKA, Ed: *Communist Party States: Comparative and International Studies.* Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1969.
SYLVA SINANIAN, ISTVAN DEAK, and PETER C. LUDZ, Eds.: *Eastern Europe in the 1970's.* New York, Praeger, 1972.

SINCE WORLD WAR II, Western academic interest in the Communist states has generally reflected the prevailing attitudes of Western governments toward those countries. This has been especially evident in the United States, where the bulk of scholarly work on the Communist areas has been done and where both research and study programs in this field have benefited or suffered depending on the level of governmental interest in the subject at any given time. In the last few years, for reasons hardly relevant here, this interest—particularly interest in Eastern Europe—has definitely declined, and the decline has been reflected in a dwindling number of works produced and a contraction of the study programs available.

At the same time, the thrust and scope of Communist studies have been changing. Partly as a reaction against what are now considered the value-laden works of the Cold-War period and against the explicit or implicit notion that the Communist states were something of an aberration and hence could not be studied in the same way as other, more normal political and social processes, a new school of analysts has developed. Chiefly manned by younger scholars with no personal or familial

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ties with the Communist countries, this school gladly eschews value judgments and maturely regards political and social developments in Communist societies as a subject to be studied, not separately from, but as an integral part of such developments in the world at large, including the United States itself.

In view of the declining American interest in Communist affairs, it is refreshing to read three books of genuine quality falling under this rubric. All are collections of either essays or conference papers; hence, they bring together the contributions of many experts and provide a veritable potpourri of styles, approaches, and emphases. Happily, even the most "conservative" of the articles are by and large free from the prejudices and "demonizing" which marred many older works in the field; and while all the papers focus on the Communist world or parts of it, it is obvious that very few of the authors consider their subject beyond the realm of "normal" social-scientific inquiry.

THE VOLUME edited by Professors Bromke and Rakowska-Harmstone is the latest in a series sponsored by the Soviet and East European Studies Program at Carleton University in Ottawa. More specifically, it is intended as a sequel to Professor Bromke's *The Communist States at the Crossroads*, published in 1965. Like its predecessor, it is mainly a country-by-country survey of recent developments, with some of the essayists hazarding considerably more analysis and projection than others. The approach, therefore, is a conventional or "conservative" one using an old format; the editors seek merely to provide interested and intelligent readers with the views of a number of specialists on recent developments and future trends.

The volume edited by Professor Triska is more "modern" and more ambitious. A compilation of papers emanating from the "Studies of the Communist System" program sponsored by Stanford University's Institute of Political Studies, it emphasizes—as Professor Triska explains in his preface—"comparative and interactional models applicable to two or more parts of the system," but it also complements this emphasis "by systematic inquiries into those properties of single units of the system that display propensities toward system conflict." The essays in the book were written by present or erstwhile members of the Stanford program.

The third book under review, *Eastern Europe in the 1970's*, is a rather hastily prepared compilation of materials from a conference on "New Perspectives in Understanding East Central Europe," held at Columbia University in December 1971. Most of those who participated in the conference would agree that it was a productive one, and the book generally reflects the high caliber of the papers and discussions, although no compilation of this sort can ever convey the full range of debate and interaction that distinguish a good conference from the vast majority of those constantly being held.

In discussing the studies edited, respectively, by Professors Bromke and Rakowska-Harmstone and by Professor Triska, one is tempted to indulge in an assessment of the relative merits of the differing methods used. But this would be covering ground that is already too well trodden. The real question is which of the two works contributes more to our knowledge and understanding of Communist systems, their development and how they function. In a sense, Triska's does, since it is literally crammed with facts and statistics covering 20 years of Communist experience in most parts of the globe. Yet, in spite of some stimulating insights offered in the essays by Triska himself and Professor Robert C. North, the book is essentially a work of reference —a compendium almost—and this was hardly the editor's intention.

By comparison, the picture one gets from *The Communist States in Disarray* is more coherent. The volume is also more even in quality and has more intrinsic unity than Bromke's earlier work. The papers, particularly those by Melvin Croan (East Germany), Michael Costello (Bulgaria), Gabriel Fischer (Romania), and Paul Langer (Outer Mongolia, North Korea, and North Vietnam) are excellent, and there is scarcely a weak link. The work succeeds because it combines expertise with modesty. Whereas Triska's book may prove disappointing to many readers whose expectations are heightened by its broad range and scope, the same is not true in the case of the Bromke/Rakowska-Harmstone volume.

Like most such compilations, both studies present papers that were written long in advance of the books' actual publication. Attempts were made to update them prior to going to press, resulting in some rather awkward transitions in both. This, of course, is an occupational hazard of writing on Communist affairs, whatever the tools, methods, or approaches used. It affects the work of Professors Bromke and Rakowska-Harmstone more than it does Pro-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fessor Triska's because the former deals mainly with contemporary political and economic history, whereas the latter attempts something more basic. The Bromke/Rakowska-Harmstone study is, nevertheless, well worth reading, for many of its perceptions, seen from today's perspective, display a good deal of prescience and are still relevant.

Eastern Europe in the 1970's—a title which seems to have been chosen for the sake of raciness rather than accuracy—devotes considerable attention to fundamental aspects of the historical background, such as the impact of fascism, the national question, and the basic elements that shaped the character of East Central Europe. These are, in fact, among the most stimulating parts of the book and a healthy reminder of the often direct relationship of past developments to present conditions.

WHAT ARE THE present conditions? Has the situation in and among the Communist states changed appreciably from that presented or projected in these three volumes? Are they still in such disarray? Firm statements on this score are always hazardous, since what appears to be substantive change often turns out to be nothing more than ephemeral variation, and the seeds of real change are sometimes planted so deep as to defy detection.

Certainly Sino-Soviet relations have degenerated to the point where the current Chinese leaders have chosen to become a partner in perhaps the greatest diplomatic revolution of the post-World War II era in order to discomfit their principal enemy. Many factors must have prompted their audacity. One of the most important may have been their realization that they could not seriously damage the Soviet Union further by machinations inside the Communist world.

For a time in the early 1960's, developments within the socialist sphere must have looked highly promising to the Chinese. North Korea and North Vietnam were regarded—understandably, if not quite correctly even then—as Chinese satellites. In Europe, Albania broke with Moscow and became an ally of Peking; Romania, and to a lesser degree other East European states, appeared to be slipping out of the Soviet grip, creating new opportunities for the spread of Peking's influence. Cuba and even the entire revolutionary movement in Latin America appeared to be leaning toward Maoist doctrines of armed struggle. And, for at least three years after Khrushchev's fall in 1964, the new Soviet leadership seemed incapable of acting decisively or wielding cohesive influence within the socialist camp.

By the early 1970's, however, the situation had changed radically, and Chinese prospects within the Communist world appeared greatly diminished. Both North Korea and North Vietnam had demonstrated their independence, often abrasively. China's Albanian bridgehead in Europe remained solitary and alone despite Chinese efforts in 1971 to enlarge it, and Albania today is probably more of a liability than an asset to the Chinese. Likewise, Cuba remains a full, if individualistic, member of a Comecon dominated more than ever by Moscow.

Most important, the Brezhnev leadership has shown itself capable of decisive action, as well as of adaptability and subtlety. On the one hand, the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 served as a grim deterrent not only to restive East Europeans but also to any Western governments that might see "bridge-building" or "peaceful engagement" as a means of weakening the USSR's hold on its allies. Yet, on the other hand, Soviet policy in Eastern Europe since 1968 has been characterized by quite surprising flexibility. Moscow's response to the December 1970 upheaval in Poland was to take a calculated, imaginative risk that appears to have paid off. Similarly, Moscow's attitude toward the comprehensive economic and social reforms in Hungary, which actually gathered momentum after August 1968, has been one of surprising forbearance. Relations with Romania, after a very strained period in the summer of 1971, seem to have stabilized at a workable level, while Brezhnev's skillfully-conducted visit to Yugoslavia in September 1971 relieved the tensions that had once again developed between the two countries.

To many, this has not been the behavior they expected of the regime that forcibly crushed the Czechoslovak reform movement in 1968. However, it underscores the fact that the Brezhnev leadership's capacity for adaptability in this as well as other areas has been crudely underestimated. The Russians, to be sure, are no less determined than ever to bind the East European states to the USSR as tightly as possible, but the last four years have shown that this does not necessarily mean adherence to rigid Stalinist policies of *Gleichschaltung*. Recent Soviet policies, in fact, suggest a willingness to tolerate a considerable degree of diversity, at least until—and perhaps even after—the infrastructure of a solid and lasting unity has been completed. The

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet Union is now patiently striving to build this infrastructure under the banner of "socialist integration," a concept that now appears to be much broader and more comprehensive than it was under Khrushchev, embracing all aspects of public activity—military, political, economic, ideological, and cultural. This effort can be likened to the assembly of a mosaic to which pieces are added in what often seems to be a haphazard manner. Probably not even the Soviet leaders have a precise idea of what the final design will be or when it will be finished, but they know what they hope it to be: an interacting, interdependent, unbreakable relationship in which the parts, though distinguishable, will see their basic interests as indivisible from those of the whole.

DIPLOMATIC developments over the last three or four years, both globally and in Europe, have had a double-edged effect on Soviet policy toward the USSR's Communist allies, especially its East European allies. The apparent advent of détente has hastened Soviet efforts to build the integrational infrastructure just mentioned, and at the same time it has strengthened the hand of those Soviet leaders urging restraint rather than constraint in dealing with troublesome East European neighbors. To date, restraint appears to have been the wiser choice: the two allies that have caused Moscow the most concern—Romania and Hungary—are now encountering problems which, Moscow hopes, will bring them back to a more amenable course without direct or perceptible Soviet intervention. The Hungarians have had to steer their New Economic Mechanism back toward more centralization and orthodoxy, while Romania, though still determined on an independent course, is finding that course increasingly more difficult to sustain. As for Yugoslavia in the twilight of the Tito era, the abrasive efforts of the regime to ensure cohesion through party centralism could paradoxically lead to what Yugoslavs most fear in the post-Tito era—a violent centrifugal reaction that might conceivably result in an enhancement of Soviet influence on Yugoslav domestic as well as foreign policy.

What Moscow probably would like to see in Eastern Europe is a coterie of Communist regimes efficient enough not to be a liability to the Soviet Union but not so successful or popular as to be too assertive. This goal is still a long way off; indeed, it may be unattainable. But, as viewed from the Kremlin, it must seem a little closer now than it did in the middle or late 1960's.

This situation could, of course, change rapidly, rendering Soviet hopes illusory. Despite all precautions, far-reaching détente could again set in motion those centrifugal forces that are now fairly quiescent in Eastern Europe, and serious difficulties with individual East European countries could reemerge. Poland, for example, with its Western borders now secure and recognized, could seek to play a role commensurate with its size and strength. In Romania's case, it is possible that a new period of strain in her relations with the USSR is already emerging. By the end of 1973, it was evident that Moscow was anxious to convoke a new world conference of Communist parties—and just as evident that Romania opposed it. Moreover, in May 1974, the Warsaw Pact charter comes up for renewal. Will Ceausescu be tempted to demand changes in the nature or structure of this Soviet-led military alliance?

Even more unpredictable than any of the East European leaders, however, are the peoples of the region. In some countries, such as Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, the political leaders are now seeking to satisfy the material needs of their peoples by pursuing a long overdue policy of "consumerism." Whether they will thereby succeed in consolidating their power or instead will only be endangered by a tide of rising expectations remains to be seen. Even more important is the question of whether the ability to buy a locally-made Fiat or Renault will blunt the edge of other deep-seated popular aspirations of a less material nature.

These, then, are just some of the more profound problems the Soviet leaders still face in their relationships with Eastern Europe, in spite of the substantial measure of "normalization" they have undoubtedly achieved in recent years. Cohesion and viability are never easy to achieve in tandem and in proper balance. When the stress was on cohesion, as under Stalin, there was little viability. When Khrushchev sought to pump more viability into the system, cohesion was threatened. Brezhnev has done much to restore an outward cohesion, but genuine viability still eludes him. The three books under review in this article give real information and insights about why this is so.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

East European Economics

By Z. M. Fallenbuchl

J. WILCZYNSKI: *Socialist Economic Development and Reforms*. New York, Praeger, 1972.
OTA SIK: *The Bureaucratic Economy*. White Plains, N.Y., International Arts and Sciences Press, 1972.
FERENC JANOSSY: *The End of the Economic Miracle*. White Plains, N.Y., International Arts and Sciences Press, 1971.
GEORGE FEIWEL: *Industrialization and Planning under Polish Socialism*. Volume I: *Poland's Industrialization Policy: A Current Analysis*. Volume II: *Problems in Polish Economic Planning*. New York, Praeger, 1971.

THE PATTERN OF economic development which originated in the Soviet Union during the 1930's and has been followed by all the East European Communist regimes since their inception in the wake of World War II has been studied by Western scholars for many decades, and more recently their ranks have been joined by a growing number of Soviet and East European economists. At the same time, considerable improvements in statistical materials and methodology, interesting intrabloc debates on economic topics, and the increased sophistication of economic thought within the Communist countries have made it possible to discuss this particular developmental model in a much more precise manner.

Although at first glance the books under review appear to have little in common, a single theme —the process of economic growth in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe—runs through all. Each of them contributes to our knowledge of the various aspects of this process and of the reasons for the many attempted modifications of the original Soviet model. Taken together, they provide a wealth of factual material as well as some provocative interpretations that tend to be more complementary than conflicting.

Wilczynski's volume serves as a very well-written introduction to the topic. Using a comparative approach and taking the entire Soviet/East European region as the object of his study, the author examines the Soviet pattern of development as it has been applied in various European socialist countries, stressing the problems encountered and the reforms introduced in an attempt to remedy them. The book, written for nonspecialists, devotes separate chapters to the diverse aspects of Soviet-type economies, such as planning and management, prices, banking and finance, etc. Within each specific area, Wilczynski briefly outlines the traditional command-system mechanism, describes its favorable and unfavorable results in practice, and notes what reforms have been either effected or proposed. The first three chapters and the final one deal with overall performance, the so-called "extensive" and "intensive" sources of growth, general economic reforms, and probable future trends as well as their significance for the capitalist world.

Even though the writer takes note of variations between countries with respect to their actual experiences, he is inclined toward overgeneralization. After all, a detailed examination of national differences is clearly quite essential to an understanding of the basic pattern, even if the similarities are much more visible. Moreover, because of his preoccupation with the region as a whole, Wilczynski fails to advance any hypotheses to explain the unevenness of the reform movements or their particular features in the individual states. The potential value of research in this particular field has clearly been demonstrated by the studies of such specialists as Radoslav Selucky, who concentrates on the influence of politics and personalities on economic reform programs in Eastern Europe, and Jerzy Kleer, who stresses the differing structural difficulties encountered by

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

individual East European countries when they have attempted to change the strategy of development.[1]

For the Soviet/East European bloc as a whole, Wilczynski examines the limitations of a pattern of growth heavily dependent upon extensive sources (*i.e.*, quantitative increases in inputs) and demonstrates how "the waste and stagnation that prevailed in the early 1960's convinced socialist economists and political leaders of the need for activating intensive sources of growth" (p. 39). It is a pity, however, that the author does not distinguish more rigorously between extensive and intensive growth patterns; indeed, he sometimes seems confused as to the meaning of the latter (pp. 137-38). One cannot argue for instance that a rise in labor productivity necessarily reflects intensive development, since it may result entirely from an increase in the quantity of capital, as has been the case recently in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Although Wilczynski introduces incremental capital-employment ratios (p. 132)—which are necessary for a determination of whether increases in labor productivity are extensive or intensive—he does not utilize them in his analysis. This is unfortunate since it is only through comprehensive calculation of the productivity of all factors of production—labor, raw materials, and capital—that one can determine whether growth has been achieved by quantitative increases in these factors or by "technological and organizational progress."

AN INSTRUCTIVE illustration of the fact that increases in labor productivity are not always indicative of intensive growth is provided in a recent article by the Polish economist, M. Nasilowski,[2] which examines Poland's growth for the years 1950-70 from two analytical approaches. By the first method he calculates the extent to which the rates of growth of labor productivity can be explained by increases in the capital-labor ratio; in the second instance he applies the Cobb-Douglas function utilized in Western economic analysis to determine that share of overall productivity increases that can be attributed to "technological and organizational progress."

According to Nasilowski's calculations, the average rate of growth of labor productivity declined from one five-year period to the next during these years, although it remained positive and continued to outstrip the rate of increase of employment. The part of the rate of growth of national income accounted for by labor productivity increases rose in 1956-60 as compared with 1951-55, but subsequently dropped with each five-year period. Nonetheless, it was still quite large (67.9 percent) in 1966-70. However, the gap between growth rates for labor productivity and for capital per employee declined rapidly; indeed, in 1966-70 labor productivity failed to increase as fast as the capital-labor ratio. Looked at another way, the portion of increases in labor productivity attributable to factors other than increased capital per employee dropped rapidly from 1951 to 1965, and in 1966-70 actually became negative. The same downward trend appears in the share of "technological and organizational progress," as determined by Nasilowski on the basis of the Cobb-Douglas function. By 1966-70, this factor accounted for less than half the rate of growth of national income.

It is thus evident that economic growth in Poland became increasingly dependent on extensive factors, *i.e.*, on ever-increasing inputs, a situation which became very grave in the second half of the 1960's. This trend cannot be explained away by any backwardness of Polish agriculture, for the situation in industry was less satisfactory than for material production overall. Although the rate of growth of industrial production was higher than that of national income throughout the whole period and the rate of growth of labor productivity was greater in industry than in the economy as a whole during the 1960's, the rates of growth of employment and of capital per employee were also higher in this sector than elsewhere. As a result, the contribution of increases in labor productivity to the growth of industrial production was less than it was to the economy generally; moreover, the relative importance of "technological and organizational progress" to growth was consistently lower in industry than in other production sectors.

According to an earlier Hungarian study, which applied the first method of analysis used by Nasilowski, a similar tendency ex-

[1] See Radoslav Selucky, *Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe*, New York, Praeger, 1972; and Jerzy Kleer, *Przez szesc krajow* (Across Six Countries), Warsaw, Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Ekomoniczne, 1967, *Reformy gospodarcze w krajach socjalistycznych* (Economic Reforms in Socialist Countries), Warsaw, CRZZ, 1969, and *Wzrost intensywny w krajach socjalistycznych* (Intensive Growth in Socialist Countries), Warsaw, CRZZ, 1972.

[2] See "Effects of Extensive and Intensive Factors of Growth in the National Income of Poland during the Period 1950-1970," *Gospodarka planowa* (Warsaw), No. 1, 1972, pp. 402-07.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

isted in Hungary.[3] By the first half of the 1960's, capital productivity in Hungarian industry had already become negative. This is perhaps the reason why economic reforms were regarded as more urgent in Hungary than in Poland, at least until 1970.

These studies attest to the persistence of the extensive pattern of economic growth in Eastern Europe, with serious implications for continued development. Inasmuch as the potential for expansion of the work force was approaching objective limits throughout the region (particularly in the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Hungary) and the shares of capital accumulation (saving)—upon which further advances in labor productivity had come to depend—were reaching an absolute maximum in the respective national incomes, these economies seemed doomed to stagnation. Hence, the recent preoccupation in Eastern Europe with economic reforms, modifications in development strategy, restructuring of the economy, modernization of capital equipment, as well as increased interest in trade with the West.

THE DELETERIOUS impact of the extensive pattern of growth on the Czechoslovak economy and the nature of the reforms being initiated there in the mid-1960's are discussed in Ota Sik's book—a volume based on a series of television talks which the then Deputy Premier of Czechoslovakia delivered in 1968, shortly before the Soviet invasion of his country. There is a certain similarity between *The Bureaucratic Economy* and Imre Nagy's *On Communism*:[4] both include some rather optimistic and enthusiastic, though thoroughly Marxist papers, written during the attempted "new course"—Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Hungary in 1953—as well as several "post-mortem" reflections full of bitterness and disillusionment.

Sik's talks fully support the generally accepted views of Western scholars on the functioning of the Soviet-type economy and strategy of development. In this respect, the volume presents very little new material; it is important, however, because it is written from the vantage of an economist who, as a government leader, had an unusually good opportunity to observe an East European economy from inside. The essence of his assessment of the "extensive economic model" is as follows:

. . . development based on industrial expansion and mobilizing fresh manpower carries with it the built-in risk of stagnation. True, at first glance it appears to be an easy way; all that is needed is to syphon off from existing concerns all profits, all funds for accumulation . . . and even a substantial part of amortization funds, and to throw the resources so obtained into building new industrial capacities. But there is a snag: to build new factories from resources gained in this way we have to deprive ourselves of the means for modernizing existing plant. That is why a large part of our working class finds itself operating in an increasingly bad environment, using obsolete techniques. Moreover, the Czechoslovak experience has shown that even the newly constructed plants fall short of the highest technological standards. The fact is that our new machines have been built to the same, or slightly improved, specifications as the old. To make matters worse, the new machinery has had to be manned by untrained labor, drawn primarily from agriculture, or from among housewives. Consequently there has not been any marked advance in actual labor productivity. Indeed, in some cases the performance of the new establishments has been poorer than those of the old factories with outdated equipment because, with their skill and good organization, the workers in the latter have been able to hold their own against the modest technological advantage of the newcomers. (pp. 46-47)

The result was an increasing dependence on capital inputs and neglect of "technological and organizational progress" as a growth factor. The predictable and painful denouement is described by Sik:

In the case of Czechoslovakia, the main trouble has been that it has pursued a predominantly extensive course, the prototype for which was the industrialization model sanctified in the Soviet Union by the personality of Stalin. And here we should add that when the extensive road is followed to an extreme it harbors its seeds of economic decline, and when the tolerable limit is passed this potential risk emerges as a reality, taking its inevitable toll in the shape of a decline in economic effectiveness, or even complete stagnation. . . . This was what happened to the Czechoslovak economy in the early sixties. (pp. 41-42)

Yet, as Sik indicates, the extensive

[3] Kozponti Statisztikai Hivatal, *Az ipar alloeszkozei es kapcsolatuk a termelessel, 1955-1965* (Industrial Fixed Assets and their Relation to Production, 1955-1965), Budapest, 1966, pp. 19-20.

[4] New York, Praeger, 1957.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pattern of growth (with all of its negative effects) could not be eliminated so long as the over-centralized system of economic management remained (pp. 100-01). Moreover, viewing the economic and political spheres as closely linked under socialism, Sik recognizes that no economic reforms are possible without political reforms; hence, the Prague Spring.

FERENC JANOSSY'S book on "economic miracles"—while presenting a theory of economic progress which is not limited to the socialist system—provides an interesting hypothesis concerning the pattern of growth in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, a theory which helps not only to explain the apparent success of the command model but also to define its growing obsolescence. From an empirical study of economic trends in postwar Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Soviet Union and, in a somewhat more sketchy manner, Hungary and Italy, the author argues that periods of postwar economic reconstruction do not end when the prewar production level is reached but instead continue until that point in time when the actual level of production equals that which would have been attained at the given time had prewar development continued without the interruption of the war. By his definition, "economic miracles" are simply periods of extended reconstruction.

In the case of the USSR, Jánossy suggests that the reconstruction period after World War I ended in 1936 and that post-World War II reconstruction lasted until 1956. In the ensuing periods (1936 to 1941 and 1956 to 1968, when the study ends), industrial production grew at more moderate rates (10 and 9 percent, respectively), at a pace that he calls the "trend-line" for that country. Problems arose during post-reconstruction years because no one recognized the turning points in 1936 and 1956. Thus, the annual plan for 1937 still envisaged a 20-percent jump in industrial production (which would have been approximately equal to the average rate for the three preceding years). Instead, the actual increase in 1937 was only 11 percent. According to Jánossy, it was because the Soviet leaders failed to perceive what was happening that they published no 1938 annual plan and delayed approval of the Third Five-Year Plan (for 1938-42) more than a year. Nor was the 1956 turning point anticipated; the targets of the Seven-Year Plan (for 1959-65) were simply based on "the upswing of the fifties . . . unreservedly extrapolated into the future" (p. 63). Using Jánossy's definition, one can see that before World War II there were only a few years which did not belong to the period of recovery, and even in those, the exaggerated targets had disorganizing consequences. On this basis, the author contends that the Soviet Union has only experienced "normal, undisturbed development" since 1956, and he concludes that:

a superficial view gives recovery, with its naturally more rapid advance, the appearance of health itself, while making health appear as a slowdown by comparison. (p. 66)

Now that the period of extended reconstruction has been completed, the Soviet economy faces an entirely different set of problems. As Jánossy states,

an economic apparatus that fulfilled its tasks—even with some difficulties—for decades should be, and must be, reorganized today. (p. 66)

This would involve more than cosmetic changes, for the Soviet Union was faced with the need to switch from an extensive to an intensive mode of growth. As Jánossy states,

The methods born of War Communism maintained during one reconstruction period and consolidated during the Second World War were still applicable to the second reconstruction period, but already proved out of date during the period of transition into the undisturbed extensive phase of development that followed, and would act as an impediment to progress if applied to the intensive phase. (pp. 66-67)

In the case of socialist Hungary, Jánossy finds two reconstruction periods—the one following World War II and lasting from 1946 to 1952 and the other following the Hungarian Revolution and lasting from 1956 to 1960—both followed by deceleration of growth to a trend-line. Again, this had not been foreseen and, therefore, created some serious problems. Reorganization of the economic system became even more urgent in this case inasmuch as Hungary is a small country, poor in natural resources, and is therefore unable to keep up with the development tempo of larger states, "at least not as long as closer economic cooperation is hampered by the present economic mechanism—not only in Hungary but in all socialist countries" (p. 74).

In the theoretical section of his book, Jánossy attempts to provide

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a basis for a new development model. He argues that high rates of accumulation and allotment of a large proportion of funds for directly productive investment will not suffice to accelerate growth rates in the long run. Thus, while productivity cannot be increased without investment, neither can the pace of economic development be speeded up simply by expanding the rate of investment. Expenditures for modernization of equipment, development of new "progressive" sectors, education and social infrastructure (including housing and proper incentives)—all accenting innovations and other qualitative factors—are very important, but, says the author, "the essential, primary element of progress is the continued development of man himself" (p. 100).

Regardless of whether or not one is prepared to accept Jánossy's statistical observations, his hypothesis on the extended periods of reconstruction, or his theoretical exploration of means to boost the trend-line in the long run, this work is a significant and stimulating contribution not only to a better understanding of the Soviet-type pattern of growth but also to economic development theory in general.

FOR A COMPREHENSIVE study of the operation of the Soviet model in the postwar development of the Polish economy, one could find no better source than George Feiwel's massive, incredibly detailed two-volume work on *Industrialization and Planning under Polish Socialism*. Although the book ends before the riots of December 1970, it amply documents the disastrous situation which existed in the Polish economy at that critical juncture.

Unfortunately, it is difficult to appreciate fully the author's own analytical insights—scattered as they are throughout the maze of quotations, summaries of statements by Polish leaders and economists, descriptions and statistical materials, which fill the 1200 pages of the two volumes. This is a shame, for Feiwel knows his subject well and has interesting things to say. Of particular merit are his lucid remarks on the adverse consequences of the attempt to achieve excessively high rates of growth, particularly in heavy industry. He demonstrates how overoptimism, a lack of realism, and the "investment psychosis" (as he terms the belief that growth could be speeded merely by increasing capital investment) resulted in overemployment, inflationary pressures, bottlenecks, and structural disproportions in the Polish economy.

Feiwel is, of course, not alone in calling attention to the harmful effects of overambitious planning and overinvestment in the Soviet-type economies. Analysis of the "barriers to growth" which appear when the planned rate of growth exceeds the optimum level forms an essential part of the theory of growth under socialism of the late Polish economist, Michal Kalecki; and Joseph Goldmann has built on the same phenomena in his theory of fluctuations, or "quasi-cycles," in Soviet-type economies.[5]

THE FOUR BOOKS reviewed here are unanimous in their criticism of the Soviet-type growth strategy and in their insistence that it must be changed. At the same time, they show how difficult it will be to introduce the needed reforms. The extensive pattern was created by the interaction of a particular developmental approach with the workings of the system itself. It is therefore highly unlikely that a satisfactory revision of the strategy could be achieved without considerable modifications of the system. Wilczynski and Feiwel concentrate on the more narrowly-defined economic alterations required. The latter recommends a deceleration in the rates of growth and a more balanced development, and the former discusses in detail many specific improvements. On the other hand, Jánossy and Sik stress the social aspects of change, Jánossy emphasizing long-run improvements in the quality of human resources, in his view the key to advancement, and Sik declaring that economic and political reforms are inseparable.

[5] M. Kalecki, *Zarys teorii wzrostu gospodarki socjalistycznej* (An Outline of the Theory of Growth of a Socialist Economy), Warsaw, PWN, 1963; J. Goldmann, "Fluctuations and Trend in the Rate of Economic Growth in Some Socialist Countries," *Economics of Planning* (Oslo), No. 2, 1964, and "Short- and Long-term Variations in the Growth Rate and the Model of Functioning of a Socialist Economy," *Czechoslovak Economic Papers* (Prague), No. 5, 1965; and J. Goldmann and K. Kouba, *Economic Growth in Czechoslovakia*, Prague, Academia, 1969.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Jewish Nationalism and the Soviet System

By Ted Friedgut

ZVI Y. GITELMAN: *Jewish Nationality and Soviet Politics: The Jewish Sections of the CPSU, 1917-1930.* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1972.
WILLIAM KOREY: *The Soviet Cage: Anti-Semitism in Russia.* New York, Viking Press, 1973.

DESPITE THEIR seemingly narrow focus, the two volumes reviewed here—especially when read sequentially—give the reader much more than a mere chronological history of the development and persistence through 56 years of Communist rule of what the prerevolutionary *Iskra* in weary exasperation had called the *"prokliatyi yevreiskii vopros* "(the accursed Jewish question)—or *"die verfluchte Judenfrage,"* as it was dubbed in the councils of the Second International. By enabling the reader to juxtapose the Soviet Union's early and recent policies toward its Jewish minority, the two studies provide a wealth of insights into the broader evolution of Soviet politics and society—and, more particularly, into the growth and persistence of a totalitarian ethos inimical to all pluralistic, extra-party values or institutions. These accounts, while primarily demonstrative of the growing cynicism and repressiveness of official Soviet policy toward the Jewish minority, also afford a basis—in conjunction with the abundant evidence of a resurgence of Jewish national self-assertiveness in the USSR—for a broader assessment of patterns of political decay and instability in the Soviet system.

Zvi Gitelman recounts in detail the 13-year activity of the Jewish sections of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)—the so-called *"Evsektsiia"*—which represented an attempt by the newborn Bolshevik regime to modernize and secularize Russia's Jewish minority. In so doing, he provides not only an illuminating account of a neglected period in the history of Soviet Jewry but also a case study of the Soviet regime's early efforts to achieve political and national integration within the framework of a modernizing state. The book is all the more impressive because the author's knowledge of the tragedies that later befell the Jews of the USSR does not divert him from a dispassionate examination of the means, motives, and conflicts that surrounded this experiment. Happily, Gitelman combines balanced judgment and meticulous scholarship with a vigorous style that brings to life the varied personalities as well as the irony-laden polemics of the *Evsektsiia,* so different from the dull and stereotyped party debates of today.

In the period with which Gitelman deals, the institutional forms and societal values of the Soviet regime were still fluid. His analysis of the social and political pressures that shaped Soviet nationality policy during this interval—particularly, his analysis of the impact of economic development—is of special interest to scholars concerned with the working of a Communist regime displaying at least a degree of institutional pluralism.

Professor Gitelman notes that while many Jews, in the climate of secular modernization and economic development prevailing in the Soviet Union in the 1920's, were perfectly willing to assimilate, there nevertheless remained a substantial Jewish community interested in maintaining an ethnic identity. Moreover, although the *Evsektsiia* was established as a transient instrument for the social assimilation of the Jews, it became increasingly committed, as a result of its composition and its preoccupation with distinctively Jewish aspects of political problems, to the preservation and bolstering of a sense of Jewish nationality. Thus, one can say that a "Jewish Lobby," entirely legitimate even though unintended, existed in the USSR throughout the 1920's. With the onset of large-scale industrialization and the concomitant program of comprehensive social mobilization, however, this and other simi-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lar minority organizations were first stripped of their legitimacy and then torn by internal factional disputes, to be finally destroyed in the purges of the 1930's.

The important change of climate that accompanied Stalin's campaign for the creation of "socialism in one country" also figures strongly in William Korey's study of Soviet anti-Semitism, although his analysis focuses primarily on the post-Stalin era. Korey points out that the Stalinist effort to mobilize Russian national pride sparked the first, sporadic official attempts to limit the number of Jews holding high-level positions. In 1939, the year of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, these incipient tendencies blossomed into a full-blown, systematic policy, first taking hold in the party and then spreading gradually throughout the gamut of governmental, educational and cultural institutions.

Korey marshals elaborate evidence to show the gradual erosion of the Jewish presence in Soviet politics and society under the impact of growing popular and official anti-Semitism. Although this material is largely familiar to readers of the author's previous writings,[1] it does provide the background necessary for an understanding of the recent eruption of Jewish national self-consciousness and the expression of that self-consciousness in the exodus movement.

Today it is clear that the simultaneous denial of both the opportunity for equality through assimilation and the right to a legitimate Jewish identity has resulted in the alienation of thousands of young Jews, setting them on the path to emigration. Ironically, many of these are precisely the Soviet-Jewish intellectuals who had largely assimilated, ridding themselves of the fear, self-contempt and self-hatred that Gitelman ascribes to the "marginal men" in the prerevolutionary Pale of Settlement.[2] This youthful generation, which grew up after Stalin, rejects the grotesque caricatures of Jewishness presented in the Soviet press. Increasingly spurned by their Russian colleagues, they seek a positive self-identification; just as earlier Russian Jews endeavored to associate themselves with the militant Bolsheviks building a new world against overwhelming odds, so this generation identifies with the Israeli pioneers and combat pilots. At the end of 1971, when the emigration of Jews from the USSR began to increase, an "exodus obsession" swept this stratum, and literally thousands who had previously displayed no inclination to leave were caught up by the appealing and credible prospect of ridding their lives of a destructive dual existence.

This pattern of dis-assimilation on the part of a minority which, by such criteria as the frequency of exogamous marriage or the non-use of the native tongue, must be counted among the most assimilated in the Soviet Union evoked from the authorities a response of repression rather than a reappraisal of policy. Korey describes the crude anti-Semitic harassments, such as the abortive diploma tax (which required repayment to the state of the costs of specialized training before permission to emigrate was granted) and a series of diversionary trials, which were used as a means of attempting to dissuade Jews from requesting visas. The fact that charges of possession, reproduction and distribution of unauthorized (and therefore uncensored) material on the Hebrew language and Jewish history figured prominently in the trials in Leningrad, Riga, Odessa, Kishinev, and Sverdlovsk provides the ultimate testimony to the failure of the *Evsektsiia* and of the Soviet social structure. In attempting to uproot the historically-formed traditions of the Jewish population, the *Evsektsiia* could only offer artificial and Procrustean substitutes which, not being anchored in solid social and economic reality, could ultimately only be sustained by coercion.

AT FIRST GLANCE, Korey's basic thesis that official anti-Jewish policy stems from the persistence of earlier Russian popular anti-Semitism under the Soviet regime seems overly simplistic. Nevertheless, it may be more than a coincidence that a CPSU leadership of predominantly Russian peasant origins and with narrow, provincial assignments in their career backgrounds has chosen anti-Semitism as an instrument of policy. In the early Bolshevik period, as Zvi Gitelman reminds us,

> *by having Jews [organized in the* Evsektsiia*] do its destructive work, the Party "objectively proved" the existence of a pro-Bolshevik stratum in Jewish society and simultaneously avoided any suspicion of anti-Semitism.* (p. 270)

Judaism, its customs and educa-

[1] See, for example, William Korey, "The Origins and Development of Soviet Anti-Semitism," *Slavic Review* (Columbus, Ohio), March 1972, pp. 111-35, and "The Legal Position of Soviet Jewry: A Historical Enquiry," in Lionel Kochan, Ed., *The Jews in Soviet Russia Since 1917*, London, Oxford University Press, 1970.

[2] The Pale of Settlement refers to the 25-province area of the Russian Empire (designated by Catherine II in 1791) where Jews were allowed to establish *kehilloth* (communities).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tional aspects, were attacked by the *Evsektsiia,* using varied and intensive propaganda and public mock trials. But the Jewish Bolsheviks who so eagerly carried on this work were scattered or killed in the 1930's and 1940's, and only a faint echo of the old techniques remains in the recent anti-Israel press conferences of Jewish personalities and the editorials of the Yiddish-language literary monthly *Sovetish Heimland.*

Today, Israel and Zionism have succeeded Jewish religion as the Communists' *bête noire,* and the task of denunciation has fallen into other hands. Korey devotes almost an entire chapter to the recent spate of Soviet anti-Semitic writings, from Trofim Kichko's scurrilous 1963 pamphlet *Judaism Without Embellishment* (a publication of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Kiev, which even evoked protests from West European Communists), through Ivan Shevtsov's pornographic novels, to the September 1972 article "School of Obscurantism" in the official bulletin of the Soviet Information Office in Paris. He also discusses what is perhaps the most profound political critique of this literature, a *samizdat* essay written, ironically, by Michael Agursky,[3] son of Samuel Agursky, a founder of the *Evsektsiia,* whose tragic career Gitelman records in his book. Michael Agursky's piece deals only with Yurii Ivanov's *Beware Zionism!* (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1970), but as Korey points out, his characterization is valid for the genre as a whole. Agursky concludes that such material is merely "the public version of the political program of a large social trend in the USSR," which, he claims, derives its values and outlook almost directly from the chauvinism of the Union of the Russian People and its Black Hundreds, who were responsible for many pogroms in early 20th-century Russia.

Lest one consider this judgment extreme, ponder the following. The article "School of Obscurantism" evoked a suit in French courts by the International League Against Racialism and Anti-Semitism. The Soviet Embassy, publisher of the article, was found guilty of inciting racial hatred when a former Moscow novelist, Grigori Svirsky, proved to the court that whole sections of the text of the Soviet bulletin had been lifted *verbatim* from a 1906 pamphlet published by the Union of the Russian People! [4]

The obscurantism demonstrated in such actions of Soviet officialdom must eventually find its echo in a Russian populace which is less educated and less privileged, and therefore receptive to suggestions that it seek minority scapegoats for its own problems. Anti-Semitism feeds the corruption of Soviet society, and this corruption creates fertile ground for further anti-Semitism. The same is true, *mutatis mutandis,* for relations with other minorities in the USSR —denial of the existence of problems breeds alienation in the denied and cynical degeneration in those who deny.

That xenophobic national feelings persist among dominant Great Russian elements of Soviet society —despite the stress which Communist ideology places on the primacy of class relations among the determinants of social relations—is perhaps not too surprising. However, the failure of that society to assimilate the Jews serves as a reminder to us of the great political importance of nationality relations in the USSR, particularly relations between Great Russians and minorities of the Baltic area, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. This is a matter too often neglected in studies of the Soviet political system.[5]

IN A SENSE, the alienation and repression of the Jews—demonstrated so forcefully in both of the volumes reviewed here—can be seen as simply one facet (perhaps more complex than some others) of an intensifying drive against every aspect of dissent and independent, critical expression. By forbidding open debates as a source of policy evaluation and innovation, the regime slips backward into an ever-greater reliance on constraint and a resistance to social, political and economic innovation. The self-perpetuating rule of the *apparatchiki,* dating back to Stalin's elimination of the sophisticated and internationally-minded Old Bolsheviks, may thus be said to have constituted a regression from modernization.

[3] Michael Agursky, "Selling Anti-Semitism in Moscow," *New York Review of Books* (New York), Nov. 16, 1972.

[4] The story behind Svirsky's revelation is worthy of a Greek drama. The novelist received the 1906 pamphlet of the Black Hundreds in Moscow from a dying friend—Soviet historical novelist Stepan Zlobin—who knew of Svirsky's interest in the history of Russian anti-Semitism. The latter kept the item as a curio and also uses it in discussing current Soviet anti-Semitic writing in his volume *The Hostages* (to appear shortly in French and Russian editions). Called as a witness in the Paris proceedings, Svirsky recognized the origins of the Soviet bulletin and was able to present the judge with the original.

[5] Zbigniew Brzezinski has called attention to this gap in scholarship in his editor's summation to the volume *Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Politics,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1969, where he predicted "a prolonged period of fairly difficult relations with the non-Russian nationalities" (p. 160).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In damming up the creative energies of its citizens, the Soviet regime not only deprives society of a vitality which might contribute to the solution of current problems but also raises the specter of an uncontrolled and destructive release of these pent-up energies in a crisis. One cannot fault Korey for viewing official attempts to intimidate the Jewish population as a reflection of the "determination of the Soviet regime to obliterate Jewish national consciousness," as he states in the context of his discussion of the trial in Riga. However, this perspective is too narrow. Korey alludes, in only the briefest terms, to the workings of a "demonstration effect," whereby Jews desiring to emigrate, members of other discontented national and religious minorities, and advocates of expanded civil rights learn from and about each others' successes in resisting suppression and thereby develop new tactics of dissent and communication. Despite the ideological and tactical differences separating the various movements, the contacts between individual members tend to multiply, creating the potential for the emergence of a united front of opposition which would break the sense of social and psychological isolation restraining the dissenters —an eventuality that must concern the authorities. To the suspicion-laden psyche of the *apparat,* a "few home-made publications" can indeed be construed to be capable of undermining the mighty Soviet state and therefore to require suppression. Seen in this perspective, the trials of Jews in Riga and elsewhere fit the general pattern of repression against Soviet dissenters.

The stubborn reassertion of an independent identity by Soviet Jews not only is a reflection of the abyss between the government and the people, but also serves as a reminder of the divisive forces which can be loosed in a system which has turned from political development to political decay. Read together, these volumes by William Korey and Zvi Gitelman afford the reader an excellent opportunity to gauge the internal evolution of the Soviet system and to judge the performance of that polity within its own original frame of reference.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED